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The potential of social protection to ensure well-being and food security in Southern 
Africa is gaining renewed interest in the presence of unprecedented shocks such as 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the incessant climate-change induced disasters. This 
study investigates the impact of social protection on welfare in Southern Africa and 
is comprised of three papers. In the first paper, I analyzed whether the Foster Care 
Grant in South Africa has an impact on child health. Based on five waves of the 
National Income Dynamics Study, the findings indicate that the grant improves 
height-for-age z-score by 0.23 standard deviations for children who received the 
grant compared to their counterpart and by 0.14 standard deviations for children who 
received the grant twice compared to those that received it only once. However, 
there is no further marginal impact for girls who receive the grant twice when 
compared to those that receive it only once. In the second paper, I assessed the 
impact of social capital on food security in Zimbabwe based on Zimbabwe 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee data, finding that households with social 
capital are more food secure and are more likely to receive agricultural extension 
services. In the third paper, I assessed the impact of social protection and the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on hunger in South Africa. Based on two 
waves of the National Income Dynamics Study - Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey, 
the findings indicate that receiving a government grant reduces the likelihood of 
going hungry and running out of money to buy food by 6 and 12 percentage points 
respectively, and receiving the special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant 
lowers chances of child hunger. Further, the findings indicate no heterogeneity on 
hunger between those that were screened or tested for COVID-19 and those who 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
The potential of social protection to provide care, fight poverty and contribute 
toward inclusive growth in Southern Africa is gaining renewed recognition, 
particularly in the presence of unprecedented shocks such as the COVID-19 
pandemic and the incessant climate change-induced disasters that leave communities 
extremely vulnerable. These shocks are associated with deterioration of welfare with 
households being thrown into sustained periods of food insecurity, children not 
receiving adequate care and the general erosion of social fabric. In desperate 
situations such as these, poor households, individuals and communities may only 
have formal or informal social protection as their last resort.  
 
Social protection comprises actions adopted as a result of vulnerability, risks, and 
deprivation (see e.g. Ni?̃?o-Zaraz?́?a et al., 2012) or a combination of formal or 
informal tools which empower households to fight and reduce vulnerability, risk and 
cope with economic shocks. Social protection in Southern Africa is diverse with 
complex and interesting dynamics. In Zimbabwe, for example, because of weak 
formal systems, vulnerable members of society draw upon informal initiatives that 
rely on traditional social networks such as family, neighbours, membership in a 
social group and community solidarity, self-organization and reciprocity. On the 
other hand, South Africa is characterized by formal social protection systems that are 
guided by statutes and laws, institutionalized in policy and legislation as well as 
funded by government with delivery centered on national priorities and eligibility 
criteria. Both formal and informal mechanisms of social protection in Southern 
Africa aim to address deep-seated vulnerabilities through either cash transfers or 
social capital (see e.g. Barrientos et al., 2013; Devereux, 2013; Hajdu et al., 2020; 
Mupedziswa and Ntseane, 2013; Mendola, 2017; Toska et al., 2016). 
 
This study empirically assesses the impact of social protection on welfare in 
Southern Africa, with emphasis on South Africa and Zimbabwe. South Africa was 
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chosen mainly because it is the only country in Southern Africa with a 
comprehensive formal social protection system reaching to millions of beneficiaries 
and cutting across almost all layers of vulnerable members of society. It is a possible 
model for other relatively wealthier Southern African countries such as Botswana 
and Namibia (see e.g. Devereux, 2013) and its influence has been fundamental in the 
diffusion of social protection systems to neighbouring countries such as Lesotho and 
Eswatini (see e.g. Ni?̃?o-Zaraz?́?a et al., 2012). On the other hand, Zimbabwe was 
chosen because of the relative uniqueness of its circumstances characterized by weak 
formal systems, a majority of people living outside the formal sector with irregular, 
unpredictable incomes and little to no chance of making any contributions towards 
social security as well as the prevalence of informal social protection organized 
according to behavioural principles of reciprocity, affective relationships, and 
community bonding.  
 
One group of vulnerable members of society in South Africa is children, 50 percent 
of whom live below the poverty line. These children normally suffer from chronic 
malnutrition (see e.g. Modjadj and Madiba, 2019; Nyati et al., 2019) which is the 
underlying cause for half of South Africa’s childhood deaths. In general, 
malnutrition is typically caused by a combination of inadequate food intake and 
associated infections that may result in low food conversion efficiency (Hough and 
Sosa, 2015; Jensen et al., 2017). This includes challenges such as stunting, wasting, 
and inadequacies of essential vitamins and minerals as well as obesity (Ayllon and 
Ferreira, 2015). For example, 1.5 million children in South Africa are stunted and 
75,000 are obese.  
 
Other relevant characteristics such as appropriate care, parental education, access to 
quality health care, as well as living environment and household food security are 
important in the health production function of a child. To that effect, however, 
height-for-age is generally used as a measure of children’s additive development and 
therefore reflects a child’s history and present inadequate nutrition. Early childhood 
development, as measured by height-for-age for example, is therefore of paramount 
importance.  Lack of cumulative development in the early years of children’s lives 
may lead in the long term to poor cognitive development, reduced adult size, and 
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undermined labour outcomes in adulthood (Deaton, 2008).  This is where cash 
transfer programs are becoming important as vehicles of human capital development. 
 
 
1.1.1 Chapter 2: The Impact of the Foster Care Grant on Child Health in South 
Africa 
 
The second Chapter of this thesis assesses the impact of the Foster Care Grant on 
child health in South Africa. Specifically, the chapter seeks to answer the following 
question: Does a Foster Care Grant have an impact on child health in South Africa? 
The grant is an unconditional cash transfer, which provides temporary, substitute, 
away-from-home care to vulnerable children whose families cannot provide it within 
a safe and nurturing environment. The grant is an interesting case study in many 
respects. Compared to almost all unconditional cash transfers in Africa, the Foster 
Care Grant is relatively more generous. This is important because this has 
implications for the range and intensity of impacts on food security and nutrition 
outcomes.  
 
The Foster Care Grant is unique in that it caters for children up to the age of 17 and 
in some cases even up to the age of 22 under special circumstances. This brings in 
another dimension of catch-up that is often ignored in the literature (see Hirvonen, 
2014; Leroy et al., 2009; Lundeen et al., 2014; Porter and Goyal, 2016; Prentice et 
al., 2013; Schott et al., 2013). Surprisingly, this grant has not been subjected to 
rigorous evaluations and has not received much attention. Although there has been 
an interest in assessing the impact of unconditional cash transfers on food security, 
nutrition and health in Africa, this study presents an interesting opportunity to better 
understand the long-term impact of unconditional cash transfers on health since the 
Foster Care Grant has been around for over 20 years compared to many 
unconditional cash transfers in Africa. For example, Miller et al. (2011) evaluation in 
Malawi was short-term, conducted over the course of one year. 
 
Based on five waves of the nationally representative National Income Dynamics 
Study (NIDS) and Correlated Random Effects, Hybrid Model and Propensity Score 
Matching estimations, the study provides the following findings. First, there is a 
positive and significant program and program intensity impact of the Foster Care 
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Grant on height-for-age for children in South Africa. The grant improves height-for-
age z-score by 0.23 standard deviations for children who received the grant 
compared to their counterparty and by 0.14 standard deviations for children who 
received the grant twice compared to those that received it only once. However, 
when disaggregated by gender, there is no further marginal impact for girls who 
receive the grant twice when compared to those that receive it only once. This is an 
important result with serious policy implications. Boys experience both significant 
program and program intensity impacts. Since there is a provision for extension of 
the Foster Care Grant benefit after the initial two years, accessing the grant more 
than once can therefore be encouraged for boys, where circumstances allow, since it 
leads to program intensity impacts. Furthermore, the findings indicate no program 
intensity and program impact of the Foster Care Grant on weight-for-age, implying 
that the program appeals to the long-term human capital development through 
height-for-age as opposed to short-term changes in nutritional status.  
 
 
1.1.2 Chapter 3: Coping Strategies, Agricultural Extension Services and the 
Impact of Social Capital on Food Security in Zimbabwe 
 
When vulnerability is mentioned in Southern Africa, food insecurity, a perennial 
challenge for many households in Zimbabwe, always comes up. This results from a 
number of factors ranging from droughts, climate change (see e.g. Govere et al., 
2020; Nyagumbo et al., 2019) to land tenure. Some parts of Zimbabwe have become 
synonymous with drought (Belle, 2017; Mavhura, 2017) and flood-related disasters 
(Gwimbi, 2007) which destroy crops, livestock and hopes, resulting in food 
insecurity. Coupled with lack of appropriate agricultural technologies and little 
research and development as well as heterogeneity in productivity created by land 
reform and its migration from large scale commercial farms to small and medium 
land holding, many households are left at the mercy of food insecurity. 
 
Unlike South Africa, with its comprehensive formal social protection systems, 
Zimbabwean households fall back on their social networks and other coping 
strategies to ensure survival. In light of this, this study empirically assesses the 
impact of social capital on food security in Zimbabwe by addressing whether 
households with members belonging to a social group are more likely to be food-
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secure and less likely to go hungry; less likely to adopt behavioral hunger-coping 
strategies; more likely to receive and seek agricultural extension services; and more 
likely to treat harvests against post-harvest losses, than those without. Although there 
is work on social capital, much of the work on social capital and coping strategies in 
Southern Africa tend to focus on climate change (see e.g. Mbiba et al., 2019; Nagoli 
et al., 2017). This research is distinct in that it adds to the extant literature by 
assessing the impact of social capital on food security in Zimbabwe based on a 
quasi-experimental approach.  
 
Drawing on 2015 nationally representative data collected by the Zimbabwe 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) and employing Propensity Score 
Matching, the findings show that households with social capital are more food 
secure. More specifically, households with members belonging to a social group 
such as community associations, informal savings and loans associations, 
agricultural extension groups, credit unions for inputs and burial societies are less 
likely to engage in demanding, psychologically stressful behavioural hunger-coping 
strategies such as skipping meals, limiting portion size of meals and reducing 
number of meals eaten. Households with members belonging to a social group have 
a 7 percentage point lower chance of experiencing a day with no food to eat, a 4 
percentage point lower chance of going to sleep at night hungry, a 5 percentage point 
lower chance of limiting portion size of meals and a 5 percentage point lower chance 
of reducing number of meals eaten; compared with households without members 
belonging to a social group. Furthermore, households with members belonging to a 
social group are more likely to seek and to receive agricultural extension services 
than those without these social networks.  
 
The results also show that households with social capital are more likely to preserve 
their harvest against post-harvest losses. For example, social capital increases the 
chances of receiving agricultural training, seeking crop advice, and treating harvests 
against post-harvest losses by 23, 17, and 14 percentage points, respectively. This 
ensures food security. These results have important policy implications. For a 
country with weak formal social protection systems as well as recurrently 
experiencing persistent climatic shocks ranging from droughts to devastating tropical 
cyclones, self-organization, reciprocity and informal, traditional social protection 
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systems in the form of social capital ensure food security. This may also mean that 
other food security interventions may ride on existing informal social structures 
since intended beneficiaries value the collective functioning of the society.    
 
 
1.1.3 Chapter 4: The Impact of Social Protection and the Special COVID-19 
Social Relief of Distress Grant on Hunger in South Africa 
 
An understanding of vulnerability and food security also needs to be gained in 
relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Southern Africa, in general, the pandemic 
coincided with other existing shocks such as adverse climatic effects in Zimbabwe 
(Ejeromedoghene et al., 2020) and thus it amplified the threats to food security. 
However, food insecurity coping strategies usually common in countries like 
Zimbabwe such as social networks for support in the form of sharing meals with 
neighbours and family are difficult due to lockdowns and social distancing 
restrictions. This increases the importance of a robust safety net led by the state. To 
that effect and considering the potential policy implications for the whole region, the 
study empirically assesses the impact of social protection and the Special COVID-19 
Social Relief of Distress Grant on Hunger in South Africa. 
 
Based on Correlated Random Effects estimations employed on two waves of the 
National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (NIDS-
CRAM), which is the first nationally representative panel data survey investigating 
the socioeconomic impacts of the national lockdown in South Africa, the findings 
show that receiving a government grant reduces the likelihood of going hungry and 
running out of money to buy food by 6 and 12 percentage points, respectively. This 
is an important finding. This means that countries with a strong safety net system are 
likely to be better prepared to contain COVID-19-induced food insecurity. COVID-
19 pandemic is associated with prolonged periods of restrictive measures, severe 
income shocks, and disruption of traditional coping strategies. For many vulnerable 
members of society, government grants may be the only coping strategy available.  
 
The results also indicate that receiving the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of 
Distress Grant lowers chances of child hunger. This is an important finding too. The 
fact that there is no impact of the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant 
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on overall household hunger but an impact on child hunger may reflect altruism on 
the part of adults. Adults may skip meals in order to make sure children get enough 
to eat. However, the results indicate that the Special Unemployment Insurance Fund 
benefit does not have an impact on hunger and does not cushion individuals and 
households from running out of money to buy food; possibly pointing to the need to 
pay special attention to each type of social protection and its accessibility to ensure 
its effect is maximized. 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of the 
Foster Care Grant on child health in South Africa. Chapter 3 assesses the impact of 
social capital on food security in Zimbabwe while Chapter 4 investigates the impact 
of social protection and the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on 
hunger in South Africa. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, provides some 




























Cash transfers have become a respected development tool with potential to fight 
intergenerational poverty through investments in human capital development 
(Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). They are targeted interventions providing cash to 
selected beneficiaries (Manley et al., 2013); particularly disadvantaged and 
vulnerable members of society. Child nutritional investments can have a significant 
impact on human capital attainments (Potter and Goyal, 2016) and there is a 
sustained interest to find out the extent to which social protection impacts child 
health and nutritional outcomes. 
   
Vulnerable children normally suffer from malnutrition which is typically caused by a 
combination of inadequate food intake and associated infections that may result in 
low food conversion efficiency (Hough and Sosa, 2015; Jensen et al., 2017). This 
includes challenges such as stunting, wasting, and inadequacies of essential vitamins 
and minerals as well as obesity (Ayllon and Ferreira, 2015). Other relevant 
characteristics such as appropriate care, parental education, access to quality health 
care, as well as living environment and household food security are important in the 
health production function of a child. Early childhood development is of paramount 
importance and lack of cumulative development in the first years of children’s lives 
is caused by inadequate diet and incessant infections, which in the long term may 
lead to poor cognitive development, reduced adult size, and undermined labour 
outcomes in adulthood (Deaton, 2008).  This is where cash transfer programs are 
becoming important as vehicles of human capital development. 
 
Most of what is known about the impact of cash transfers on food security, nutrition 
and health comes from well-documented experiences of mostly Latin American 
countries (e.g.Attanasio and Mesnard, 2005; Galaso, 2011; Hidrobo et al., 2018; 
Hidrobo et al., 2015; Fiszbein et al., 2014; Gertler et al., 2012; Manley et al., 2013; 
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Morris et al., 2004). Cash transfer programs in Africa are relatively new 
development phenomena with most programs in their pilot stages and covering a few 
thousand beneficiaries. Most of these programs are unconditional as opposed to the 
experiences drawn from Latin American countries. Results from the relatively few 
unconditional cash transfer programs are mixed and in some cases disappointing 
(Himaz, 2008; Potter and Goyal, 2016; Ruel et al., 2013). For example, Kirk et al. 
(2018) used rural samples of three waves of the Uganda National Panel Survey and 
estimated panel regressions of child height-for-age z-scores controlling for time-
invariant child-level heterogeneity and found no impact of short-term changes in 
total gross income on height-for-age z-scores.  
 
On the other hand, Fisher et al. (2017) examine whether and how cash transfers go 
beyond welfare objectives to promote livelihoods using evidence from six Sub-
Saharan African countries concluding that a small but predictable flow of cash 
improves strategic livelihood choices and stimulates productive investments. 
Similarly, Tiwari et al. (2016), working on evidence from four Sub-Saharan African 
countries also found that a relatively generous, regular and predictable transfer 
increases the quantity and quality of food and reduces the prevalence of food 
insecurity.  
 
This study contributes to the growing and interesting literature on cash transfers in 
general and on the impact of unconditional cash transfers from Africa in particular. 
Although Fisher et al. (2017) looked at a cross-country analysis of the impact of cash 
transfers on livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, their focus was on Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Ghana. Related, a cross-country analysis of the 
impact of unconditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa by Tiwari et al. (2016) 
focused on Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho and Zambia. Yet, South Africa is a very 
interesting case study as far as social protection programs are concerned. It has a 
comprehensive social protection system for all vulnerable members of the society 
(children, the elderly, disabled, and war veterans) with beneficiaries running into 
several thousands and in some cases into millions. 
 
The Foster Care Grant in South Africa is an unconditional cash transfer, which 
provides temporary, substitute, away-from-home care to vulnerable children whose 
families cannot provide them with a safe and nurturing environment. The obligations 
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of the foster parent are to ensure that the child’s welfare is adequately taken care by 
making sure that the child is fed, clothed, healthy, and attending school. Remarkably, 
notwithstanding its monetary generosity, the grant has not been subjected to rigorous 
evaluations nor received much attention. On the other hand, most of the health and 
nutrition grants target children up to 3 years old and in some cases up to the time 
they enrol in primary school. The Foster Care Grant is unique in that it caters for 
children up to the age of 17 and in some cases even up to 22 under special 
circumstances. This brings in another dimension of catch-up that is often ignored in 
the literature (see Hirvonen, 2014; Leroy et al., 2009; Lundeen et al., 2014; Porter 
and Goyal, 2016; Prentice et al., 2013; Schott et al., 2013). For example, Rieger and 
Wagner (2015) found that children can partially catch-up from malnutrition spells; 
suggesting that sustainable nutrition interventions have to be long term. 
 
Improvements in living conditions brought about by adoption may trigger catch-up 
growth among vulnerable children. Therefore, the Foster Care Grant may lead to 
improvement in nutritional status for foster children and ultimately may lead to 
improved health outcomes. A natural question is: Does a monthly transfer of cash in 
the form of a Foster Care Grant have a positive impact on child health? I 
hypothesized that the Foster Care Grant has an impact on height-for-age, weight-for-
age, and body mass index for vulnerable children in South Africa that have been 
placed in foster care. 
 
The arrangement of the rest of this Chapter is as follows. The next section details the 
background to the Foster Care Grant. Section 2.3 presents a review of relevant 
strands of the literature and clarifies the hypotheses to be tested whilst section 2.4 
provides the data and descriptive analysis. Section 2.5 specifies the methodology. 
Section 2.6 and 2.7 specifies balancing and estimation results, respectively. Finally, 
section 2.8 concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Background of the Foster Care Grant 
 
The Foster Care Grant is a social protection program in South Africa intended to 
provide for the basic needs of children who have been placed in the care of foster 
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parents by a Children’s Court. The grant is paid to the foster parent for children aged 
between 0 and 18 years with a possibility of an extension to until the age of 21 years 
if the child is still in secondary school. It provides temporary, substitute, away-from-
home care to vulnerable children whose families cannot provide them with a safe 
and nurturing environment. The obligations of the foster parent are to ensure that the 
child’s welfare is adequately taken care by making sure that the child is fed, clothed, 
healthy, and attending school. This means that the foster parent must be a sustainable 
family or individual willing to act as foster parents to the child and must have 
capacity to provide an environment that is conducive to the child’s growth and 
development.  
 
The grant is usually for two years with a provision for extension for a further two 
years subject to assessment by a social worker given compelling circumstances. 
Eligibility criteria for Foster Care Grant require that the foster parent and the foster 
child must be resident in South Africa at the time of making an application but not 
necessarily citizens. This means that a child from any country that is in South Africa 
and in need of care and protection can be fostered; including undocumented and 
refugee children. Importantly, the would-be foster parent must be in possession of a 
court order that makes the foster care status legal. This means that the child must 
have been placed in foster care by order of the court before the Foster Care Grant can 
be sought.   
 
Circumstances are dynamic and as a result a social worker regularly reviews the 
situation of a child who is placed in foster care to determine whether the foster child 
remains in the care of the parents; is fed, clothed, and receives necessary medical 
attention; and goes to school regularly. The Foster Care Grant can be terminated if 
the foster child or both foster parents pass away; the child is no longer in the custody 
of the foster parent; and when the court order expires as well as when the child turns 
18 and when the child leaves school at school leaving age.  
 
The value of the Foster Care Grant is R 1,050 (USD 70) per eligible child per month. 
This is an important figure considering that monthly food poverty line in South 
Africa is at R 561 (USD 37) per person per month. The poverty line refers to the 
amount of money that a person requires to get the minimum required daily energy 
intake. The grant amount is greater than the lower-bound poverty line which is 
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currently at R 810 per month per person and not so far off from the upper-bound 
poverty line at R 1,227 per person per month. The lower-bound poverty line refers to 
the food poverty line plus the average amount derived from non-food items of 
households whose total expenditure is equal to the food poverty line. On the other 
hand, the upper-bound poverty line refers to the food poverty line plus the average 
amount derived from non-food items of households whose food expenditure is equal 
to the food poverty line. The grant is a third of the median wage in South Africa 
which is put at R 3,300, a figure that is reported to support 3.5 people. This goes to 
show how important the Foster Care Grant is in fighting poverty.  
 
The Foster Care Grant is very generous when compared to other child grants in 
South Africa. For example, it is almost 2.4 times greater than the Child Support 
Grant which is a means-test social protection program given to a primary caregiver 
for children under the age of 18 who do not receive any other social assistance from 
the government and who do not receive any care from a state institution. Elsewhere 
in Southern Africa, Zambia’s Child Grant gives a child 70 Kwacha (ZMW) which is 
equivalent to USD11 per month. The Lesotho Grant Program pays varying amounts 
depending on the number of children and it pays per quarter as opposed to monthly. 
It pays M360 for a household with 1 to 2 children, M600 for 3 to 4 children, and 
M750 for 5 or more children. The Lesotho Lot (M) is pegged at 1:1 with the South 
African Rand (R). Therefore the Foster Care Grant is very generous when compared 
to many child grants in Southern Africa.  
 
The Foster Care Grant, in South Africa, is not a new phenomenon having been in 
existence since the early 1960s. However, the number of beneficiaries never rose 
above 40,000. Only after South Africa gained independence in 1994 did the Foster 
Care Grant experienced relative phenomenal growth. By the year 2000, a total of 
almost 50,000 beneficiaries received court-ordered foster care; 120,000 by the year 
2004; and the figure skyrocketed to slightly above 450,000 by 2008. In February 
2017, the number of beneficiaries reached 478,158 (South African Human Rights 
Commission/UNICEF,2011; Factsheet, 2017). The Foster Care Grant has become an 
important case both in terms of coverage and importance that warrants interrogation 




2.3 Literature review and hypotheses 
 
Cash transfer programs have proved to be an important development tool for poverty 
alleviation in developing countries (Bazzi et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2016; Hanlon et 
al., 2010; Jensen et al., 2017). They are a form of a social protection mechanism with 
long-term potential for breaking intergenerational poverty through promoting human 
capital development (Barrientos, 2012; Fisher et al., 2017; Robertson et al., 2013); 
through investments in vulnerable children’s health and education. Cash transfers 
have also proved to be life-sustaining for vulnerable social groups and households in 
the face of shocks (Hur et al., 2010) by improving availability, access and utilization 
of food during crisis (Handa et al., 2014; Maluccio, 2005; Miller et al., 2011; Tiwari 
et al., 2016).  
 
Most of what is known about the impact of cash transfers on food security, nutrition 
and health comes from well-documented experiences of mostly Latin American 
countries (e.g.Attanasio and Mesnard, 2005; Galaso, 2011; Hidrobo et al., 2018; 
Hidrobo et al., 2015; Fiszbein et al., 2014; Gertler et al., 2012; Manley et al., 2013; 
Morris et al., 2004). In particular, Hidrobo et al. (2018) reviewed 66 studies on food 
security and concluded that social protection programs improve both the quantity 
and quality of food consumed by beneficiaries. Most of the experiences from Latin 
America comprise conditional cash transfer programs; and have registered success in 
improving nutritional status. For example, Oportunidades in Mexico improved child 
growth (see Fernald et al., 2009; Manley et al, 2013; Gertler, 2004; Gertler, 2000; 
Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Rivera et al., 2004); Bono de Desarrollo Humano in 
Ecuador (Paxson and Schady, 2010) and Familias en Accion in  Colombia (Attanasio 
et al., 2005) improved height of preschool children. Leroy et al., (2009) assessed 
evidence on the impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on child nutrition and 
discovered significant improvements in child anthropometrics. Lopez-Arana et al., 
(2016) evaluated the effect of Familias en Acciion (FA) on children’s stunting, body 
mass index, thinness, overweight and obesity and discovered reduced odds of 
thinness; with prevalence of stunting, overweight and obesity decreasing over time.  




In a comprehensive study, Manley et al. (2013) analysed evidence on the relationship 
between cash transfer programs and nutritional status of children in recipient 
households and found that the programs’ average impact on height-for-age is 
positive; albeit small and not statistically significant. Besides, they discovered that 
girls tend to benefit more than boys. The issue of gender heterogeneity in the impact 
of cash transfers on health outcomes is widely noted. For example, girls may see 
larger benefits than boys from cash transfers (Duflo, 2003). Related, the issue of 
kinship and caregiver characteristics has also been under scrutiny. For example, 
Ayllon and Ferreira-Batista (2015) studied the relationship between single 
motherhood and children’s height-for-age z-score in Brazil. They paid attention to 
the role of the gender of the first-born and a low sex ratio to marital status and found 
out that single mothers that have been affected by giving birth to first-born girl child 
with a low sex ratio have a height-for-age z-score that is lower than that of children 
of similar characteristics that cohabit with both progenitors.  
 
Elsewhere, Himaz (2008) found that the largest social assistance program in Sri 
Lanka, which is aimed at integrating youth, women, and disadvantaged groups into 
economic and social development, as well as promoting social stability and 
alleviating poverty, improves height-for-age z-score of a child from a grant-receiving 
family by roughly 0.40 standard deviations with the impact led by children between 
six, and 36 months of age, in comparison to those that did not receive the grant. In 
the case of weight-for-height, the results show an improvement of 0.45 standard 
deviations for children aged 36 – 60 months. 
 
Cash transfer programs in Africa are relatively new development phenomena with 
most programs in their pilot stages and covering a few thousand beneficiaries. Most 
of these programs are unconditional as opposed to those from Latin American 
countries. Although conditional cash transfers are popular, questions have been 
raised on the importance of conditionalities (Barrientos, et al., 2010); with arguments 
centred on the supply-side constraints emanating from lack of sufficient health 
infrastructure for example. This means that conditional cash transfers may not be the 
best option in circumstances where access to health facilities is poor, which is true in 
most African countries. In such situations, unconditional programs are more likely to 
deliver improved welfare. 
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Porter and Goyal (2016) investigated the impact of the Productive Safety Net 
Program, a large-scale social protection scheme in Ethiopia, on child nutritional 
outcomes. The Productive Safety Net Program is a safety net introduced in 2005 
which is designed to provide predictable support to selected food insecure 
households over several years. In their analysis, they focused on the effect of the 
program on individual child nutritional status as measured by height-for-age. Their 
results show an important positive medium-term nutritional impact of the program 
for children aged 5-15 years that is comparable in size to Conditional Cash Transfer 
program impacts for much younger children. They went on to show expressive 
evidence that the program impact on improved nutrition is identified with improved 
food security and reduced child working hours. 
 
In rural Malawi, Miller et al. (2011) found sizeable program impact of the Malawi 
Social Transfer Cash Transfer Scheme on food security and food diversity. On the 
other hand, the Zambia Child Grant and the Zambia Multiple Category Cash 
Transfer Program (both unconditional) were found not to reduce perceived stress but 
improve economic security as measured by per capita consumption expenditure, 
food insecurity, and asset ownership (Hjelm et al., 2017). In general, some of the 
unconditional cash transfers and pilot programs in Africa have exhibited positive 
impacts on food expenditure and consumption (Gillian et al., 2013; Haushofer and 
Shapiro, 2014; Merttens et al., 2013). An unconditional cash transfer for orphans and 
vulnerable children in Kenya was found to reduce the likelihood of early pregnancy 
of adolescent girls (Handa et al., 2015); as well as contributing to higher household 
economic security and overall wellbeing (Handa et al., 2014). It was also found to 
reduce depressive symptoms (Kilburn et al., 2015). 
 
This study contributes to the growing and interesting literature on cash transfers in 
general and on the impact of unconditional cash transfers from Africa in particular. 
Although Fisher et al. (2017) looked at a cross-country analysis of the impact of cash 
transfers on livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, their focus was on Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Ghana. Relatedly, a cross-country analysis of the 
impact of unconditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa by Tiwari et al. (2016) 
focused on Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho and Zambia. Yet, South Africa is a very 
interesting case study as far as social protection programs are concerned.  
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South Africa, as mentioned above, has a comprehensive social protection system for 
all vulnerable members of society (children, the elderly, disabled, and war veterans) 
with beneficiaries running into several thousands and in some cases into millions. 
The Foster Care Grant, in particular, is an interesting case study in many respects. It 
gives a foster child R 1,050 (USD 70 equivalent) per month per foster child. 
Surprisingly, the Foster Care Grant has not been subjected to rigorous evaluations 
and has not received much attention. South Africa in general, and the Foster Care 
Grant in particular is an interesting case study in terms of coverage and grant 
amount. Compared to almost all unconditional cash transfers in Africa, the Foster 
Care Grant is relatively more generous. This is important because this has 
implications for the range and intensity of impacts on food security and nutrition 
outcomes. Although there has been an interest on assessing the impact of 
unconditional cash transfers on food security, nutrition and health in Africa, this 
study presents an interesting opportunity to better understand the long-term impact 
of unconditional cash transfers on child health since the Foster Care Grant has been 
around for over 20 years compared to many unconditional cash transfers in Africa. 
For example, Miller et al. (2011) evaluation in Malawi was short-term, conducted 
over the course of one year.  
 
There is little that has been written on unconditional cash transfers in South Africa in 
general and the Foster Care Grant in particular. Previous studies of cash transfer 
programs’ impact on child nutritional status in South Africa are limited despite 
comprehensive social protection programs for children. Notable, however, is Duflo 
(2003) who assessed the impact of the Old-Age Pensions on children’s nutritional 
status. Booysen and Van Der Berg (2005) did not  give insights into how food 
expenditures change as households become income-grant recipients when they 
examined income sources and food expenditures among a population of HIV 
affected households and non-affected controls. This research is distinct and aims to 
add value to the body of knowledge by bridging the gap on the Foster Care Grant. 
The question that arises is whether the Foster Care Grant leads to consumption gains 








Cash transfer programs are important for human capital development. In some cases, 
they are the only source of income and provide food security for poor households 
and vulnerable children. There is a powerful connection between early childhood 
nutrition and health status and subsequent economic success (Hoddinott et al., 2008). 
A strong correlation between ill-health, malnutrition, under-nutrition, and poverty 
and chronic poverty (Krishna, 2007; Lentz and Barrett, 2013) exists. Vulnerable 
children such as orphaned and neglected children are more likely to suffer from ill-
health, mal- and under-nutrition, which is associated with reduced human capital 
accumulation, including below average adult stature, poor cognitive capacity, and 
reduced economic productivity and lower adult earnings, among others. This implies 
that low and poor investment in human capital accumulation leads to inter-
generational transmission of poverty. For example, mothers who were themselves 
undernourished as children are more likely to give birth to low weight children (see 
Behrman et al., 2009; Victoria et al., 2008).  
 
Although other factors such as household preferences and intra-household dynamics 
are important for a guarantee in children nutritional improvements, the importance of 
a regular cash transfer cannot be underestimated. Cash transfer programs, in some 
cases, have been found to have a positive effect on child height (see Labrecque et al., 
2018; Rivera et al., 2004). In the case of the Foster Care Grant in South Africa, the 
obligations of the foster parent are to ensure that the child’s welfare is adequately 
looked after by making sure that the child is fed, clothed, healthy, and attending 
school. The Foster Care Grant, therefore, may lead to improvement in nutritional 
status for foster children and ultimately may lead to improved health outcomes. I 
therefore propose the following hypotheses linking the impact of the Foster Care 
Grant to child health outcomes: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1:  
 








This study draws on the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), which is South 
Africa’s first nationally representative panel data. It is a comprehensive longitudinal 
study, which investigates livelihood dynamics, coping strategies and well-being of 
households and individuals over time by examining changes in household 
composition and structure, poverty and demographics. It also follows and details 
economic activity and labour market issues, human capital development on health 
and education as well as changes in social capital and social protection programs. 
The NIDS is a rich dataset with detailed child, adult and household level panel 
information. 
 
The data has five waves, as detailed in Table 2.1 below. The data has four 
anthropometric variables namely: height-for-age; weight-for-age; weight-for-height; 
and body mass index z-scores. Each child was measured on these variables three 
times in order to minimize or eliminate the chances of errors and as such the 
variables are relatively highly reliable.  
 
 
Table 2.1: National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – Number of Observations 
 
 Households Adults Children Total Observations  
      
      
Wave 1 (2008) 7,296 16,871 9,606 31,144 
 
 
Wave 2 (2010) 9,127 21,880 11,081 36,156 
 
 
Wave 3 (2012) 10,219 22,466 12,216 42,150 
 
 
Wave 4 (2015) 
 
















Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the entire dataset as well as for 2008, 
2010, 2012, and 2015 datasets. The average age for a child is 7 and about 50 percent 
of the children are girls; while 89 percent are black. Thirty-eight percent of the 
children live in urban areas. A cross-wave average of 3.7 percent of the children is 
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receiving the Foster Care Grant. The average age of the household head is 50 with an 
average of 6 years of education. On average, the household size in the dataset is 7 
and 69 percent of households are female-headed.  
 
On the other hand, Table 2.3 below presents descriptive statistics for the outcome 
variables. The average height-for-age z-score is -1.17, -0.76, and -0.83 for children 
aged 1-4, 5-9, and 10-14 years respectively. The summary statistics for weight-for-
age and body mass index z-scores are detailed in the same Table. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates 
 
 Full Sample 2008 2010 2012 2015 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
      
Child’s Age 7.09 6.83 7.18 7.23 7.04 
 (4.09) 
 
(3.95) (4.11) (4.10) (4.13) 
Girl 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 
 (0.50) 
 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Head’s Education 5.98 5.06 5.50 6.42 6.43 
 (4.49) 
 
(4.41) (4.59) (4.60) (4.25) 
Head’s Age 50.31 52.50 51.14 48.22 50.32 
 (15.61) 
 
(15.01) (15.45) (15.89) (15.60) 
Head is Female 0.69 0.58 0.68 0.753 0.69 
 (0.46) 
 
(0.49) (0.46) (0.43) (0.46) 
Household Size 7.0 6.75 7.27 7.06 6.87 
 (3.63) 
 
(3.25) (3.95) (3.78) (3.45) 
Foster Care Grant 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 (0.19) 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
Child is black 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89 
 (0.31) 
 
(0.31) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) 
Geo Area: Urban 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.40 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) 
      
Observations 31,023 5,377 6,991 8,470 10,185 




Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables 
 
Panel A: 
 Full Sample 2008 2010 2012 2015 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
      
Height-for-age -0.897 -0.873 -0.973 -0.919 -0.858 
 (1.426) 
 
(1.453) (1.493) (1.557) (1.267) 
Weight-for-age -0.284 -0.367 -0.264 -0.231 -0.294 
 (1.248) 
 
(1.292) (1.308) (1.292) (1.159) 
Body Mass Index 0.379 0.244 0.473 0.473 0.331 
 (1.429) (1.442) (1.532) (1.531) (1.279) 
      
Observations 22,427 4,069 3,594 6,447 8,317 
 
Panel B: 
 Full Sample 1 – 4 years 5 – 9 years 10 – 14 years 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
     
Height-for-age -0.897 -1.173 -0.755 -0.829 
 (1.426) 
 
(1.532) (1.235) (1.219) 
Weight-for-age -0.284 -0.237 -0.345 -0.438 
 (1.248) 
 
(1.232) (1.236) (1.209) 
Body Mass Index 0.379 0.733 0.141 -0.0344 
 (1.429) (1.453) (1.312) (1.313) 
     
Observations 22,427 8,704 12,415 436 






Impact evaluations are carried out to determine the difference between an outcome 
with intervention and the outcome without the intervention. However, a major 
challenge mostly encountered in impact evaluations is that one cannot observe a 
counterfactual for participants had they not participated. Comparing outcomes of 
participants to those of people who did not participate in the intervention results in 
biased estimates due to potential selection bias arising from unobserved 
characteristics correlated with the outcome. For example, children whose parents or 
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caregivers with higher intellectual capacity are more likely to receive the Foster Care 
Grant than those whose caregivers are less intelligent. Accessing the Foster Care 
Grant involves a court order and foster parents with a strong legal understanding are 
more likely to access the grant than those without.  
 
In other cases, the bias may not arise due to individuals self-selecting into treatment, 
but from being selected for treatment on the basis of an interview or evaluation of 
their willingness to cooperate with the program giving rise to administrative 
selection bias or program placement bias. The issue of selection bias is not a 
challenge where participants are selected randomly; but full randomised selection is 
not always available. Access to the Foster Care Grant is not based on randomisation 
but rather on eligibility and in the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), 
baseline data for the Foster Care Grant is not available for intervention evaluation. 
The standard Difference-in-Differences method cannot be applied, and Instrumental 
Variables approach are likewise unavailable for want of plausible instruments. For 
the purpose of this study, and given that the NIDS is a panel data with 5 waves, three 
identification strategies namely Correlated Random Effects; Hybrid; and Propensity 
Score Matching models are adopted. 
 
 
2.5.1 Correlated Random Effects 
 
The Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model is selected for its several benefits. 
First, it circumvents the disadvantages of Fixed-Effects models by estimating within 
effects in Random-Effects models (Allison, 2009; Schunck, 2013). It can lead to the 
use of time-invariant fixed effects in a linear model, and simple robust tests of 
correlation between heterogeneity and explanatory variables. It introduces extra 
parameter heterogeneity and provides two over-identifying restrictions that can be 
tested in the data (Wooldridge, 2019). In our case, it allows for heterogeneity in the 
returns to receiving the Foster Care Grant and decomposes the cross-sectional bias 
for each child separately. For each child, the CRE gives a parameter that shows the 
partial correlation between background characteristic effect and receiving the Foster 
Care Grant. The model is applied here to a relationship in which specific unobserved 
background and household characteristics such as a taste for healthy children and 
child high food conversion efficiency are of particular concern. 
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Second, CRE models can also allow the estimation or identification of average 
partial effects as opposed to just parameters. They do not suffer from over-
parameterization problems (Suryadipta, 2017; Woodridge, 2010; 2011; 2018). The 
general model specification adopted is as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝑔𝑡𝜃 +  𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝜑 +  𝑤𝑖𝑡  𝜗 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                        (1)  
 
where: 
ℎ𝑖𝑡   is health outcome for child i at time t denoting height-for-age, weight-for-age 
and body mass index z-scores. Height-for-age was chosen because it is widely 
regarded as the main indicator of nutritional status (see Manley et al., 2013; WHO, 
1986, 1995, 2006), which reflects long term human capital development.  It is of 
particular interest because it is a good proxy for cumulative nutritional status 
(Himaz, 2008; Labrecque et al., 2018; Rieger and Wagner, 2015). It is documented 
in the literature that improvements in height-for-age z-scores may be due to an 
improvement in past nutritional status and may improve health and cognitive 
outcomes later in life. On the other hand, weight-for-age indicates shorter-term 
changes in nutritional status. 
 
𝑔𝑡 captures a vector of aggregate time effects corresponding to the wave year; 𝑧𝑖 is a 
set of time-invariant observed covariates such as gender, race, geographical area, and 
child health status; 𝐹𝑖𝑡 captures the Foster Care Grant status for child i at time t; 𝑤𝑖𝑡 
is a vector of time-varying covariates; 𝛼𝑖  captures child fixed effects and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error. Equation 1 above is then transformed to become a Correlated 
Random Effects (CRE) model by allowing time-constant variables as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝑔𝑡𝜃 +  𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝜑 +  𝑤𝑖𝑡  𝜗 +  𝜔 +  𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅𝛾 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                (2)  
 
In other words, the CRE equation (2) supplements the Fixed Effects equation (1) by 
estimating a linear projection of the unobserved heterogeneity onto covariates. In 
particular, interest is on estimators of 𝜑 that allow for correlation between 𝛼𝑖  and the 
history of covariates, {𝑤𝑖𝑡 ∶ 𝑡 = 1, … … … . , 𝑇}. The CRE approach enables the 
unification of fixed and random effects estimation approaches. This specification 
follows proposal by Mundlak (1978) who projected the unobserved heterogeneity 
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onto the mean of the explanatory variables; and which was later relaxed by 
Chamberlain (1980, 1982). The main assumption here is that: 
 
∈ [𝛼𝑖\𝑤𝑖1, … … … , 𝑤𝑖𝑇] = ∈ [(𝛼𝑖\?̅?𝑖) =  𝜔 + ?̅?𝑖𝛾]                                     (3) 
 
By assumption, Equation (3) is expected to be linear and a sufficient condition. It is 
important to note that ?̅?𝑖 =  𝑇
−1  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1   is a vector of time averages. From 
Equation (3), 𝛾 estimates the between-group effect. Note that at times a group mean 
may be included to obtain the within effect of 𝜗 in order to ensure that effect 
estimates of level 2 variables are corrected for between-group differences in 𝑤𝑖𝑡 (see 
Schunck, 2013).  As highlighted above, there are quite a number of advantages for 
taking this approach, which include an opportunity to test for equivalence of within-
group and between-group estimates; can be used with generalized equations enabling 
specification of less restrictive within-group structures; and can be extended to allow 
for effects of level 1 variables to vary between clusters by including random slopes. 
 
 
2.5.2 Hybrid Model 
 
The hybrid model extends the Correlated Random-Effects model by including 
random slopes thereby allowing effects of level 1 variables to vary between groups. 
The Correlated Random-Effects model uses the undemeaned level-one variables 
captured by 𝑤𝑖𝑡 . Although it is possible to include random slopes with a purely 
Correlated Random-Effects model, it is not equivalent to the corresponding Hybrid 
model with random slopes; in which case it is highly recommended to use the 
Hybrid model (see Schunck, 2013). The Hybrid model also allows for the inclusion 
of level 2 variables as well as capable of being used with generalized estimating 
equations.  
 
The Hybrid model used in this study is specified as follows: 
 






The Hybrid model works by splitting within- and between-group effects for level-
one covariates by including both the deviation from the cluster-specific mean of the 
time-varying covariates and the cluster-specific mean ?̅?𝑖  From Equation 4, 𝛽1 yields 
the within-group effect, and 𝛽3 captures the between-group effect. 
 
The Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects models are preferred here over the 
Fixed-Effects and Random Effects models because they are flexible and separate 
within- and between- group effects. They permit consistent estimation of level-one 
effects and the inclusion of level-two variables (see Schunck and Perales, 2017). 
They combine the strengths of Random- and Fixed-Effects models by yielding level-
one estimates that are unbiased by cluster-level unobserved heterogeneity and at the 
same time permitting level-two cluster-invariant explanatory variables. 
 
 
2.5.3 Propensity Score Matching 
 
As in many real-world applications, where it is not feasible to assign participants to 
treatment alternatives, observational studies are the only viable options (Rosenbaum, 
2002, 2010; Lechner, 2000; Lee, 2017). In that case therefore other methods which 
deal with selection on unobservables have to be adopted. This study also uses 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to estimate causal treatment effects. PSM is used 
here to build a statistical counterfactual group that is based on a model of the 
probability of participating in the Foster Care Grant using observed characteristics.  
 
The specification is as follows. Defining the number of times a child received Foster 
Care Grant as 𝜗 (treatment) when compared with 𝜑 (control) number of times the 
child received the Foster Care Grant (where 𝜗 > 𝜑  and can take the value of 0 but 
not necessarily means zero), the average impact of the Foster Care Grant will be 
given by:  
 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝜗,𝜑 = 𝐸[𝑌𝜗 −  𝑌𝜑|𝐷 =  𝜗] = 𝐸[𝑌𝜗|𝐷 = 𝜗] − 𝐸[𝑌𝜑|𝐷 = 𝜗]             (5) 
 
As Moreno-Serra (2005) argued, a specification of this nature leads to an Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) equivalent to the marginal gain in terms of an 
outcome. In the context of this study, it is a marginal gain in terms of height-for-age, 
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weight-for-age, and body mass index accruing to a randomly selected child who 
received the Foster Care Grant 𝜗 times relative to what would have been the 
outcome if the child had received the Foster Care Grant 𝜑 times in the four time 
periods. 
 
The major assumptions in a specification of this nature are weak unconfoundedness 
and overlap. This captures the assumption of ignorability (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). The first assumes that covariates that affect receiving the Foster Care Grant 
have been measured in the study. On the other hand, the second is based on an 
assumption that every child has a probability greater than zero of receiving 
Treatment or Control. The probability of assignment is bounded away from zero and 
one as follows: 
 
0 < Pr(𝐷 = 1| 𝑋, 𝜗, 𝜑)  < 1                                                       (6) 
 
where D = 1 is receiving the Foster Care Grant a specified number of times in the 
four time periods. This is the assumption of common support, which ensures that 
there is ample overlap in the characteristics of the treatment and the control for 
adequate matches. This means that for each value of X, there is a positive probability 
of being both treated and untreated. This way, therefore, would allow for a balanced 
distribution in measured important baseline covariates in the compared groups.  
 
 
2.5.4 The experiment 
 
In designing the experiment, the study uses two Control Groups. The first Control 
Group (which is conveniently called Control Group 1) is comprised of children who 
received the Foster Care Grant only once in the whole time period. This yielded a 
total of 1,567 children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the four time 
periods (i.e. Control Group 1: n = 1,567). The second Control Group (Control Group 
2) is comprised of children whose caregivers never received the Foster Care Grant in 
the four time periods and from the data, a total of 42,119 such children never 





The Treatment Group is comprised of children whose caregivers received the Foster 
Care Grant twice in the four time periods and this yielded a total of 504 children (i.e. 
Treatment Group: n = 504). Designing the two Control Groups against this 
Treatment Group also provides a platform to check robustness of the results. The 
choice of this treatment group is motivated by specifications in the regulation of the 
grant in which it is categorically stated that the grant is usually for two years with a 
provision for extension for a further two years subject to assessment by a social 
worker given compelling circumstances. 
 
 
2.6 Balancing results 
 
2.6.1 Estimating Propensity Score 
 
In estimating a model of program participation, samples of children who received the 
grant once (T = 0) and those that received twice (T = 1); as well as those that did not 
receive any grant (T = 0) and those that received it twice (T = 1), were pooled to 
estimate participation on observed covariates that are likely to determine 
participation. The specification of the participation equation used is as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝜏𝑊𝑖 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖                                                                   (7) 
 
where  𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑖 stands for Foster Care Grant status and is binary reflecting T = 1 or T = 
0 for a child;  𝑊𝑖  is a vector for interaction and higher order terms and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector 
of other explanatory variables. The model is estimated using probit and the predicted 
outcome from the participation equation is therefore the probability of participation 
or the propensity score. Results of this probit model are presented in Table 2.4 
below. Arguably, all the variables chosen in the calculation of the propensity score 
are associated with both the treatment and outcomes. For example, the Child’s Age 
is definitely associated with height-for-age (for example) and in turn associated with 
the Foster Care Grant. The younger the child the more likely there is a change in 
anthropometric outcomes, and the younger the child the more likely the family is to 
receive the Foster Care Grant but not necessarily in a causal way. The Household 




Table 2.4: Probit Results on Program Participation 
 
 
                                                                      (1)                          (2) 
   
   
























Geo-Area: Urban -0.0288 
 
-0.105 
 (0.0512) (0.0704) 
 
Household Size  -0.00159 
 
  (0.00947) 
 
Constant -3.769*** -0.526** 
 (0.187) (0.246) 
   
Observations 29,484 1,775 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%;  **Significant at 5%;  *Significant at 10%. 
Estimations in Column (1) are based on a sample comprising of children who never received the 
Foster Care Grant and those that received the grant twice; and estimations in Column (2) are 
comprised of children who received the grant once and those who received the grant twice. 
 
 
The more educated the household head is the more likely it will be for her to have a 
higher taste for healthier children. Likewise, the more educated the household head 
is, the more likely he or she will better understand the requirements for applying for 
the Foster Care Grant including understanding court proceedings that are used to 
determine eligibility. To improve the estimation and balancing, also included is the 




In order to achieve strong ignorable treatment assignment, a rich set of covariates 
was used by excluding variables that are related to treatment but not the outcome and 
variables that may be influenced by the treatment (see, Lee and Little, 2017; Imbens, 
2004) as well as those that perfectly predict treatment status. Excluding variables 
that perfectly predict treatment status is important because distributions of covariates 
need to overlap between treatment and comparison groups. On the other hand, 
variables affected by treatment obscures part of the treatment effect that is being 
estimated (see, Ho et al., 2007); and variables associated with treatment but not 
outcome add noise to the estimate and thereby reduce precision. Importantly too, 
including too many covariates was avoided since over-specification can result in 
higher standard errors for the estimated propensity score. 
 
 
2.6.2 Balance on the propensity score 
 
In order to generate confidence in the estimates, there is need for considerable 
overlap in the propensity scores between treatment and comparison groups. The idea 
is to make sure that no inference about treatment effects can reasonably be made for 
a treated child for whom there is not a comparison child with the same propensity 
score. This can be achieved by subjectively assessing the common support using 
graphs of propensity scores across treatment and control groups. Figure 2.1 below 
shows the distribution of propensity score across Treatment and Comparison Groups 























Notes: Treated = Children whose caregivers received the Foster Care Grant twice in the four time 
periods. Comparison (Untreated) = Children whose caregivers received the Foster Care Grant only 
once in the four time periods. 
 
 
2.6.3 Balance on the Covariates 
 
It is also important to check for balance of individual covariates across treatment and 
comparison groups within blocks of the propensity score after the propensity score is 
balanced. Balance on covariates assures that the propensity score is correctly 
specified and that its distribution is not different across groups within each block. 
Table 2.5 shows the covariate balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups 
after the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW) on the propensity score 
based on Control Group 1, which is comprised of children whose caregivers received 






Table 2.5: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups after 
the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW) Matching on the 
Propensity Score using Control Group 1 
 




   Mean 
Treatment 
(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 




       
Child’s  Age    8.61 8.66 -0.014 
       
Child’s Age Squared    88.36 88.72 -0.006 
       
Household Head’s Age    54.14 54.07 0.004 
       
Household Head is 
Female 
   0.72 0.73 -0.014 
       
Household Head’s 
Education 
   5.81 5.80 0.003 
       
Race – Black    0.86 0.86 -0.008 
       
Geo-Area : Urban    0.42 0.41 0.019 
       
Notes: Control Group 1 is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the 
four time periods. The Treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant 




In turn, covariate balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups after Inverse 
Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW) Matching for Control Group 2, which is 
comprised of children whose caregivers never received the Foster Care Grant in the 
four time periods is presented in Table 2.6. It is important to note that the small 














Table 2.6: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups after 
the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW) Matching on the 
Propensity Score using Control Group 2 




   Mean 
Treatment 
(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 




       
Child’s  Age    6.97 7.35   -0.097 
       
Child’s Age Squared    67.11 70.79 -0.061 
       
Household Head is 
Female 
   0.63 0.66 -0.055 
       
Household Head’s 
Education 
   6.60 6.61   -0.001 
       
Geo-Area: Urban    0.44 0.41 0.050 
       
Household Size    6.77 6.78 -0.001 
       
       
Notes: Control Group 2 is comprised of children who did not receive the Foster Care Grant in any of 
the four time periods. The Treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care 
Grant twice in the four time periods.  
 
 
Table 2.7 to Table 2.10 below show covariate balance between treatment and control 
groups using Nearest-Neighbour matching (with and without caliper) since the 
Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW) matching of covariate balance 
across treatment and control groups does not show standardized difference between 
Treatment and Control Group before matching. These descriptive results show 













Table 2.7: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups before and after Matching on the Propensity Score 
Based on Control Group 1 
 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 




       
Child’s Age 8.82 8.28 14.5 9.0 8.93 1.9 
       
Child’s Age Squared 90.03 84.29 9.5 92.63 91.37 2.1 
       
Head’s Age 54.67 53.51 7.2 54.01 55.64 -10.1 
       
Head is Female 0.71 0.72 -2.7   0.73 0.72 2.1 
       
Head’s Education 5.91 5.69 5.2 6.01 5.46 12.5 
       
Race – Black 0.85 0.86 -0.7 0.87 0.84 8.2 
       
Geo-Area : Urban 0.37 0.43 -11.0 0.36 0.35 0.5 
       
Notes: Control Group 1 is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the four time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of 








Table 2.8: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups before and after Caliper Matching on the Propensity 
Score Based on Control Group 1 
 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 




       
Child’s Age 8.82 8.28 14.5   9.0 8.93 1.8 
       
Child’s Age Squared 90.03 84.29 9.5 92.63 91.37 1.4   
       
Head’s Age 54.67 53.51 7.2 54.01 55.64 -8.8 
       
Head is Female 0.71 0.72 -2.7 0.73 0.70 6.4 
       
Head’s Education 5.91 5.69 5.2   6.01 5.75 6.0 
       
Race – Black 0.85 0.86 -0.7 0.87 0.85 4.1 
       
Geo-Area : Urban 0.37 0.43 -11.0 0.36 0.36 -1.0 
       
Notes: Control Group 1 is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the four time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of 







Table 2.9: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups before and after Nearest Neighbour Matching on the 
Propensity Score Based on Control Group 2 
 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 




       
Child’s Age 8.82 6.93 48.3 8.99 8.92 1.8 
       
Child’s Age Squared 90.03 66.41 39.2 92.46 90.68 3.0 
       
Head is Female 0.71 0.65 13.1 0.73 0.74 -2.6 
       
Head’s Education 5.91 6.72 -17.4 5.99          6.00 -0.2 
       
Geo-Area: Urban 0.37 0.43 -12.1 0.36          0.34 3.0 
       
Household Size 7.48 6.73 21.7 7.51 7.32 5.2 
       
Notes: Control Group 2 is comprised of children who did not receive the Foster Care Grant in the four time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of children 










Table 2.10: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Comparison Groups before and after Caliper Matching on the Propensity 
Score Based on Control Group 2 
 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 






(n = 504) 
Mean 
Comparison 




       
Child’s Age 8.82 6.93 48.3 8.99 8.98 0.1 
       
Child’s Age Squared 90.03 66.41 39.2 92.46 92.0 0.8 
       
Head is Female 0.71 0.65 13.1 0.73 0.76 -5.4 
       
Head’s Education 5.91 6.72 -17.4 5.99           6.05 -1.1 
       
Geo-Area: Urban 0.38 0.43 -12.1 0.36           0.34 2.7 
       
Household Size 7.48 6.73 21.7 7.51 7.25 7.5 
       
Notes: Control Group is comprised of children who never received the Foster Care Grant in the four time periods. The Treatment Group is comprised of children 





It is very important to check whether the treatment and comparison groups are well 
balanced in the matched and weighted samples. This can be achieved by subjectively 
assessing density functions of continuous covariates in treated and control groups 
plotted. Figure 2.2 to 2.4 show Density Plots after Kernel Matching based on Control 
Group 1. Density plots based on Control Group 2 (comprised of children whose 
caregivers did not receive the Foster Care Grant in any of the four time periods) are 

















Figure 2.3: Density Plot of Mean Household Head’s Age after Kernel Matching 




Figure 2.4: Density Plot of Mean Household Head’s Education after Kernel 




Figure 2.5: Density Plot of Mean Age Squared after Kernel Matching based on 
Control Group 2 
 
Notes: Treated = children who received the Foster Care Grant twice in the four time period. Control = 
children who never received the Foster Care Grant in the four time period. 
 
Figure 2.6: Density Plot of Mean Household Head’s Education after Kernel 




Figure 2.7: Density Plot of Mean Household Size after Kernel Matching based 
on Control Group 2 
 
Notes: Treated = children who received the Foster Care Grant twice in the four time period. Control = 




2.7 Estimation Results 
 
2.7.1 Propensity Score Matching Estimation Results 
 
Estimation results are based on one treatment group and two control groups. The 
treatment group, as highlighted earlier, is comprised of children who received the 
Foster Care Grant twice in the four time period. Control Group 1 is comprised of 
children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the four time period. It can 
be emphasized that estimations using Control Group 1 therefore tests program 
intensity. Control Group 2 is comprised of children who never received the Foster 







2.7.1.1 Program intensity 
 
Table 2.11 below shows the Average Treatment  effect on the Treated (ATT) of the 
Foster Care Grant on height-for-age, weight-for-age, and body mass index using 
propensity score matching based on the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights 
(IPTW) and the Nearest Neighbour matching algorithms. Interpretation and analysis 
of the results is based on IPTW; and Nearest Neighbour results are presented here for 
robustness check only. The Foster Care Grant has a positive and significant impact 
on height-for-age for children aged 0-14 years. For this age group, it improves 
height-for-age z-score by 0.137 standard deviations for children who received the 
grant twice compared to those that received it only once. This confirms hypothesis 
2.1 above. Disaggregating the sample by age, the results show a positive and 
significant impact for both children aged 1-4 years and for children aged 5-9 years. 
This is an important result because it shows that the Foster Care Grant has a positive 
and significant impact on accumulated investments in child health as measured by 
height-for-age. It also suggests that receiving the grant more than once has a positive 
impact on child health.  
 
The results, however, do not show any significant impact on height-for-age for 
children aged 10-14 years. This result does not support the argument of catching-up 
but rather is in line with emphasis in the literature that interventions on health 
outcomes tend to be more effective in the early stages of a child. On the other hand, 
receiving the Foster Care Grant twice as compared to receiving it once does not lead 
to significant improvements in weight-for-age z-scores for foster children in South 
Africa. The results also show no significant intensity improvement on body mass 
index for all the age groups.  
 
Understanding gender heterogeneity in the impact of cash transfer programs on 
health outcomes gives another important dimension in better interrogating who 
benefits and who does not and can inform on policy formulation in developing 
countries. Table 2.12 shows estimation results of the Average Treatment effect on 
the Treated (ATT) of the Foster Care Grant on girls’ health using propensity score 
matching based on Control Group 1. Just like in Table 2.11, Control Group 1 is 
comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the four time 
period and the Treatment Group is comprised of children who received the grant  
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Table 2.11: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of the Foster Care 
Grant on Child Health Using Propensity Score Matching Based on Control 
Group 1 
 























       
 Height-for-age       
IPTW Matching      -0.137*     -0.548*      -0.246**   -0.039  
Nearest Neighbour      -0.160    -0.922***      -0.243   -0.010  
                 
       
Weight-for-age       
IPTW matching 0.031 -0.311 0.051    
Nearest Neighbour -0.019 -0.071       -0.101    
       
       
Body Mass Index       
IPTW matching -0.002 -0.216 0.072    -0.010  
















































    
   Yes 
 
    
    Yes 
 
 
     241 
     683 
 
 
Notes: Control Group 1 is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the 
four time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant 
twice in the four time periods. 
 
 
twice in the same period. The results show that there are no program intensity 
impacts for girls who received the grant twice as compared to those that only 
received it once on height-for-age, weight-for-age, and body mass index for all the 





Table 2.12: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of the Foster Care 
Grant on Girls’ Health Using Propensity Score Matching based on Control 
Group 1 
 














aged 5- 9 
years 
 






       
Height-for-age       
IPTW Matching       -0.083      -0.524     -0.294*  0.105  
Nearest Neighbour       -0.045 -0.938     -0.182  0.143  
             
       
Weight-for-age       
IPTW Matching 0.018 -0.043     -0.021    
Nearest Neighbour 0.165  0.181      0.032    
       
       
Body Mass Index       
IPTW Matching -0.104 -0.423 -0.092  -0.072  
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Notes: Control Group 1 is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the 
four time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant 
twice in the four time periods. 
 
 
On the other hand, the results in Table 2.13 on the Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated (ATT) of the Foster Care Grant on boys’ health, show that there is a positive 




Table 2.13: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of the Foster Care 
Grant on Boys’ Health Using Propensity Score Matching based on Control 
Group 1 























       
Height-for-age       
IPTW Matching    -0.261** -0.699*      -0.168  -0.340**  
Nearest Neighbour -0.157    -1.209***      -0.415**  0.023  
                 
       
Weight-for-age       
IPTW Matching 0.032     -0.886** 0.134    
Nearest Neighbour -0.032 -0.435 -0.086    
       
       
Body Mass Index       
IPTW Matching 0.092 -0.034 0.273  -0.072  
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Notes: Control Group 1 is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant only once in the 
four time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant 
twice in the four time periods. 
 
 
years; 1-4 years; and 10-14 years who received the grant twice compared to those 
that received it only once; by 0.26, 0.7, and 0.34 standard deviations respectively.  
The significant program intensity impact for boys aged 10-14 years is evidence of 
catching up in long term investments in health for boys compared to girls. However, 
there is no impact on weight-for-age for boys for the full sample. A positive and 
significant program intensity impact on weight-for-age is registered for boys aged 1-
4 years; with boys who received the Foster Care Grant twice witnessing an 
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improvement in weight-for-age z-scores by 0.886 standard deviations compared to 
those that received the grant only once. No impact on body mass index is registered 
for boys of all age groups. 
 
The results on program intensity of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age, weight-
for-age, and body mass index therefore show that there is a positive and significant 
impact of the grant on height-for-age for the full sample (children aged 0-14 years), 
for children aged 1-4 years, and for children aged 5-9 years. However, there is no 
impact on height-for-age for children aged 10-14 years and neither is there a 
significant program intensity impact on weight-for-age and body mass index for all 
age categories. By paying particular attention to gender heterogeneity, results show 
that there is a positive and significant program intensity impact for boys in all age 
categories including even children aged 10-14 years; and a positive and significant 
program intensity impact on weight-for-age for boys aged 1-4 years. However, there 
is no program intensity impact on height-for-age, weight-for-age, and body mass 
index for girls.  
 
 
2.7.1.2 Program Impact  
 
Estimations to assess the impact of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age, weight-
for-age, and body mass index were carried out based on a control group comprised 
of children who never received the Foster Care Grant in the four time period. This 
comparison group is conveniently named Control Group 2 for ease of reference. The 
Treatment Group is comprised of children whose caregivers received the grant twice 
in the four time period. As highlighted earlier on, the choice of this treatment group 
is motivated by specifications in the regulation of the grant in which it is 
categorically stated that the grant is usually for two years with a provision for 








Table 2.14: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of the Foster 
Care Grant on Child Health Using Propensity Score Matching (Based on 
Control Group 2) 
 














aged 5- 9 
years 
 






       
Height-for-age       
IPTW Matching      -0.225*** -0.665*** -0.285***  -0.135  
Nearest Neighbour      -0.203*** -0.874*** -0.219**  -0.132  
                 
       
Weight-for-age       
IPTW Matching -0.164 -0.455 -0.133    
Nearest Neighbour -0.164 -0.400 -0.151    
       
       
Body Mass Index       
IPTW Matching -0.153** -0.366 -0.144  -0.105  
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Notes: Control Group 2 is comprised of children who never received the Foster Care Grant in the four 
time periods. The Treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant 
twice in the four time periods. 
 
 
Table 2.14 above presents Average Treatment on the Treated Effect (ATT) 
estimations of the Foster Care Grant on child health using propensity score matching 
based on Control Group 2. The program has a positive and significant impact on 
height-for-age for children aged 0-14 years, 1-4 years, and 5-9 years. The estimates 
are significant at 1 percent. The program improves height-for-age z-score by 0.225, 
0.665, and 0.285 standard deviations for the age categories, respectively. These 
results confirm hypothesis 2.1 above. However, there is no effect for children aged 
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10-14 years. This, in a way, can be argued to be contrary to the literature of catching 
up (see Hirvoneni, 2014; Lundeen et al., 2014). The Foster Care Grant, therefore, has 
a significant impact on height-for-age for children when they are most vulnerable. 
  
The program has no impact on weight-for-age. This result is similar to the result 
obtained in assessing program intensity above. This means that the program has no 
impact on short-term changes in nutritional status but rather appeals to the long-term 
human capital development. As for body mass index, there is no impact for children 
aged 1-4 years, aged 5-9 years, and aged 10-14 years. A significant result registered 
for the full sample can therefore be argued to be driven by the 0-1 year olds.  
 
Disaggregating the sample by gender as presented in Table 2.15, the grant has a 
positive and significant impact on height-for-age for girls. Girls aged 0-14 years who 
received the Foster Care Grant twice witness an improvement in height-for-age z-
scores by 0.226 standard deviations compared to those who did not receive at all. 
The estimates for girls aged 1-4 years and 5-9 years are positive and significant. 
However, the program does not have an impact on height-for-age for girls aged 10-
14 years. On the other hand, as detailed in Table 2.16, the program has a positive and 
significant effect on height-for-age for boys aged 0-14 years (full sample) and boys 
aged 1-4 years with increases in standard deviations by 0.25 and 0.67 respectively. 
However, there is no impact for boys aged 5-9 years and the estimate for boys aged 
10-14 years is weakly significant. Just as in the ATT results on program intensity, 
the program has a positive and significant impact on weight-for-age for boys aged 1-
4 years, increasing the z-score by 0.85 standard deviations. There is no impact on 














Table 2.15: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of the Foster 
Care Grant on Girls’ Health Using Propensity Score Matching (Based on 
Control Group 2) 
 























       
 Height-for-age       
IPTW Matching -0.226*** -0.689* -0.362**  -0.075  
Nearest Neighbour   -0.212**    -1.111*** -0.350**  -0.014  
                 
       
Weight-for-age       
IPTW matching -0.156 -0.193 -0.159    
Nearest Neighbour -0.132 -0.025 -0.278*    
       
       
Outcome: Body Mass 
Index 
      
IPTW matching      -0.200** -0.508 -0.216  -0.110  










































        Yes 
 
        Yes 
 
 
         141 
         6694 
 
 
Notes: Control Group 2 is comprised of children who never received the Foster Care Grant in the four 
time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant twice 













Table 2.16: The Average Treatment on the Treated Effect (ATT) of the Foster 
Care Grant on Boys’ Health Using Propensity Score Matching (Based on 
Control Group 2) 
 














aged 5- 9 
years 
 






       
Height-for-age       
IPTW Matching  -0.250***     -0.674** -0.201  -0.266*  
Nearest Neighbour -0.259**      -0.371 -0.150       -0.229  
                 
       
Weight-for-age       
IPTW Matching -0.179 -0.845** -0.103    
Nearest Neighbour -0.113   -1.202*** 0.003    
       
       
Body Mass Index       
IPTW Matching -0.111 -0.148 -0.038  -0.157  
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Notes: Control Group 2 is comprised of children who never received the Foster Care Grant in the four 
time periods. The treatment Group is comprised of children who received the Foster Care Grant twice 
in the four time periods. 
 
 
Estimation results of the impact of the Foster Care Grant on child health therefore 
show that the program has a significant impact on height-for-age for children living 
in South Africa. However, the impact of the program does not cascade to children 
aged 10-14 years in general. This result is also confirmed in the estimations of the 
impact of the program intensity above where there is a positive and significant 
impact on height-for-age for children aged 0-14 years, 1-4 years, and 5-9 years but 
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not significant for children aged 10-14 years. On the other hand, there is a positive 
and significant impact on height-for-age for both girls and boys. However, as noted 
above, although there is an impact on height-for-age for girls who received the grant 
twice as compared to those that do not receive, there is no program intensity impact 
for girls meaning that there is no further marginal impact for girls who receive the 
grant twice compared to those that receive it only once. This is an important result. 
In contrast, however, boys witness both significant program and program intensity 
impacts. There is no impact on weight-for-age for the full sample and all ages. This 
result is also confirmed in the program intensity estimations.  
 
 
2.7.2 Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects Estimation Results 
 
Results of the Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects models are detailed in Tables 
2.17 to 2.25 and are based on Wave 3(2012), Wave 4(2015), and Wave 5(2017) 
datasets. Colum (1) details estimation results of the Hybrid model and Column (2) 
displays Correlated Random-Effects estimations. From the tables, the W-prefix in 
some variables means within-cluster effects, B_ prefix denotes between-cluster 
effects, and variables with the R_ prefix are estimated the same way as in standard 
Random Effects models. Uniquely, variables with a D_ prefix give the difference 
between the between- and within-cluster effects. 
 
Table 2.17 details estimation results of Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects 
models for the full sample (children aged 0-14 years). The variable of interest is 
binary equaling one if a child received the Foster care Grant and the dependent 
variable is height-for-age. Receiving the Foster Care Grant is associated with a 
within-cluster improvement in height-for-age for children aged 0-14 years by 0.06 
standard deviations (Table 2.17, Column 1). Within-cluster increases in age are 
associated with a within-cluster increase in height-for-age by 0.04 standard 
deviations; an estimate which is significant at 10 percent. However, between-cluster 
effect of the Foster Care Grant is associated with a between-cluster decrease in 
height-for-age z-scores by 0.11 standard deviations, albeit weakly significant. An 






Table 2.17: Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects Health Estimations for 
Children aged 0 – 14 years 
 






   
R__Child is female   0.12***   0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
R__Child is Black   0.17***   0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Foster Care Grant 0.06 0.06 
                        (0.07)           (0.07) 
W__Household Size -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
W__Household Head’s Education -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
W__Child’s age 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W_ Birth place:Hospital 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
W__Health-Excellent -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
W__Child has health card   -0.13***   -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
W__Child has medical aid -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
W__Urban_formal -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
W__Tribal Authority Area 0.08 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
W__Urban_informal 0.07 0.07 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
W__Log_income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
W__Log_food Expenditure 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
W__Household Head is female 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
W__2015 Year Dummy 0.07 0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
W__2017 Year Dummy 0.10 0.10 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
B__Foster Care Grant -0.11*  
 (0.06)  
B__Household Size   -0.03***  
 (0.00)  
B__Household Head’s Education   0.01***  
 (0.00)  
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B__Child’s age   0.01***  
 (0.00)  
B__Birth place hospital 0.05  
 (0.03)  
B__Child’’s health_excellent   0.09***  
 (0.02)  
B__Child has health card -0.00  
 (0.05)  
B__Child has medical aid   0.28***  
 (0.08)  
B__Urban_formal  0.09**  
 (0.04)  
B__Tribal Authority Areas   0.12***  
 (0.04)  
B__Urban_informal 0.01  
 (0.05)  
B__Log_income   0.06***  
 (0.02)  
B__Log_food expenditure   0.12***  
 (0.03)  
B__Household Head is female -0.02  
 (0.02)  
B__2015 Year dummy   0.19***  
 (0.04)  
B__2017 Year dummy   0.12***  
 (0.04)  
D__Foster Care Grant  -0.18** 
  (0.09) 
D__Household Size  -0.02*** 
  (0.01) 
D__Household Head’s Education    0.02*** 
  (0.00) 
D__Child’s age  -0.03 
  (0.03) 
D__Birth place: hospital  0.03 
  (0.05) 
D__Child’s health: excellent    0.10*** 
  (0.03) 
D__Child has health card  0.12* 
  (0.07) 
D__Child has medical aid    0.39*** 
  (0.12) 
D__Urban_formal  0.17* 
  (0.10) 
D__Tribal Authority Areas  0.04 
  (0.10) 
D__Urban_informal  -0.06 
  (0.13) 
D__Log_income   0.05** 
  (0.03) 
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D__Log_food expenditure    0.10*** 
  (0.03) 
D__Household Head is female  -0.03 
  (0.03) 
D__2015 year dummy  0.11 
  (0.08) 
D__2017 year dummy  0.02 
  (0.13) 
Constant -2.71*** -2.71*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
   
Observations 25,554 25,554 
Number of groups 14,903 14,903 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent Variable is height-for-age 
z-score. B_ prefix means between-cluster effects; D_ gives the differences between the between- and 
within-cluster effects; and R_ prefix denote same effects as those in standard random-effects model. 
 
 
scores for children by 0.03 standard deviations and is significant at 1 percent. The 
between-cluster effects of household head’s education, child’s age, child’s health, 
whether a child has a medical aid, a child lives in Tribal Authority Areas compared 
to those that live in the rural areas, log of household income, log of food expenditure, 
2015 year dummy, and 2017 year dummy are all positive and significant at 1 
percent.  
 
The estimations and test results not included in the appendix, proved that the within-
cluster effects are statistically different from the between-cluster effects as evidenced 
by small p-values obtained in the tests of orthogonality between observables and 
unobservables. This is applicable to all variables except for the child’s age, 
birthplace at a hospital, geographical areas (informal urban area and tribal authority 
area), female household headship, and year dummies. All the same it is evidence 
enough to reject the assumption of orthogonality and therefore ground for not using 
the Random Effects model.  
 
Column (2) of Table 2.17 details Correlated Random-Effects estimation results of 
the effect of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age. There is a positive within-
group effect for children receiving the Foster Care Grant. Having a health card 
compared to not having one is associated with a within-cluster decrease in height-
for-age z-score by 0.13 standard deviations, which is significant at 1 percent. The 
Correlated Random-Effects estimations show that the difference between the 
between- and the within-cluster effects of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age is 
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negative by a factor of 0.18 which is significant at 5 percent. The differences for 
household head’s education, child’s health, child has a medical aid, lives in formal 
urban area, log of household income, and log of food expenditure are all positive and 
significant.  
 
Table 2.18 below details Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects estimation results 
of the effect of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age for children aged 1-4 years. 
Both the Hybrid and Correlated Random–Effects models predict that receiving the 
Foster Care Grant leads to a within-cluster effect of 0.58 standard deviations in 
height-for-age, which is significant at 10 percent. It is worth mentioning in passing 
that within-cluster increases in household size are associated with a within-cluster 
decrease in height-for-age z-scores and increases in a child’s age is associated with a 
within-cluster increases in height-for-age z-scores by 0.33 standard deviations and 
are both strongly statistically different from zero. 
 
Table 2.18: Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects Estimations for Children 
aged 1 – 4 years 
 






   
W__Foster Care Grant 0.58* 0.58* 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
W__Household Size -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
W__Household head’s education -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
W__Household head’s age 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
W__Child’s age    0.33*** 0.33*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
W__Child is female -0.16 -0.16 
 (0.59) (0.59) 
W__Black 0.02 0.02 
 (0.90) (0.90) 
W__Birth place – hospital 0.05 0.05 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
W__Child’s health: excellent 0.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
W__Child has health card 0.04 0.04 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
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W__Child has medical aid -0.29 -0.29 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
W__Urban_formal -0.27 -0.27 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
W__Tribal Authority Areas -0.29 -0.29 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
W__Urban_informal 0.08 0.08 
 (0.40) (0.40) 
W__Log_income 0.11* 0.11* 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
W__Log_food expenditure -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
W__Household head is female -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
W__2015 year dummy -0.48* -0.48* 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
W__2017 year dummy -0.83* -0.83* 
 (0.47) (0.47) 
B__Foster Care Grant -0.01  
 (0.18)  
B__Household Size -0.04***  
 (0.01)  
B__Household head’s education 0.03***  
 (0.01)  
B__Household head’s age 0.01***  
 (0.00)  
B__Child’s age 0.08***  
 (0.02)  
B__Child is female 0.14***  
 (0.04)  
B__Black 0.17***  
 (0.06)  
B__Birth place - hospital 0.04  
 (0.05)  
B__Child’s health: excellent 0.07*  
 (0.04)  
B__Child has health card -0.02  
 (0.15)  
B__Child has medical aid 0.07  
 (0.14)  
B__Urban_formal 0.04  
 (0.07)  
B__Tribal Authority Areas 0.14**  
 (0.07)  
B__Urban_informal -0.05  
 (0.09)  
B__Log_income 0.08**  
 (0.03)  
B__Log_food expenditure 0.08*  
 (0.04)  
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B__Household head is female 0.00  
 (0.04)  
B__2015 year dummy -0.01  
 (0.05)  
B__2017 year dummy -0.04  
 (0.05)  
D__Foster Care Grant  -0.59 
  (0.37) 
D__Household Size  0.00 
  (0.02) 
D__Household head’s education  0.03 
  (0.02) 
D__Household head’s age  0.00 
  (0.00) 
D__Child’s age  -0.25** 
  (0.10) 
D__Child is female  0.31 
  (0.59) 
D__Black  0.16 
  (0.90) 
D__Birth place - hospital  -0.01 
  (0.14) 
D__Child’s health: excellent  0.06 
  (0.08) 
D__Child has health card  -0.06 
  (0.28) 
D__Child has medical aid  0.36 
  (0.35) 
D__Urban_formal  0.32 
  (0.31) 
D__Tribal Authority Areas  0.43 
  (0.31) 
D__Urban_informal  -0.13 
  (0.42) 
D__Log_income  -0.03 
  (0.07) 
D__Log_food expenditure  0.10 
  (0.08) 
D__Household head is female  0.06 
  (0.10) 
D__2015 year dummy  0.48* 
  (0.26) 
D__2017 year dummy  0.79* 
  (0.47) 
Constant -3.18*** -3.18*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
   
Observations 6,856 6,856 
Number of groups 5,712 5,712 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent Variable is height-for-age 
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z-score. B_ prefix means between-cluster effects; D_ gives the differences between the between- and 
within-cluster effects; and R_ prefix denote same effects as those in standard random-effects model. 
 
For children aged 5-9 years, the within-cluster effect of the Foster Care Grant is 
positive but not significant. These results are detailed in Table 2.19.  
 
Table 2.19: Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects Estimations for Children 
aged 5-9 years 
 






   
R__Black 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
W__Foster Care Grant 0.12 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
W__Household Size -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
W__Household head’s education -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
W__Child’s age 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
W__Child is female -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
W__Birth place -hospital 0.09 0.09 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
W__Child’s health: excellent -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Child has health card -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
W__Child has medical aid 0.00 0.00 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
W__Urban_formal -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
W__Tribal Authority Areas 0.18 0.18 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
W__Urban_informal 0.04 0.04 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
W__Log_income 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Log_food expenditure 0.05 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Household head is female -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
W__2015 year dummy -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
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W__2017 year dummy -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
B__Foster Care Grant -0.10  
 (0.09)  
B__Household Size -0.03***  
 (0.00)  
B__Household head’s education 0.01**  
 (0.00)  
B__Child’s age 0.03**  
 (0.01)  
B__Child is female 0.05*  
 (0.03)  
B__Birth place -hospital 0.05  
 (0.04)  
B__Child’s health: excellent 0.06**  
 (0.03)  
B__Child has health card -0.03  
 (0.07)  
B__Child has medical aid 0.28***  
 (0.10)  
B__Urban_formal 0.19***  
 (0.05)  
B__Tribal Authority Areas 0.22***  
 (0.05)  
B__Urban_informal 0.17**  
 (0.07)  
B__Log_income 0.04  
 (0.02)  
B__Log_food expenditure 0.09***  
 (0.03)  
B__Household head is female -0.04  
 (0.03)  
B__2015 year dummy 0.11**  
 (0.04)  
B__2017 year dummy 0.12***  
 (0.04)  
D__Foster Care Grant  -0.21 
  (0.14) 
D__Household Size  -0.02** 
  (0.01) 
D__Household head’s education  0.01* 
  (0.01) 
D__Child’s age  -0.07 
  (0.04) 
D__Child is female  0.13 
  (0.27) 
D__Birth place - hospital  -0.04 
  (0.08) 
D__Child health: excellent  0.11*** 
  (0.04) 
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D__Child has health card  -0.03 
  (0.11) 
D__Child has medical aid  0.28* 
  (0.16) 
D__Urban_formal  0.19 
  (0.16) 
D__Tribal Authority Areas  0.04 
  (0.17) 
D__Urban_informal  0.12 
  (0.21) 
D__Log_income  0.03 
  (0.04) 
D__Log_food expenditure  0.04 
  (0.05) 
D__Household head is female  -0.02 
  (0.05) 
D__2015 year dummy  0.18 
  (0.11) 
D__2017 year dummy  0.29 
  (0.20) 
Constant -2.23*** -2.23*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
   
Observations 9,579 9,579 
Number of groups 7,096 7,096 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent Variable is height-for-age 
z-score. B_ prefix means between-cluster effects; D_ gives the differences between the between- and 
within-cluster effects; and R_ prefix denote same effects as those in standard random-effects model. 
 
 
On the other hand, Table 2.20 details the Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects 
estimation results of the effect of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age for 
children aged 10-14 years. Receiving the Foster Care Grant by children aged 10-14 
years is associated with a within-cluster increase in height-for-age by 0.16 standard 
deviations, which is significant at 10 percent. However, the between-cluster effect of 
the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age for children aged 10-14 years is negative and 
weakly significant with a factor of 0.11. The difference between the between- and 
within-cluster effect of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age is significant at 5 









Table 2.20: Hybrid and Correlated Random-Effects Estimations for Children 
aged 10-14 years 
 






   
R__Child is female 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
R__Black 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
W__Foster Care Grant 0.16* 0.16* 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
W__Household Size 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
W__Household Head’s Education -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
W__Child’s age -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
W__Birth place – hospital 0.03 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
W__Child’s health: excellent 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Child has health card -0.12** -0.12** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
W__Child has medical aid -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
W__Urban_formal -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
W__Tribal Authority Areas -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
W__Urban_informal 0.05 0.05 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
W__Log_income 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Log_food expenditure -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
W__Household Head is female -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
W__2015 year dummy 0.15 0.15 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
W__2017 year dummy 0.09 0.09 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
B__Foster Care Grant -0.11*  
 (0.06)  
B__Household Size -0.02***  
 (0.00)  
B__Household Head’s Education 0.02***  
 (0.00)  
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B__Child’s age -0.08***  
 (0.01)  
B__Birth place – hospital 0.06*  
 (0.04)  
B__Child’s health: excellent 0.05  
 (0.03)  
B__Child has health card -0.13**  
 (0.05)  
B__Child has medical aid 0.24*  
 (0.13)  
B__Urban_formal 0.05  
 (0.05)  
B__Tribal Authority Areas 0.03  
 (0.05)  
B__Urban_informal -0.01  
 (0.07)  
B__Log_income 0.00  
 (0.03)  
B__Log_food expenditure 0.11***  
 (0.03)  
B__Household Head is female -0.02  
 (0.03)  
B__2015 year dummy 0.33***  
 (0.04)  
B__2017 year dummy 0.35***  
 (0.04)  
D__Foster Care Grant  -0.27** 
  (0.11) 
D__Household Size  -0.03*** 
  (0.01) 
D__Household head’s Education  0.02*** 
  (0.01) 
D__Child’s age  -0.07* 
  (0.04) 
D__Birth place – hospital  0.03 
  (0.08) 
D__Child’s health: excellent  -0.02 
  (0.04) 
D__Child has health card  -0.01 
  (0.08) 
D__Child has medical_aid  0.45** 
  (0.19) 
D__Urban_formal  0.11 
  (0.16) 
D__Tribal Authority Areas  0.03 
  (0.17) 
D__Urban_informal  -0.06 
  (0.21) 
D__Log_income  -0.00 
  (0.04) 
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D__Log_food expenditure  0.11** 
  (0.05) 
D__Household Head is female  0.02 
  (0.05) 
D__2015 year dummy  0.18 
  (0.11) 
D__2017 year dummy  0.26 
  (0.19) 
Constant -1.20*** -1.20*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
   
Observations 8,456 8,456 
Number of groups 6,290 6,290 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent Variable is height-for-age 
z-score. B_ prefix means between-cluster effects; D_ gives the differences between the between- and 





It is important to comment on the findings of the impact of the Foster Care Grant on 
height-for-age vis-a-vis the impact of the grant on weight-for-age. One would expect 
short-run effects on height to be small. In this study, compared to estimates on 
weight-for-age, the estimates on height-for-age are relatively larger. However, the 
results are acceptable considering that in general, the estimates on weight-for-age are 
not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, it is not entirely unique to 
witness a situation where estimates on the impact of a program on height-for-age are 
relatively larger than those for weight-for-age. For example, for the Targeted 
Resource Transfers for families program in Nepal, Renzaho et al. (2017) obtained 
relatively greater improvement in height-for-age for children compared to the 
improvement in weight-for-age after a five-year period of intervention. 
 
Furthermore, the estimates on the impact of the Foster Care Grant on height-for-age 
compare very well with estimates of cash transfers in South Africa. For example, 
Duflo (2003) discovered that girls living with a member eligible for the Old Age 
Pension program experience an increase in height-for-age by 0.68 standard 
deviations and 0.11 for boys; and also discovered that pensions received by women 
improved the height-for-age z-scores of younger girls by at least 1.16 standard 
deviations. On the other hand, the Child Support Grant in South Africa was observed 
to increase children under the age of 36 months’ height-for-age z-scores by 0.25 
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standard deviations (see e.g. de Groot et al., 2015). Elsewhere, the effect of the 
Samurdhi in Sri Lanka on height-for-age for children under five years ranges 
between 0.4 and 0.5 standard deviations (ibid.). The Apni Beti Apna Dhan program 
in India improved child height by over 0.3 standard deviations (Manley et al., 2013). 
It is also important to note that program characteristics play a role in influencing 
impact, some of which are, among others, payment size and duration. As noted in 
section 2.2 above, the Foster Care Grant is relatively generous.  
 
It is not directly possible to determine from the data children who were fostered but 
did not receive the Foster Care Grant. This may be viewed as a limitation in that 
there may be arguments for using just a sample of fostered children in assessing the 
impact of the grant. However, given the empirical strategy adopted in this study, it is 
plausible to argue that this limitation can be ignored. Propensity Score Matching is 
capable of appropriately assigning observations into treatment and control groups 
based on observables.  On the other hand, just using the sample of fostered children 
may accentuate the problem of selection bias that the Propensity Score Matching is 
not able to fully address if the bias emanates from unobserved characteristics. If 
foster parents who chose to apply for the Foster Care Grant are systematically 
different from foster parents who choose not to apply for the grant and these 
characteristics are unobserved, then selection bias will be greater. Related, just 
choosing a sample of fostered children may suffer from sample selection bias. It can 
therefore be argued that broadening the sample may reduce this bias especially 
considering that the Propensity Score Matching adopted in this study does not 
address the challenge when the characteristics are unobserved. It is proposed, 
however, that further research can focus on evaluating how the Foster Care Grant 
affects outcomes for unfostered children living in the same household. 
 
The presence of bias emanating from unobserved characteristics can explain the 
difference in the impact size estimates between the Propensity Score Matching and 
the Correlated Random Effects (as well as those from the Hybrid Model). Program 
impact estimates from the Hybrid and the Correlated Random Effects models are 
relatively smaller when compared to estimates obtained using Propensity Score 
Matching. This confirms that whatever the unobserved heterogeneity bias that may 
have persisted in the estimates obtained through Propensity Score Matching must 
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have been sufficiently dealt with under the Hybrid and Correlated Random Effects 
models. 
 
It is also important to comment on the importance of disaggregating the sample 
according to different age groups and gender. One of the strengths of this study is the 
quality of the data. This study draws from a huge panel data with five waves as 
detailed in Table 2.1 in Section 2.4. This allowed the disaggregation of the sample 
into sub-groups which, enriched the analysis and allowed further interrogation of the 
issue at stake. When assessing the impact of a cash transfer on child health 
outcomes, it is more informative to disaggregate the sample based on age groups. 
Studies on health outcomes are encouraged to stratify their analyses by appropriate 
age brackets (see e.g. Alderman and Headey, 2018).  It is generally accepted that 
children younger than two years are more vulnerable to poor diets (see e.g. Leroy et 
al., 2015) and there is continued widening of the absolute height deficit for children 
between two to five years. Therefore, disaggregating the sample into age brackets 
enhances understanding of the impact of the Foster Care Grant on child health which 
is essential on informing the targeting of interventions. 
 
Prior works on cash transfers in South Africa have indicated gender heterogeneity to 
impact of cash transfers on child health. Duflo (2003), for example, concluded that 
the expansion of the Old-age Pension program in South Africa led to an 
improvement in the health and nutrition of girls and no discernible effect on boys. It 
is therefore important to disaggregate the sample according to gender so as to be able 
to determine the effect of the Foster Care Grant on boys vis-a-vis on girls. In tests 
separately carried out, the results indicate that the coefficients are significantly 
different from each other, confirming the existence of heterogeneity across the sub-
groups. In one of the tests, I used the Wald chi-square test after estimating separate 
models for boys and girls after which I then used suest to combine the models and 
tested whether the coefficients differ across the groups. In each case the groups are 
significantly different from each other. I also compared the 95 percent confidence 
intervals between the groups and I discovered that they do not overlap, meaning that 
there are statistically significant differences at 5 percent level. 
 
In future, should there be a major policy shift in the way the Foster Care Grant is 
administered or should there be an exogenous shock affecting eligibility for the 
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grant, then other empirical strategies such as the Difference-in-Differences 
framework may be adopted to check the robustness of the findings presented in this 
study. A shift in policy that makes a certain group of people that are not currently 
eligible for the grant to become suddenly eligible will present a natural experiment in 
which a double difference between ‘treatment and control group before and after the 
policy change’ would show the impact of the Foster Care Grant on a number of 
selected outcomes. Such a policy shift may also allow empirical strategies such as 
the Regression Discontinuity Design to establish the impact of the Foster Care Grant 
in the neighbourhood of those that find themselves suddenly eligible against those 





The Foster Care Grant in South Africa is an unconditional social protection program 
intended to provide for the basic needs of children who have been placed in the care 
of foster parents by a Children’s Court. The grant is generous and presents an 
interesting case study, which has not been subjected to rigorous evaluations and has 
not received much attention. The study bridged this gap by assessing its impact on 
height-for-age, weight-for-age, and body mass index. 
 
The findings indicate that the program has a positive and significant impact on 
height-for-age for the full sample (children aged 0-14 years), for children aged 1-4 
years, and for children aged 5-9 years. However, the impact does not cascade to 
children aged 10-14 years, a result running contrary to studies on catching up such as 
Rieger and Wagner (2015). The results also show a positive and significant program 
intensity impact for boys on height-for-age. To the contrary, there is no such further 
marginal impact for girls who receive the grant twice compared to those that receive 
it only once. This result seems to be at parallel with findings by Manley et al. (2013) 
and Duflo (2003) where they discovered that girls tend to benefit more than boys. 
Since there is a provision for extension to access the Foster Care Grant after the 
initial two years, it can therefore be encouraged, where circumstances allow, that 





The findings also indicate that in general, there is no program intensity and program 
impact on weight-for-age. This means that the program has no impact on short-term 
changes in nutritional status but rather appeals to the long term human capital 
development through height-for-age. The Foster Care Grant has an impact on height-
for-age. This result runs contrary to studies such as Kirk et al. (2018)’s findings 
elsewhere in Africa who find no impact of unconditional cash transfers on height-
for-age. The grant, therefore, has a significant impact on height-for-age for foster 































COPING STRATEGIES, AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES AND 






Food security is a perennial challenge for many households in Zimbabwe. This is as 
a result of a number of factors ranging from droughts, climate change (see e.g. 
Govere et al., 2020; Hove and Gweme, 2018; Nyagumbo et al., 2019) to land tenure. 
For example, some parts of Zimbabwe have become synonymous with drought 
(Belle, 2017; Mavhura, 2017) and flood-related disasters (Gwimbi, 2007) which 
destroy crops, livestock and hopes resulting in food insecurity. The creation of small 
to medium land holdings from what used to be large scale commercial farms has 
created heterogeneity in productivity (see e.g. Moyo and Salawu, 2018) and 
contributing to persistent poverty and food insecurity among smallholder farming 
households (see e.g. Komarek et al., 2017; Ragasa and Mazunda; 2018). Coupled 
with lack of appropriate agricultural technologies and little research and 
development, this has left many households at the mercy of food insecurity.  
 
When faced with food insecurity, households tend to rely on social protection 
programs (Bhalla et al., 2018) such as cash transfers. However, in the absence of 
formal programs, households fall back on their social networks and other coping 
strategies to ensure that they survive (see e.g. Fafchamps, 2006; Fafchamps and 
Lund, 2003). Social capital may enhance the ability of households, villages and 
communities to tap from informal social support among neighbours and group 
members that might curb food insecurity. 
  
Households and minority groups with low social capital experience food insecurity 
(Dean and Sharkey, 2011). Relatedly, community-level social capital is also 
significantly associated with decreased odds of experiencing hunger (Martin et al., 
2004). On the other hand, individual and collective behaviour, social networks, and 
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associations have a great influence on responses and recovery systems against 
shocks (see e.g. Chan et al., 2018; Kerr, 2018; Nagoli and Chiwon-Karltun, 2017; 
Pacoma and Delda, 2019; Paul et al., 2019; Sabatino, 2019). Collective action 
necessitates pooling of resources, knowledge, and effort for community responses 
(see e.g Bourne et al., 2017).  
 
It is generally accepted that social capital is contextual (Ehsan et al., 2019; 
MacGillivray, 2018). This is the reason why, in each specific context, social capital 
remains an interesting research area. Alternative measures may only be relevant to 
particular levels – individual, household and community – of social capital (Paul et 
al., 2019). It is important to consider different measures in different contexts and this 
study adds to the literature by presenting results of the impact of social capital on 
food security in Zimbabwe. As noted by Sabatino (2019), there is still absolute 
necessity to consider the different social capital measures and this research does so 
by using ‘belonging to a social group’ as a measure of social capital. 
 
In Zimbabwe, social groups are increasingly becoming important given the collapse 
of formal institutions and persistent poverty. Households are forced to resort to their 
social networks for resources and information. Belonging to a social group can 
therefore be viewed as a potential resource for household food security. This 
explains why social capital measured as ‘belonging to a social group’ is important in 
the context of Zimbabwe.  Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following 
questions. First, are households with members belonging to a social group more 
likely to be food-secure and less likely to go hungry than those without? When faced 
with food insecurity, households tend to adopt and adapt to certain behavioural 
hunger-coping strategies. So, second, are households with members belonging to 
social groups less likely to adopt behavioural hunger-coping strategies? Third, does 
social capital increase the likelihood of a household receiving and seeking 
agricultural extension services? Finally, does social capital increase the likelihood of 
a household treating its harvest against post-harvest losses? 
 
To answer these questions, this research uses a nationally representative dataset 
collected annually by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
(ZIMVAC), which is a consortium of the Government of Zimbabwe, Development 
Partners, United Nations, NGOs, and Technical Agencies. For the purpose of this 
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study, 2015 ZIMVAC cross-sectional data was selected specifically because it is the 
only survey that asked whether households had members belonging to a social 
group. Other later surveys used trust as a measure of social capital, which was not of 
interest in this study. A quasi-experimental method, Propensity Score Matching, was 
used to ascertain the effect of social capital.  
 
The study offers the following major findings. First, households with members 
belonging to a social group are more food secure and are less likely to go hungry 
than those without membership. Social capital ensures food security and decreases 
the risk of hunger in Zimbabwe. Second, households with members belonging to a 
social group are less likely to engage in demanding and psychologically stressful 
food insecurity coping strategies such as skipping meals, limiting portion size of 
meals and reducing number of meals eaten. Third, households with members 
belonging to a social group are more likely to participate in agricultural training; 
receive visits from agricultural extension officers, seek cropping and veterinary 
advice, and technical support. Finally, households with members belonging to a 
social group are more likely to treat their harvest against post-harvest losses. This 
ensures food security. 
  
The rest of the Chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews relevant 
literature and outlines the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 describes the data used 
in this research and offers descriptive statistics and Section 3.4 details the design of 




3.2 Literature Review 
 
This section presents a discussion on theoretical framework and empirical review 
including a detailed consideration and discussion on the concept of social capital in 
general and on household hunger and food security, coping strategies, and 







3.2.1 Social Capital, household hunger and food security 
 
The literature generally acknowledges that the concept of social capital is 
‘definition-elusive’, debatable, multi-layered and complex (Ng’ang’a, 2016; 
Nguyen-Trung et al., 2020; Sabatino, 2019). It embodies features of social 
organization such as trust, norms and networks that enhances coordination and 
cooperation for reciprocal benefit (Putman, 1995). It is also seen as a ‘stock’ or set of 
resources in-built in social networks (Lin, 2017; Sabatino, 2019) and therefore 
viewed as an asset of social norms and networks at the core of community collective 
actions (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Social capital is, in simple terms, frequently 
defined in terms of trust, adherence to norms or participation in networks (Fedes van 
Rijn, 2015). It is a resource at the disposal of individuals and households, which 
emerges from their social bonds and from belonging to a community. 
  
Food security, on the other hand, is important in building a health society. 
Household food insecurity has been linked to an array of negative psychological 
outcomes, such as mental distress and accompanying feelings of depression, 
especially among parents (see Jackson et al., 2019; Mandelbaum et al., 2018) may be 
because food insecurity is often linked to family-level processes (Jackson and 
Vaughn, 2017). It may also be linked to neighbourhoods with low social capital, 
meaning that higher levels of social capital are correlated with decreased risk of 
household hunger (Nebbitt et al., 2016). A low level of social capital may undermine 
the ability of a community to tap from informal social support among neighbours 
and group members that might curb food insecurity. The argument is that social 
networks in highly cohesive communities can act as a fall-back when families in the 
community face hunger. 
 
It can, therefore, be argued that belonging to a social group can be a potential 
resource for household food security. This is because social groups provide a 
channel through which households gain new information, resources, and 
opportunities. Being a member creates belonging and a sense of confidence; and 
members receive acceptance, empathy and support. This leads to the following 







Households with members belonging to a social group are more likely to be food-




Households with members belonging to a social group are less likely to experience a 




Low social capital is associated with food insecurity (see e.g. Dean and Sharkey, 
2011; Jackson et al., 2019; Johnson et al., 2010). Martin et al. (2004) explored 
whether social capital is positively associated with decreased risk of hunger and 
concluded that social capital at both the household and community levels is 
significantly associated with household food security. According to them, 
community-level social capital is significantly associated with decreased odds of 
experiencing hunger. They also found that having a household member who 
participates in a social or civic organization is also significantly associated with 
having higher levels of social capital. Social capital, especially in terms of 
reciprocity among neighbours, according to them, contributes to household food 
security. Households with higher levels of social capital are less likely to experience 
hunger. 
 
This research, however, is distinct from theirs on a number of fronts. First, although 
they focused on the impact of social capital on household food security, social 
capital is contextual since participation is likely to be influenced by culture. Their 
study area is a developed country and this research adds to extant literature from a 
developing country’s perspective. Second, the measure of social capital they used is 
different from the one adopted in this study. In their paper, they used social capital 
measured using a 7-item Likert scale analysed at household and community level 
whereas in this study social capital is a binary response indicating whether a 
household has a member who belongs to a social group.  Third, in their empirical 
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strategy, they used a logistic regression and this study adopts a different empirical 
strategy which is based on quasi-experimental approach. 
 
Although Dean and Sharkey (2011) looked at social capital and food insecurity, this 
research is distinct in that it focuses on households as opposed to individuals. The 
argument for them is that access of specific individuals to community-based 
resources is grounded in these individuals’ engagement with their community. A 
counter argument in this research is that in Zimbabwe, ensuring food security is 
mainly shouldered by household heads and in turn they make decisions for the 
household. This view tends to support what Morton et al. (2008) referred to as 
‘reciprocal economies’ where food is shared among friends, family members, 
neighbors and other community members. Such decisions are usually made by 
household heads on behalf of the household. An individual level cross-sectional 
study of social capital and food insecurity may not address social capital as a 
structural property. Furthermore, their measure of social capital focuses on extra-
familial community components such as trust in one’s community or community 
safety. 
   
3.2.2 Social Capital and Coping Strategies 
 
Households and communities, particularly in developing countries, find themselves 
at the receiving end of shocks and are ‘forced’ to adopt and adapt coping strategies 
to get by. Such shocks include but are not limited to climate risk and food insecurity. 
When faced with food insecurity, households may adopt aggressive coping strategies 
such as skipping meals, limiting portion size of meals, reducing number of meals 
eaten, and borrowing food. 
 
Individual and collective behaviour, social networks, and associations have a great 
influence on responses and recovery systems against shocks. Sabatino (2019) 
examined the relationship between resilience and social capital and presented a 
review of the theory on the concepts of resilience and social capital concluding that 
the relationship between social capital and resilience is important.  Interest is on the 
capacity to resist shocks using a social system of relations between individuals and 
the ability of social groups and the community to ‘adapt, support, absorb, and cope’ 
with shocks such as food insecurity. At community level, coping processes are 
72 
 
targeted at supporting and revamping social connections and a sense of belonging 
and finding common solutions to common problems. 
 
In the face of food insecurity, a resilient household is one that can develop and take 
steps to strengthen individual and household responsibility to address and manage 
the change in welfare. The household would respond in relation to pressure from the 
shock and invoke the necessary structures and resources. This is where social capital 
is called in to cushion households in the face of adverse shocks. A resistant 
household with social capital is exposed to stress without suffering serious damage 
because its social networks respond effectively through cohesion, shared identity, 
learning and adaptability. This line of reasoning is consistent with the findings by 
Pacoma and Delda (2019). Their results reveal that local and translocal ties add to 
household resilience by way of providing food, financial assistance and 
psychological support. 
 
Nagoli and Chiwona-Karltun, (2017) provide an in-depth understanding on how 
social dynamics of kinship ties assist in coping with shocks from the recessions of 
Lake Chilwa in Malawi. In good seasons, Lake Chilwa provides food security to 
over 1.5 million people through crop husbandry and fishing. In their paper, they 
interrogated gender roles and relationships at the community level to shed light on 
how social structures affect coping strategies during lake recessions. They concluded 
that during lake recessions, poor households fall back on fellow households through 
lineage networks. Generally, their findings shed light on how households, 
communities and their livelihoods respond to shocks. However, this research is 
distinct from Nagoli and Chiwona-Karltun’s work in that they looked at community 
level whereas this research focuses on households. 
 
Much of the work on social capital and coping strategies focuses on climate change 
(see e.g. Bott et al., 2019; Chan et al., 2018; Mbiba et al., 2019; Ng’ang’a et al., 
2016; Paul et al., 2019) and not on immediate household decisions facing food 
insecurity such as skipping meals, limiting portion size, and reducing number of 
meals. Few studies have described and assessed potential behavioural coping 
strategies among the food insecure (see e.g. Hoisington et al., 2002; Pinard et al., 
2016). Martin and Lippert (2012) observed that food insecure mothers skip meals, 
wait to eat until later in the day, or eat less to spare their children from hunger. In a 
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case study of Zvishavane district in Zimbabwe, Ncube et al. (2018) discovered that 
rural women develop and adopt drought coping strategies such as, among others, 
skipping meals and reducing meal portions.  Harvey (2016), Purdam et al. (2016) 
and Puddephatt et al. (2020) also observed that the food insecure report restrictive 
eating patterns such as eating smaller meals, skipping meals and not eating for an 
entire day. 
 
Behavioural hunger-coping strategies such as skipping meals, limiting portion size of 
meals and reducing number of meals eaten may result in problems such as 
insufficient  food intake and nutritional imbalance (see e.g. Lee et al., 2019). This 
may lead to health challenges such as illnesses, mental health problems and 
generally poor quality of life as well as depressive disorder (Daniel, 2020; Kwak and 
Kim, 2017; Lee et al., 2017). 
 
Investing in social capital is at the core of strategies that most households rely on in 
responding to shocks. Adaptive households enable knowledge exchange through 
social exposure between individuals, households and groups with both homogenous 
and diverse socio-economic characteristics. Belonging to a social group and 
investing in social networks is important and effective in the presence of 
idiosyncratic food insecurity shocks. This is because households with members 
belonging to socially knit social groups can rely on the informal social protection 
and insurance through sharing arrangements premised on altruism or expected 
reciprocity that ensures food security. Social capital, this way, provides a mechanism 
through which households can protect themselves against shocks and therefore it has 
an inverse relationship with coping strategies such as skipping meals, limiting 
portion size of meals, reducing number of meals eaten and borrowing food. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis linking social capital to household coping 
strategy is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 3.2:  
 
Households with members belonging to a social group are less likely to engage in 
behavioural hunger-coping strategies such as skipping meals, limiting portion size of 




3.2.3 Social Capital and Agricultural Extension Services 
 
Agricultural extension services provide households and farmers with information, 
advice and training on various aspects related to agriculture, agricultural productivity 
and markets. Agricultural advisory systems, agricultural extension and veterinary 
services refer to the whole array of organisations that support and help people 
involved in agricultural production to solve problems and to get information, gain 
skills and obtain technologies to improve livelihoods and welfare. Agricultural 
extension, advisory and veterinary services therefore ensure food security if the 
advice is taken to productive use. They ensure food security through unlocking 
sustainable agricultural productivity and by bridging the gap between research and 
farmer practices, and aim to enhance livelihoods and well-being of communities, 
particularly in rural areas, by facilitating information exchange and capacity for 
collective action (Bourne et al., 2017).  
 
Advisory services are not only concerned with the transfer of technology and 
knowledge, but also facilitating households and farmers to make collective decisions 
and cooperate as well as forming effective institutions for managing collective 
activities. There is knowledge diffusion from researchers to farmers, among farmers 
and from community to researchers. This way therefore, extension officers and 
advisory agents strengthen ties between farmers and other actors. Bourne et al. 
(2017) acknowledges that there has been a transition in approaches used to deliver 
advisory services from technology transfer only to promoting both information flow 
and developing capacity for collective action.  
 
Social capital can loosely be viewed as a form of social protection and evidence 
shows that social protection does not only have positive welfare impacts but also 
stimulates productive activity among households (Cropensstedt et al., 2018). This is 
essential particularly in rural areas where most of the poor live and where agriculture 
remains pivotal to their livelihoods and food security. For them, linking social 
protection with agricultural development may ensure food security. Cropensstedt et 
al. (2018) acknowledged that informal support systems are important institutions in 
most communities and there are potential synergies between informal support 
mechanisms and formal social protection programmes in enhancing food security, 
agricultural growth and sustainable rural development. According to them, 
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integrating principles from informal networks into formal programmes is likely to 
make these more effective and trusted. In the spirit of this line of reasoning, 
agricultural extension services represent the formal and social capital the informal 
support systems, which when integrated ensures household food security. 
    
F?́?des van Rijn et al. (2015) assessed the impact of agricultural extension services on 
social capital and found indications that agricultural extension services result in 
higher levels of intra-village networks (bonding social capital) in Rwanda and 
improved trust and norms of cooperation (cognitive social capital) in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. They observed that agricultural education and extension efforts 
need to take into consideration the role of social capital in program success 
emphasising the need to have social capital indicators incorporated in the design and 
analysis of evaluation tools of agriculture-related development initiatives. However, 
their study compared to this research clearly shows that agricultural extension 
services and social capital are endogenous. This research is distinct from theirs in 
that social capital is the variable of interest and agricultural extension services is the 
outcome variable whereas the opposite is true in their case. 
 
Relatedly, Bourne et al. (2017) proposed a framework linking social network 
measures to information flow and capacity for collective action and applied it to 
networks in 11 sites within East Africa. Their results provide valuable insight into 
performance of existing advisory systems. However, based on information networks, 
anecdotal evidence and literature, they found limited capacity for collective action 
within farmer groups in Rwanda and to some extent in Kenya. Furthermore, they 
found that in Tanzania there were few connections with external information sources 
potentially limiting new innovations entering communities. These results are not 
unique to Africa. For example, Pachoud et al. (2019) conducted a social network 
analysis of advice-seeking and an analysis of territorial proximity in Brazil and 
concluded that extension agents are at the center of the advice network; however, 
there is a lack of trust and reciprocity among producers leading to low levels of 
interaction and collective action. 
 
Literature on agricultural producer groups largely accepts that farmers’ co llective 
action is greatly engraved in social and cultural context driven by social norms (see 
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e.g. Bijman et al, 2012; Falkowski et al., 2017). In particular, Falkowski et al. (2017) 
investigated factors that promote positive solutions to coordination problems in rural 
areas by closely looking at social interactions between individuals who decide to 
engage in collective action of participating in agricultural producer groups. Their 
analysis shows that farmers who associate more weight on trust and cooperation 
organise producer groups around kinship and acquaintanceship relations. Their 
contribution added to our understanding of how social relations in rural areas are 
constructed and performed. 
 
Belonging to a social group results in members sharing information about 
agricultural visits by agricultural extension officers and becomes a conduit through 
which knowledge is shared resulting in agricultural innovation. Therefore, food 
security will come from the integration of knowledge from various actors and 
interdependence, learning and social interaction. This means that participation in 
social groups (both formal and informal networks) is expected to motivate the 
exchange of information, establish synergy among members and stimulate access to 
resources (see ibid.); and that may ensure food security particularly if this leads to 
productive cooperation. For example, food security is expected to be facilitated by 
increased interactions between farm households and other actors in agricultural 
research, development and training.  
 
Interaction within social groups and between members and the extension service is 
an important part of an agricultural system. Hansen (2015) explored how interaction 
between two important parties in knowledge system, namely the farmers and the 
extension service can contribute to better farming performance. In particular, the 
analysis was on how membership in discussion clubs influences farmers’ problem 
solving behaviour and farm performance; as well as how interaction with consultants 
through regular farm visits affect farmers’ problem solving behaviour. The major 
conclusions are that through membership, farmers learn to improve their problem 
solving and that frequent interaction with consultants through regular farm visits 
helps farmers to become more proactive due to enough and relevant information. 
Both for farmers and for consultants, extension services add to better problem 




It has been noted that farmers have managed not only to increase their knowledge 
but also to actively use it through individual and group learning. Discussion group 
membership has been found to have a positive impact on farmers’ profits and that 
farmers’ participation in networks contributed to cheaper animal husbandry practices 
(Hansen, 2013; cited in Hansen, 2015). This means that social capital contributes to 
learning through interaction with others which is achieved through shared 
understanding between members, agricultural extension officers and personal 
relationships between them. Interacting with others can contribute to viable solutions 
with the ultimate result of ensuring food security. Social capital, particularly in the 
definition adopted in this study of belonging to a social group plays an important 
role.  
 
In the case of agricultural extension and veterinary services, as noted elsewhere in 
the literature (ibid.), a decline in public extension services results in alternative 
extension approaches including more participatory approaches such as volunteer-
farmer training. Agricultural training of this nature increases household food 
security. Kumar et al. (2020) found that adoption of improved technologies and 
practices is significantly increased by, among others, membership in progressive 
farmers groups and cooperative societies, and participation in agricultural training 
and farm visits. They also concluded that improved practices increase when farmers 
obtain information from informal sources, cooperatives/farmers organizations, and 
public and private extension programs. Therefore, the following hypothesis linking 




Social capital increases the likelihood of a household receiving agricultural training.  
 
 
Agricultural technologies can increase crop production thereby improving household 
food security. Innovations such as enhanced agricultural practices, crop varieties, 
inputs and related products such as crop insurance have potential to improve 
household food security (Buisson and Balasubramanya, 2019; Mutenje et al., 2016). 
These agricultural innovations are facilitated by a wide array of interactions between 
men and women, households and communities; and are moulded by formal and 
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informal institutions, practices, behaviours and social relations and ride on diffusion 
of information in local systems (BenYishay and Mobarak, 2019; Fafchamps and 
Quinn, 2018). Farmers learn about agricultural technology from multiple people 
before adopt it themselves (Beaman et al., 2018; Morello et al., 2018; Dalemans et 
al., 2018); and they consult a broad range of formal and informal professional 
information sources (Fales et al., 2019; Fales et al., 2016; Koutsouris et al. 2017; 
Lowe et al., 2019). This observation is supported by Fieldsend et al. (2019) in their 
analysis on sustainable approaches to fostering agricultural knowledge where they 
observed that most farmers sought advice from several sources; acquire and share the 
knowledge. Households that receive agricultural advice have greater productivity 
and greater food security compared to those that do not receive any advice at all (see 
e.g. Ragasa and Mazunda, 2018). Households with social capital are likely to share 
the importance of seeking and receiving this kind of advice. Therefore the following 




Social capital increases the likelihood of a household seeking crop advice. 
 
 
Agricultural extension services include, among others, provision of timely 
information and the dissemination of innovations to households, farmers, and other 
rural residents who depend on agriculture. Site-specific extension advice that is 
better suited to the needs of individual farm households can potentially increase 
productivity (Oyinbo et al., 2019). It is therefore within the mandate of the extension 
agents to disseminate best practices and innovations emanating from research on 
ways of enhancing adaptive potential and resilience of vulnerable people (Niu and 
Ragasa, 2018; Olorunfemi et al., 2019). This is usually achieved through regular 
agricultural extension services visits to communities. Some of the approaches that 
have been used include village-based intermediaries, farmer-to-farmer extension, 
farmer field days and farmer field schools (see e.g. Kansiime et al., 2019; Baird et 
al., 2016). Dates of visits become very important and individuals, households and 
communities tend to share and remind each other on pending and upcoming visits by 
extension officers. The following hypothesis linking social capital to visits by 





Social capital increases the chances of a household receiving a visit from an 
agricultural extension officer. 
 
 
Bard et al, (2019) adopted a qualitative approach to conceptualise how and under 
what circumstances veterinary advice has the potential to support and inspire farmer 
engagement with behavioural change. They concluded that, while accuracy of 
veterinary advisory content is valued, it is the relational context of trust; shared 
veterinarian-farmer understanding; and meaningful interpretation of advice at farmer 
level that is likely to effect change. The knowledge acquired inevitably filters to 
other members of the community. On the part of veterinary advisors and for them to 
obtain knowledge needed to solve complex veterinary queries, advisors use 
distributed networks and rely on informal ‘communities of practice’ comprised of 
bonding social capital and also draw upon bridging social capital from multiple 
advisors from different advisory professions (see e.g. Klerkx and Proctor, 2013). 
Given this, the following hypothesis linking social capital to seeking veterinary 




Social capital increases the likelihood of a household to seek veterinary services 
 
 
In general, agricultural productivity in developing countries, particularly in Southern 
Africa, remains low due to limited adoption of innovation. There is some evidence of 
the role of social networks in technology diffusion (Beaman et al., 2018). However, 
little rigorous work has been done on how to mobilize local social networks for 
agricultural innovation (Fafchamps et al., 2020). In agricultural innovation, 
technology is regarded as an input. Agricultural technologies typically consist of a 
package of technical objects, guidelines and instructions for improved farming 
practices; and these may require technical support (Akullo et al., 2018). Technical 
support increases productivity. Elahi et al. (2018) found that access to advisory 
services of this nature improves wheat productivity. This means that agricultural 
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innovation through the use of new technologies and practices needs access to 
resources such as knowledge, training and emotional support. This requires support 
from different actors such as peers, social capital, advisors, and researchers (see e.g. 
Cofre-Bravo et al., 2019). 
 
Farming households use all types of social capital to implement and exploit new 
technologies (see e.g. Hilkens et al., 2018; Hunecke et al., 2017; ibid; Turner et al., 
2017). Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai (2018) found that participation in farmer groups 
is associated with increased yield and technical efficiency. Relatedly, Kamar et al. 
(2020) found that in Nepal the probability of the adoption of improved practices is 
affected by farmers’ sources of information concluding that adoption is increased 
when farmers obtain information from informal sources, cooperatives/farmers 
organizations, and public and private extension programs. This means that farming 
innovation is influenced by social networks in which farming households are 
naturally members to; giving them access to new knowledge (see e.g. Ainembabazi 
et al., 2017; Jitmun et al., 2020; King et al., 2019). For example, bonding social 
capital promotes cooperation and connection between farming households thereby 
facilitating sharing of knowledge, labour and implements (see e.g. Hoang et al., 
2016, cited in Cofre-Bravo etal., 2019). 
  
On the other hand, farming households with bridging and linking social capital are 
likely to have greater ability to amass and assimilate knowledge about new 
technologies from external sources as well as receiving timely information. 
Agricultural extension networks, for instance, use model farmers to demonstrate new 
cultivation techniques and technologies to local communities. This inevitably leads 
to social learning (see e.g. Macours, 2019; Shikuku, 2019; Takahashi et al., 2020). 
For example, Marcus and Bhasme (2018) showed that the production and transfer of 
knowledge occur both horizontally to community members and vertically through 
linkages with extension agents, research institutions and private sector interests. This 
implies that households with members belonging to social groups may establish 
strong inclusion or exclusion mechanisms within their networks so that members are 
accorded access to information, whereas those without such networks are left out 
from the knowledge transfer process. This leads to the development of the following 





Social capital increases the chances of a household receiving technical support 
during an agricultural season. 
 
 
Addressing seasonal food insecurity does not only require increased food production, 
but also taking into account post-harvest losses (Brander et al. 2020). Post-harvest 
losses during storage have been noted to be substantial in Sub-Saharan Africa due 
mostly to insect infestation and mould damage (see e.g. Chegere, 2018; Danso et al., 
2017; Mutungi et al., 2019; Tesfaye and Tirivayi, 2018). In Zimbabwe, for example, 
maize postharvest losses range between 15.5 and 17.5 percent (Govere et al., 2019).  
Brander et al. (2020) discovered that improved on-farm storage reduces seasonal 
food insecurity of smallholder farmer households. According to them, addressing 
seasonal food insecurity demands taking into account post-harvest losses during 
storage. In Kenya, Aggarwal et al. (2018) (cited in Brander et al. (2020)) find that 
giving community saving clubs hermetic storage bags increases the quantity stored. 
Hermetic storage bags are effective against insects by stopping accelerated 
multiplication of insects (see e.g. Abass et al., 2018; Mutambuki et al., 2019; 
Singano et al., 2019). Relatedly, Purdue Improved Crop Storage bags retain 
provitamin and caotenoids in biofortified maize genotypes (Nkhata et al., 2019). 
 
 In Uganda, Omotilewa et al. (2018) discovered that households that were given an 
improved maize storage technology stored maize for a longer period and reported a 
substantial drop in storage losses than the untreated cohorts. In another Randomised 
Control Trial in Tanzania, Brander et al. (2020) discovered that improved on-farm 
storage reduces seasonal food insecurity. These post-harvest storage technologies are 
likely to be shared among families, relatives, neighbours and communities. This is 
because people prefer to spread knowledge to their acquaintances (Cetto et al., 2018; 
Walker, 2011; Zheng et al., 2019); and social networks are an important mechanism 
for diffusing information (Beaman and Dillon, 2018). This leads to the following 












3.3 Data  
 
This research is based on a nationally representative dataset collected annually by the 
Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC), which is a consortium 
of the Government of Zimbabwe, Development Partners, United Nations, NGOs, 
and Technical Agencies. It is led and regulated by the Government of Zimbabwe and 
chaired by the Food and Nutrition Council (FNC), a department in the Office of the 
President. In turn, the FNC is mandated to promote a multi-sectoral response to food 
insecurity and nutrition. 
 
For the purpose of this study, 2015 ZIMVAC cross-sectional data was selected 
specifically because it is the only survey that asked whether households had 
members belonging to a social group. Other later surveys used trust as a measure of 
social capital, which was not of interest in this research. The 2015 ZIMVAC survey 
asks household heads whether there is anyone in their household who is a member of 
a social group. Social groups mentioned in the survey are: community associations, 
Informal Savings and Loans Associations (ISAL), SACCOs (registered and formal 
credit and lending), agricultural extension groups, credit unions for inputs/cash, and 
burial societies.  It goes on to ask household heads how many months they have been 
members to a particular social group, and the benefits of being a member of a 
particular group to the household. The respondents were given an option to indicate 
whether the benefits were: information sharing; access to credit/loans; learning from 
each other; pooling resources for production; group marketing; or not. 
 
The dataset has 10,708 households and descriptively, 22 percent of households have 
members belonging to a social group. Table 3.1 below shows descriptive statistics of 
household characteristics. The average age of household heads with members 
belonging to a social group is higher at 52 years than those without. They also have 
more education and bigger households than those without membership. On average, 
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relatively more household heads with members belonging to a social group are 
female and married than those without.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Household Characteristics 
 
  
       Comparison 
 
   Treatment 
 
       Mean 
        group 
       (1) 
    group 
     (2) 
diff. 
(3) 
    
Household head’s age 48.65 51.36 -2.71*** 
 (17.71) (15.85)  
Household size 4.90 5.42 -0.52*** 
 (2.09) (2.06)  
Household head is female 0.35 0.37 -0.02** 
 (0.48) (0.48)  
Household head is married 0.70 0.72 -0.02** 
 (0.46) (0.45)  
Household head is divorced 0.05 0.03 0.01*** 
 (0.21) (0.18)  
Head’s education: O level 0.22 0.26 -0.03*** 
 (0.42) (0.44)  
 Head has no education 0.23 0.18 0.04*** 
 (0.42) (0.39)  
    
Observations 8,307 2,338  
Notes: Standard Deviations in parenthesis. Mean Differences in Column (3) were calculated using t-
tests and before Propensity Score Matching. Treatment Group is comprised of households with 
members belonging to a social group. Comparison Group is comprised of households without social 
capital. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
The outcome of interest is household food security and this study employs mainly 
single-item indicators to measure it. These single-item indicators have recently 
received favour and are widely accepted as valid indicators and proxies of food 
security (see e.g. Jackson et al., 2019; Lee et al, 2016; Narain et al., 2018). Table 3.2 
shows descriptive statistics for different food security pillars. Food Security Pillar 1 
describes household food security from cereals stocks and food crops; Pillar 2 = 
household food security from cereals stocks, food crops and cash crops; Pillar 3 = 
household food security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, and livestock; 
Pillar 4 = household food security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, 
livestock, and remittances; and Food Security Pillar 5 = household food security 
from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, livestock, remittances, and income. On 
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average, households with members belonging to social groups are more food secure 
than those without. 
 











 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Food security Pillar 1 0.18 0.21 -0.02** 
 (0.39) (0.40)  
Food security Pillar 2 0.21 0.23 -0.01 
 (0.41) (0.42)  
Food security Pillar 3 0.27 0.34 -0.07*** 
 (0.44) (0.47)  
Food security Pillar 4 0.31 0.37 -0.06*** 
 (0.46) (0.48)  
Food security Pillar 5 0.83 0.90 -0.07*** 
 (0.38) (0.30)  
    
Observations 8,357 2,351  
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis. The Mean Differences in Column (3) were calculated 
using t-tests and before Propensity Score Matching. Treatment Group is comprised of households 
with members belonging to a social group and the Comparison Group is comprised of households 
without. Food Security Pillar 1 = household food security from cereals stocks and food crops; Pillar 2 
= household food security from cereals stocks, food crops and cash crops; Pillar 3 = household food 
security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, and livestock; Pillar 4 = household food security 
from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, livestock, and remittances; and Food Security Pillar 5 = 
household food security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, livestock, remittances, and 
income. Each food security pillar is binary indicating whether a household is food secure in the pillar 
or not. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Household food security in this study is also measured by binary responses to 
whether there was a day in the past 30 days when there was no food to eat; there was 
any household member who went to sleep at night hungry in the past 30 days; and 
whether any household member went a whole day and night hungry in the past 30 
days; or not. These were conveniently called Household Hunger Scale 1, Household 
Hunger Scale 2 and Household Hunger Scale 3, respectively as shown in Table 3.3. 
On average, 23 percent of households without any member belonging to a social 
group report having a day when there was no food compared to only 15 percent for 
households with social capital. Sleeping without eating anything is an implicit 
measure of the severity of food insecurity. Of the households without any of their 
members belonging to a social group, 22 percent reported ever going to sleep at 
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night without eating anything compared to 18 percent of those with social capital. 
Only 6 percent of households with members belonging to a social group ever went a 
whole day and night hungry compared with 11 percent of households without social 
capital. On average, relatively a higher proportion of households without social 
capital experience hunger than those with social capital. 
 











 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Household hunger scale 1 0.23 0.15 0.08*** 
 (0.42) (0.36)  
Household hunger scale 2 0.22 0.18 0.04*** 
 (0.41) (0.39)  
Household hunger scale 3 0.11 0.06 0.04*** 
 (0.31) (0.24)  
    
Observations 8,357 2,351  
Notes: Standard Deviations in parenthesis. Treatment group is comprised of households with 
members belonging to a social group and Comparison Group is comprised of households without. The 
Mean Differences in Column (3) were calculated using t-tests and before Propensity Score Matching. 
Household Hunger Scale 1 = whether there was a day in the past 30 days when there was no food to 
eat; Household Hunger Scale 2 = whether there was any household member who went to sleep at 
night hungry in the past 30 days; and Household Hunger Scale 3 = whether any household member 
went a whole day and night hungry in the past 30 days. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When faced with food insecurity shocks, households tend to adopt coping strategies 
such as skipping meals, limiting portion size at meal, and reducing the number of 
meals. Table 3.4 below shows descriptive statistics on behavioural hunger-coping 
strategies by treatment and control groups. Treatment group is comprised of 
households with members belonging to a social group and control group is 
comprised of households without any member belonging to a social group. Only 9 
percent of households in the treatment group resort to skipping meals compared to 
15 percent of households in the control group. The proportion of households 
resorting to limiting meal portion sizes and reducing the number of meals is high in 
both the treatment and control groups although with significant differences between 
the groups. Sixty percent of households in the control group report limiting portion 
size of meals compared to 56 percent of households in the treatment group. On the 
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other hand, 61 percent and 55 percent reduce the number of meals in the control and 
treatment groups, respectively. Forty-six and 42 percent of households without social 
capital and those with social capital resort to borrowing food, respectively. 
 
 











 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Skipping meals 0.15 0.09 0.06*** 
 (0.36) (0.29)  
Limiting portion size 0.61 0.56 0.05*** 
 (0.49) (0.50)  
Reducing number of meals 0.60 0.55 0.05*** 
 (0.49) (0.50)  
Borrowing food 0.46 0.42 0.04*** 
 (0.50) (0.49)  
    
Observations 8,357 2,351  
NOTES: Standard Deviations in parenthesis. Treatment group is comprised of households with 
members belonging to a social group and Comparison Group is comprised of households without. The 
Mean Differences in Column (3) were calculated using t-tests and before Propensity Score Matching. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows descriptive statistics for dependent variables of agricultural 
extension and veterinary services by treatment and control groups. The survey asked 
household heads whether a household received any agricultural training in the 
2014/2015 agricultural season, they received any visit by an Agricultural Extension 
Officer, any member of the household sought any cropping advice during the 
cropping season, any household member sought veterinary services, a household 
received any technical support during the agricultural season, and whether a 
household treat its harvest against post-harvest losses; or not. As can be seen from 
Table 3.5, the mean differences between households with members belonging to a 
social group and those without are huge. Fifty-seven percent of households with 
members belonging to a social group received agricultural training compared to only 
33 percent of households without social capital. On the other hand, 47 percent of 
households with social capital had a visit from an Agricultural Extension Officer 
compared to only 29 percent for households without social capital.  
87 
 












 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Agricultural training 0.33 0.57 -0.24*** 
 (0.47) (0.49)  
Agritex visit 0.29 0.47 -0.19*** 
 
 
(0.45) (0.50)  
Seek crop advice 0.23 0.40 -0.17*** 
 (0.42) (0.49)  
Seek veterinary services 0.18 0.32 -0.14*** 
 (0.38) (0.47)  
Technical support 0.20 0.36 -0.16*** 
 (0.40) (0.48)  
Treat harvest 0.55 0.72 -0.16*** 
 (0.50) (0.45)  
    
Observations 8,357 2,351  
NOTES: Standard Deviations in parenthesis. Treatment group is comprised of households with 
members belonging to a social group and Comparison Group is comprised of households without. The 
Mean Differences in Column (3) were calculated using t-tests and before Propensity Score Matching. 
Agric Training = whether a household received any agricultural training in the 2014/2015 agricultural 
season. Agritex Visit = whether a household received any visit by an Agricultural Extension Officer. 
Seek Crop Advice = whether any member of the household sought any cropping advice during the 
cropping season. Seek Vet Services = whether any household member sought veterinary services. 
Tech Support = whether a household received any technical support during the agricultural season. 
Treat Harvest = whether a household treat its harvest against rodents and weevils. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Relatedly, only 23 percent of households in the comparison group sought crop 
advice compared to 40 percent of households in the treatment group. Seeking crop 
advice is likely to be associated with good yields and may ensure food security. 
Eighteen percent of households in the comparison group sought veterinary services 
compared to 32 percent of households in the treatment group and only 20 percent of 
them sought technical support compared with 36 percent of households in the 
treatment group. Food security is also ensured by preserving harvests from rodents 
and weevils and other causes of post-harvest losses. Seventy-two percent of 
households in the treatment group treat their harvest against post-harvest losses 




Almost all the differences in means from Table 3.1 to Table 3.5 are significantly 
different from zero. This means that on average, having social capital improves 
welfare and is associated with food security. This also brings in another interesting 
scenario from a methodological point of view. In finding the effect of an 
intervention, it is important to make sure that the treatment and control groups are 





3.4.1 Empirical Strategy 
 
Social capital is potentially endogenous and as such experimental and quasi-
experimental empirical strategies are the most appropriate to establish effects. The 
definition of social capital adopted in this study is a binary response on whether a 
household has a member who belongs to a social group. This measure is likely to 
suffer from selection bias if there are systematic and unobserved characteristics that 
make certain members and households self-select themselves into social groups more 
than others who do not possess such characteristics. This study is not a Randomised 
Controlled Trial (RCT) and as such the effect of social capital on food security 
outcome variables can be subject to treatment selection bias in which households 
with members belonging to a social group may differ systematically from 
households with no member belonging to a social group.  
 
In light of the above arguments, Propensity Score Matching is therefore adopted in 
this research. Propensity Score Matching is increasingly used to estimate treatment 
effects using observational data (Austin, 2009; Ali et al., 2015; Fullerton, 2016; 
Garrido et al., 2014; Lee and Little, 2017; Linden and Samuels, 2013).  A propensity 
score is a single score that in this case will represent the probability of a household 
having a member who belongs to a social group, conditional on a set of observed 
covariates. Conditional on the true propensity score, belonging to a social group is 
independent of measured baseline covariates. In other words, treated and untreated 
households with the same propensity score will have similar distributions of 
observed baseline covariates (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 1984). This means 
that propensity scores are important when estimating a treatment’s effect on an 
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outcome using observational data and when selection bias due to non-random 
treatment assignment is likely. Propensity scores therefore provide a way to balance 
measured covariates across households with members belonging to a social group 
and households without and better approximates the counterfactual for treated 
households. A probit model used to calculate the propensity score can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝑆𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝛽)                                                                                                           (1) 
 
The empirical strategy is motivated as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1 −  𝑌0 | 𝑆 = 1 ]                                                                                      (2) 
 
where 𝑌1 is the potential outcome in the case of a household having a member 
belonging to a social group. 𝑌0 is the potential outcome if a household does not have 
any of its members belonging to a social group. 𝑆 is binary, with 𝑆 = 1 if the 
household has a member belonging to a social group and 𝑆 = 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖 is a 
vector of covariates that influence social capital and 𝛽 is 1 𝑥 𝑘 vector of coefficients. 
𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝛽) is a cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution. ATT 
is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and ATT is only identified when the 
outcomes of households from the treatment and comparison groups do not differ in 
the absence of treatment. That is if: 
 
𝐸[𝑌0| 𝑆 = 1 ] − (𝐸[𝑌0| 𝑆 = 0]) = 0                                                                     (3) 
 
To achieve that in an observational study such as this one, requires relying on some 
identifying assumptions. The first assumption requires that assignment to treatment 
be independent of the outcomes, conditional on the covariates, 𝑋, -: 
 
[𝑌0; 𝑌1] ⫫ 𝑆 | 𝑋                                                                                                              (4)  
 
The second assumption is the overlap or common support condition. The probability 




0 < Pr(𝑆 = 1 | 𝑋 )  < 1                                                                                           (5) 
 
This means that with the common support assumption, the assignment mechanism 
can be interpreted as if, within subpopulations of units with the same value for the 
covariate, totally randomised experiment was carried out and data can be analysed 
from subsamples with the same value of the covariates under such interpretation 
(Grilli and Rampichini, 2011). When these two assumptions are satisfied then the 
treatment can be referred to as being strongly ignorable (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). Unfortunately, the strongly ignorable treatment assignment assumption 
cannot be empirically tested.  
  
Propensity Score Matching method attempts to imitate the randomised assignment to 
treatment and comparison groups by selecting from the comparison group those 
households that have similar propensities to households in the treatment group. The 
impact of social capital on food security is therefore estimated by comparing the 
average outcomes of a household with a member belonging to a social group and the 
average outcome among a statistically matched subgroup from households without 
any of its members belonging to a social group. This match is achieved based on 
observed characteristics available in the ZIMVAC data. 
 
3.4.2 Choice of variables in the calculation of the propensity score 
 
The major consideration in selecting variables to be used in the calculation of a 
propensity score is the trade off between bias and efficiency. In choosing variables, 
attention was paid to variables that are potentially related to food security but not 
social capital. Variables associated with social capital but not food security were left 
out because they do not address confounding and are irrelevant for the purposes of 
the propensity score. Covariates affected by social capital were left out because they 
potentially mask part of the treatment effect being estimated (see e.g. Garrido et al., 
2014). Related, variables that perfectly predict social capital were also left out in the 
calculation of the propensity score because they do not achieve sufficient overlap in 





The selection of variables for the calculation of the propensity score was limited to 
household head’s age, gender of the household head, marital status of the household 
head, household head’s education and village, so as to keep the variables that are 
potentially related to both social capital and food security and to disregard those that 
are weakly associated with food security. Using all covariates was avoided in order 
to circumvent bias arising from selecting a wide bandwidth in response to the 
weakness of the common support. Including insignificant covariates in the 
propensity score specification would lead to inefficiency since this would increase 
the variance of the propensity score estimates.   
 
 
3.4.3 Balance on the propensity score 
 
It is here that the overlap assumption is addressed. A large area of common support 
gives confidence and assurance that the observed treatment effect satisfies external 
validity. Therefore, it is important to ensure that there is overlap in the range of 
propensity scores across households with members who belong to a social group and 
those that do not. This was achieved by subjectively examining graphs of propensity 
scores across treatment and comparison groups. For example, Figure 3.1 shows the 
overlap of the distribution of the propensity scores across households with a member 
belonging to a social group (treatment group) and households without (control 
group). As can be seen from the graph on the check of the range of common support, 
balance was achieved across treatment and comparison groups. It was also ensured 
that the distribution of the propensity score is similar between treatment and 

















3.4.4 Balance on the Covariates 
 
In order to ensure that the propensity score’s distribution is not different across 
groups and that the propensity score is appropriately specified, a check for balance of 
individual covariates across households with members belonging to a social group 
and those without within blocks of the propensity score was carried out. This was to 
ensure that treatment and comparison groups are comparable on baseline 
characteristics so as to guarantee valid results. To achieve this, standardised 
differences were calculated. Figure 2 below displays visual inspection of 
standardised differences for unmatched and matched samples. Before matching, 
standardized percentage bias across covariates ranged from -8% and 16% but after 




















Table 3.6 shows standardised differences across covariates after matching. All 
standardized differences after matching across covariates are all less than 0.03. This 
confirms that the covariates are balanced and the propensity score’s distribution is 
similar across groups. Although there is no rule regarding how much imbalance is 
acceptable, standardised differences of less than 0.03 are, by all standards very small 
and acceptable.  
 
Table 3.6: Standardized Differences across Covariates after Matching 
 
  
Mean in treated 
 
Mean in untreated 
 
Standardized diff. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Head’s Age 49.72                              49.29 0.026 
Head is Female               0.36                0.36                 0.016 
Head is divorced  0.04                0.04                 0.002 
Head has ‘O’Level  0.23                0.23                -0.006 
    
NOTES: Treatment Group is comprised of households with members belonging to a social group. 
Comparison Group is comprised of households without any member belonging to a social group.  
 
The smaller the differences are, the better. Literature points to anything from 0.10 to 
0.25 as being indicative of imbalance (Austin, 2009; Garrido et al., 2014; Linden and 
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Samuels, 2013; Normand et al, 2001; Rubin, 1973). Using standardised differences 
other than t-tests and any other such diagnostic tool is appropriate in that 
standardised differences are dimensionless and are not influenced by sample size. 
Therefore they can be used to compare balance in measured covariates between 
households with members belonging to a social group and those without in the 
matched sample with that in the unmatched sample. Figure 3.3 below also confirms 
that balance across continuous covariates was also achieved. The figure shows a 
density plot of household head’s age for treatment and control groups after matching 
and the visual inspection shows that they were indeed balanced and the distribution 
is similar in both the treatment and control groups. 
 
Figure 3.3: Density Plot for Household Head’s Age in Treated and Comparison 






3.4.5 Matching and weighting strategies 
 
The choice of matching and weighting strategy is, to a large extend, influenced by 
the trade-off between bias and efficiency. Nearest Neighbour matching and the 
Inverse-Probability Treatment Weights (IPTW) were chosen for this study. Nearest 
Neighbour was chosen because it often produces well balanced samples. Each 
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household with members belonging to a social group was matched to one 
comparable household without. This one-to-one matching algorithm was preferred 
because it leads to least biased estimates and efficiency was not much of a concern 
because of large number of observations in the dataset. The Nearest Neighbour 
matching estimator is motivated as: 
 




𝑜𝑏𝑠 −  ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝜖𝐶(𝑖)𝑀
 𝑌𝑗
















                                                                  (7) 
 
where 𝑁𝑇 is the number of households with members belonging to a social group; 
𝑁𝑖
𝐶 is the number of households without; 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is equal to 
1 
𝑁𝑖
𝐶  if 𝑗 is a control units of 𝑖 
and zero otherwise; and 𝑊𝑗 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖  . As for the Inverse-Probability Treatment 
Weights, each household with members belonging to a social group receives a 
weight equal to the inverse of the propensity score and each comparable household 
without social capital is given a weight equal to the inverse of one minus the 





In assessing the impact of social capital on food security, a number of food security 
related outcome variables were used. These included food security pillars, household 
hunger scales, coping strategies and agricultural extension and veterinary services 
related outcome variables. Table 3.7 below shows estimation results of the impact of 
social capital on 5 different food security pillars. Food Security Pillars from 1 to 5 
are binary, based on whether a household is food secure to the described categories 
or not. Food Security Pillar 1 is based on household food security from cereals 
stocks and food crops. Pillar 2 is based on household food security from cereals 
stocks, food crops and cash crops; and Pillar 3 on food security from cereals stocks, 
food crops, cash crops, and livestock. Relatedly, Pillar 4 is concerned with 
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household food security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, livestock, and 
remittances. Finally, Food Security Pillar 5 is likewise based on household food 
security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, livestock, remittances, and 
income. 
 
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows Nearest Neighbour Matching results. These results 
measure average treatment effect on the treated. Households with social capital are 
more food secure than those without. The impact is significant at 1 percent for Food 
Security Pillars 3 to 6. Households with members belonging to a social group have a 
6 percentage point higher chance of being food secure in cereal stocks, food crops, 
cash crops, and livestock and an 8 percentage point higher chance of being food 
secure for Food Security Pillar 6 than those without members who belong to a social 
group.  
 
These results are confirmed in Panel B and Panel C in the table. Panel B shows 
Kernel Weighted Estimations of the impact of social capital on food security. These 
results are consistent with results in Panel A of the table except that the results are 
now also picking significance at 1 percent for Food Security Pillar 1. The estimated 
effect and level of significance are similar for Nearest Neighbour matching results in 
Panel A and those in Panel B for Food Security Pillars 3 to 6. These findings are also 
supported by results in Panel C of the table, which shows Inverse-Probability 
Treatment Weight results of the impact of social capital on food security. These 
results support hypothesis 3.1.1 confirming that social capital has an impact on 
household food security. This result supports Jackson et al. (2019) who found that 
social capital is positively associated with food security. 
 
 In general, households that are food insecure are likely to experience incidences of 
hunger. This may involve experiences of lean days in which households may spend 
some days without food or even retiring to bed without eating anything. Table 3.8 
presents results on the impact of social capital on household hunger. The table has 
three panels showing Nearest Neighbour Matching, Kernel Weighted and Inverse-
Probability of Treatment Weight estimation results, respectively. The results are also 
presented based on specific household hunger questions. Household Hunger Scale 1 
is based on whether there was a day in the past 30 days when there was no food to 
eat. Household Hunger Scale 2, in turn, is based on whether there was any household 
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Table 3.7: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of Social Capital on Food Security 
 
                                   PANEL A: NEAREST NEIGHBOR MATCHING 
 Food Security Food Security Food Security Food Security Food Security 
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillar 4 Pillar 5 
      
Social Capital 0.017 0.004 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.082*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) 
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645 
                                   PANEL B: KERNEL WEIGHT RESULTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON FOOD SECURITY 
 Food Security Food Security Food Security Food Security Food Security 
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillar 4 Pillar 5 
      
Social Capital 0.019*** 0.008 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.072*** 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.012) 
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645 
                                  PANEL 3: IPTW RESULTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON FOOD SECURITY 
 Food Security Food Security Food Security Food Security Food Security 
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillar 4 Pillar 5 
      
Social Capital 0.020** 0.011 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.073*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645 
NOTES: Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data.  The probability of treatment is based on a probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member 
who belongs in a social group). Food Security Pillars from 1 to 5 above are binary. Food Security Pillar 1 = household food security from cereals stocks and food 
crops; Pillar 2 = household food security from cereals stocks, food crops and cash crops; Pillar 3 =  household food security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash 
crops, and livestock; Pillar 4 = household food security from cereals stocks, food crops, cash crops, livestock, and remittances; and Food Security Pillar 5 =  




member who went to sleep at night hungry in the past 30 days; and Household 
Hunger Scale 3 on whether any household member went a whole day and night 
hungry in the past 30 days. 
 
The results show that households with social capital are less likely to experience a 
day when there was no food to eat, less likely to have household members who went 
to sleep at night hungry, and less likely to go a whole day and night hungry 
compared to those without. The results are consistent and significant at 1 percent in 
all the three matching algorithms used in this study and for all the household hunger 
scales. For example, households with members belonging to a social group have a 
7.8 percentage point lower chance of experiencing a day when there was no food to 
eat; a 4.7 percentage point lower chance of having a member who went to sleep at 
night hungry; and a 4.6 percentage point lower chance of having a member going a 
whole day and night hungry than those without members belonging to a social 
group. These results confirm hypothesis 3.1.2 and are consistent with the findings of 
Martin et al (2004) who concluded that social capital is positively associated with 
decreased risk of hunger. 
 
When faced with food insecurity, households are forced to adopt coping strategies 
including skipping meals, limiting portion size at meal, reducing the number of 
meals, borrowing food, eating less expensive food and sometimes eating immature 
crops. Relatively more food secure households are less likely to adopt these 
strategies. In order to assess the impact of social capital on these coping strategies, 
matching estimations were carried out and the results are presented in Table 3.9, 
Table 3.10 and Table 3.11.  
 
Table 3.9 presents Nearest Neighbour Matching estimation results. The table 
comprises of results for the impact of social capital on 12 coping strategies. Coping 
Strategy 1 is based on whether a household skipped an entire day without eating and 
Coping Strategy 2 on limiting portion size at meal. Coping Strategy 3 = reducing 
number of meals eaten; Coping Strategy 4 = borrowing food. Household Coping 
Strategy 5 = relying on less expensive food; Coping Strategy 6 = harvesting 
immature food crops; Strategy 7 = sending household members to eat with 
neighbours; and Coping Strategy 8 = sending household members to beg. 
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Table 3.8: Impact of Social Capital on Household Hunger Scale 
 
PANEL A: NEAREST NEIGHBOR ESTIMATIMATIONS 
  Hunger Scale Hunger Scale Hunger Scale  
  1 2 3  
      
Social Capital  -0.078*** -0.047*** -0.046***  
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
PANEL B: KERNEL WEIGHT ESTIMATIONS 
        Hunger Scale    Hunger Scale         Hunger Scale  
  1 2 3  
      
Social Capital  -0.073*** -0.031*** -0.043***  
  (0.009) (0.001) (0.003)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
PANEL C: INVERSE-PROBABILITY OF TREATMENT WEIGHT ESTIMATIONS 
      Hunger Scale    Hunger Scale Hunger Scale  
     1 2 3  
      
Social Capital  -0.076*** -0.034*** -0.044***  
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data. The probability of treatment is based on a probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member 
who belongs in a social group). Household Hunger Scale 1 to 3 above are binary. Household Hunger Scale 1 = whether there was a day in the past 30 days when 
there was no food to eat; Household Hunger 2 = whether there was any household member who went to sleep at night hungry in the past 30 days; and Household 
Hunger 3 = whether any household member went a whole day and night hungry in the past 30 days. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 Household Coping Strategy 9 = purchasing food on credit; Coping Strategy 10 = 
gathering food and hunting; Coping Strategy 11 = reducing adult consumption; and 
Coping Strategy 12 = relying on casual labour for food. 
 
The results show that households with members belonging to a social group, when 
compared to households without, have a: 6.6 percentage point lower chance of 
skipping an entire day without eating; 5.4 percentage point lower chance of limiting 
portion size of meals; 4.3 percentage point lower chance of borrowing food; 8.2 
percentage point lower chance of relying on less expensive food; 8.5 percentage 
point lower chance of harvesting immature food crops; 3.4 percentage point lower 
chance of sending household members to eat with neighbours; 5.4 percentage point 
lower chance of sending members to beg; 2.5 percentage point lower chance of 
purchasing food on credit; 3.3 percentage point lower chance of gathering food and 
hunt; 6.5 percentage point lower chance of reducing adult consumption; and a 6.1 
percentage point lower chance of relying on casual labour for food. All the estimates 
are significant at 1 percent except for the estimate for Coping Strategy 9: purchasing 
food on credit, which is weakly significant.  
 
To check for robustness, Kernel-Weighted and Inverse-Probability of Treatment 
Weight results are presented in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11, respectively. Results in 
Table 3.10 are consistent with results in Table 3.9: Households with social capital 
are less likely to adopt the outlined coping strategies compared to households 
without. All the estimates are also significantly different from zero at the 1 percent 
level except for Coping Strategy 9: purchasing food on credit, which is also weakly 
significant. These results are also confirmed in the Inverse-Probability of Treatment 
Weight results in Table 3.11. All the estimates are strongly significant. However, the 
estimate for Coping Strategy 9 is now significant at 5 percent when compared to 
results in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10.  
 
These results therefore support hypothesis 3.2 that households with members 
belonging to a social group are less likely to engage in behavioural hunger-coping 
strategies that include skipping meals through to relying on casual labour for food. 
Martin and Lippert (2012) observed that food-insecure mothers skip meals. 
Relatedly, Ncube et al. (2018) concluded that women skip meals and reduce meal 
portions and Puddephatt et al. (2020) reported that the food-insecure indicate 
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Table 3.9: Nearest Neighbour Estimation Results of the Impact of Social Capital on Household Coping Strategy 
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 1 2 3 4  
      
Social Capital -0.066*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.043***  
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 5  6 7 8  
      
Social Capital -0.082*** -0.085*** -0.034*** -0.054***  
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 9 10 11 12  
      
Social Capital -0.025* -0.033*** -0.065*** -0.061***  
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data and nearest neighbor matching. The probability of treatment is based on 
a probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member who belongs in a social group). Household Coping Strategy from 1 to 12 above are binary. 
Coping Strategy 1 = skipping entire day without eating; Coping Strategy 2 = limiting portion size at meal; Coping Strategy 3 = reducing number of meals eaten; 
Coping Strategy 4 = borrowing food. Household Coping Strategy 5 = relying on less expensive food; Coping Strategy 6 = harvesting immature food crops; 
Strategy 7 = sending household members to eat with neighbors; and Coping Strategy 8 = sending household members to beg. Household Coping Strategy 9 = 
purchasing food on credit; Coping Strategy 10 = gathering food and hunting; Coping Strategy 11 = reducing adult consumption; and Coping Strategy 12 = relying 




Table 3.10: Kernel-Weight Results of Impact of Social Capital on Household Coping Strategy 
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillar 4  
      
Social Capital -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.034***  
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.010) (0.001)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 Pillar 5 Pillar 6 Pillar 7 Pillar 8  
      
Social Capital -0.055*** -0.068*** -0.033*** -0.052***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 Pillar 9 Pillar 10 Pillar 11 Pillar 12  
      
Social Capital -0.019** -0.031*** -0.047*** -0.063***  
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.000) (0.016)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data and Kernel Weighted matching. The probability of treatment is based on 
a probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member who belongs in a social group). Household Coping Strategy from 1 to 12 above are binary. 
Coping Strategy 1 = skipping entire day without eating; Coping Strategy 2 = limiting portion size at meal; Coping Strategy 3 = reducing number of meals eaten; 
Coping Strategy 4 = borrowing food. Household Coping Strategy 5 = relying on less expensive food; Coping Strategy 6 = harvesting immature food crops; 
Strategy 7 = sending household members to eat with neighbours; and Coping Strategy 8 = sending household members to beg. Household Coping Strategy 9 = 
purchasing food on credit; Coping Strategy 10 = gathering food and hunting; Coping Strategy 11 = reducing adult consumption; and Coping Strategy 12 = relying 
on casual labor for food. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.11: IPTW Results of the Impact of Social Capital on Household Coping Strategy 
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillar 4  
      
Social Capital -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.035***  
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 Pillar 5 Pillar 6 Pillar 7 Pillar 8  
      
Social Capital -0.056*** -0.065*** -0.035*** -0.052***  
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy Coping Strategy  
 Pillar 9 Pillar 10 Pillar 11 Pillar 12  
      
Social Capital -0.019* -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.060***  
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)  
      
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data and Inverse-Probability of Treatment Weight matching. The probability 
of treatment is based on a probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member who belongs in a social group). Household Coping Strategy from 
1 to 12 above are binary. Coping Strategy 1 = skipping entire day without eating; Coping Strategy 2 = limiting portion size at meal; Coping Strategy 3 = reducing 
number of meals eaten; Coping Strategy 4 = borrowing food. Household Coping Strategy 5 = relying on less expensive food; Coping Strategy 6 = harvesting 
immature food crops; Strategy 7 = sending household members to eat with neighbors; and Coping Strategy 8 = sending household members to beg. Household 
Coping Strategy 9 = purchasing food on credit; Coping Strategy 10 = gathering food and hunting; Coping Strategy 11 = reducing adult consumption; and Coping 
Strategy 12 = relying on casual labor for food. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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restrictive eating patterns. However, these behavioural hunger-coping strategies may 
lead to health challenges such as illnesses, mental health problems and poor quality 
of life as well as depressive disorder (Daniel, 2020; Kwak and Kim, 2017; Lee et al., 
2017). This means that social capital, as confirmed in Tables 3.9 through to Table 
3.11, is an implicit social protection program that albeit improves health and welfare. 
 
Agricultural extension and veterinary services provide advisory services that may 
increase food security. In order to assess the impact of social capital on household 
food security, agricultural extension and veterinary related outcome variables were 
used. This included binary variables such as agricultural training, agricultural 
extension visits, and crop advice. These results are presented in Tables 3.12, 3.13 
and 3.14. Results in Column 1 in each table are based on ‘Agric Training’ measuring 
whether a household received any agricultural training in the 2014/2015 agricultural 
season. Column 2 presents results for ‘Agritex Visit’ based on whether a household 
received any visit by an Agricultural Extension Officer and Column 3 shows results 
for ‘Seek Crop Advice’ based on whether any member of the household sought any 
cropping advice during the cropping season. Likewise, Column 4 displays results for 
‘Seek Vet Services’ premised on whether any household member sought veterinary 
services and Column 5 for ‘Tech Support’ based on whether a household received 
any technical support during the agricultural season. Finally, Column 6 is based on 
‘Treat Harvest’ measuring whether a household treats its harvest against post-harvest 
losses, or not. 
 
Table 3.12 presents Nearest Neighbour Matching results and all the estimates are 
positive and significant at 1 percent. A household with social capital has a 23 
percentage point higher chance of participating in agricultural training than one 
without social capital; an estimate which is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Relatedly, a household with social capital has an 18 percentage point higher chance 
of both receiving a visit by an agricultural extension officer and of seeking crop 
advice; estimates which are strongly significant. Likewise, social capital increases 
the chance of households seeking veterinary services, technical support, and treating 
their harvests. Households with members belonging to a social group have a 12 
percentage point and a 14 percentage point higher chance of seeking veterinary  
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Table 3.12: Nearest Neighbour Matching Results of the Impact of Social Capital on Agricultural Extension and Veterinary 
Services 
 
  Agric Training Agritex Visit Seek Crop Advice  
  (1) (2) (3)  
      
Social Capital  0.230*** 0.177*** 0.175***  
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 
  Seek Vet Services Tech Support Treat Harvest  
  (4) (5) (6)  
      
Social Capital  0.120*** 0.141*** 0.139***  
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data and nearest neighbor matching. The probability of treatment is based on 
a probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member who belongs in a social group). Outcome Variables in Columns 1 to 6 are all binary. Agric 
Training = whether a household received any agricultural training in the 2014/2015 agricultural season. Agritex Visit = whether a household received any visit by 
an Agricultural Extension Officer. Seek Crop Advice = whether any member of the household sought any cropping advice during the cropping season. Seek Vet 
Services = whether any household member sought veterinary services. Tech Support = whether a household received any technical support during the agricultural 






Table 3.13: Kernel Weight Results of the Impact of Social Capital on 
Agricultural Extension and Veterinary Services 
 
  Agric Training Agritex Visit Seek Crop Advice  
  (1) (2) (3)  
      
Social Capital  0.223*** 0.172*** 0.162***  
  (0.006) (0.018) (0.007)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 
  Seek Vet Services Tech Support Treat Harvest  
  (4) (5) (6)  
      
Social 
Capital 
 0.129*** 0.148*** 0.146***  
  (0.010) (0.000) (0.017)  
      
Observations  10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC 
data and Kernel Weighted matching. The probability of treatment is based on a 
probit model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member who belongs 
in a social group). Outcome Variables in Columns 1 to 6 are all binary. Agric 
Training = whether a household received any agricultural training in the 2014/2015 
agricultural season. Agritex Visit = whether a household received any visit by an 
Agricultural Extension Officer. Seek Crop Advice = whether any member of the 
household sought any cropping advice during the cropping season. Seek Vet 
Services = whether any household member sought veterinary services. Tech Support 
= whether a household received any technical support during the agricultural season. 
Treat Harvest = whether a household treat its harvest against rodents and weevils. 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
services, technical support, and treating harvest respectively than those without; 
estimates which are all significant at 1 percent. 
 
Table 3.13 above presents Kernel-Weighted estimation results for robustness check. 
The results confirm the findings of Table 3.12. Social capital increases the chances 
of households participating in agricultural training, receiving visits from agricultural 
extension officers, seeking veterinary services, seeking crop advice, receiving 
technical support and treating harvests against post-harvest losses. The estimates are 
not different from those in Table 3.12 and are also all significant at 1 percent. These 
results are also confirmed in Inverse-Probability of Treatment Weight estimation 
results presented in Table 3.14. Social capital increases the chances of households 
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getting agricultural training, receiving visits from agricultural extension officers and 
seeking cropping and veterinary services as well as treating and preserving harvests. 
  
 
Table 3.14: IPWT Results of the Impact of Social Capital on Agricultural 
Extension and Veterinary Services 
 
 Agric Training Agritex Visit Seek Crop Advice  
 (1) (2) (3)  
     
Social Capital       0.229***         0.176***       0.166***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)  
     
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645  
 
 
 Seek Vet Services Tech Support Treat Harvest  
 (4) (5) (6)  
     
Social Capital      0.131***     0.149***     0.151***  
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)  
     
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,645  
NOTES: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Results based on 2015 ZIMVAC data and 
Inverse-Probability of Treatment Weight matching. The probability of treatment is based on a probit 
model. Social Capital is binary (=1 if a household has a member who belongs in a social group). 
Outcome Variables in Columns 1 to 6 are all binary. Agric Training = whether a household received 
any agricultural training in the 2014/2015 agricultural season. Agritex Visit = whether a household 
received any visit by an Agricultural Extension Officer. Seek Crop Advice = whether any member of 
the household sought any cropping advice during the cropping season. Seek Vet Services = whether 
any household member sought veterinary services. Tech Support = whether a household received any 
technical support during the agricultural season. Treat Harvest = whether a household treat its harvest 
against rodents and weevils. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
These results confirm hypotheses 3.3.1 through to 3.3.6. Unlike findings from 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya by Bourne et al. (2017) where they found limited 
capacity for collective action, these results show that social capital and collective 
action have an impact on ensuring food security through agricultural extension 
services and minimizing post-harvest losses. Relatedly, these results are contrary to 
Pachoud et al. (2019) who found lack of trust and reciprocity among producers in 
Brazil leading to low levels of interaction and collective action. This means that in 
trying to understand social capital, context is very important. On the other hand, the 
results in general confirm  Ragasa and Mazunda (2018) who found that households 
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that receive agricultural advice have greater productivity and greater food security; 
and more particularly Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai (2018) who found that 
participation in farmer groups is associated with increased yield and technical 





3.6.1 Further reflection on the concept of social capital 
 
The definition of social capital adopted in this study requires further reflection. 
Defining social capital as group participation is deliberate. There is 
acknowledgement that measuring social capital requires different approaches that 
can reflect the cultural context of social capital (see e.g. Chung et al., 2014); and 
different levels of conceptualization (Moore and Carpiano, 2020) and that its 
definition and measurement are still rather unclear (Guillen et al., 2011). There is 
generally no agreement on the concept of social capital and it is subjective as to 
whether there is consistency for which dimensions of social capital are considered 
important for measurement (see e.g. Chung et al., 2012; Hong et al., 2007 cited in 
Chung et al., 2014; Jeong et al., 2021). The concept has multiple aspects, 
dimensions, characteristics and associations with the underlying societal context, 
contributing to the disagreement on its appropriateness for empirical analysis. Social 
participation is an important aspect of social capital in Zimbabwe as it reflects on 
environmental context and characteristics of its society. 
 
Treating group membership as social capital is not entirely uncommon. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, 
includes ‘trust and membership in associations’ as one category of the World Value 
Survey that is used to measure social capital (see e.g. Chung et al., 2014; Dalton et 
al., 2002; Elgar et al., 2011; Mansyur et al., 2008). On the other hand, the World 
Bank developed the ‘Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social 
Capital’ which divides social capital into: ‘groups and networks, trust and solidarity, 
collective action and cooperation, information and communication, social cohesion 
and inclusion, and empowerment and political action’ (see e.g. Grootaert et al., 
2004).  Related, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the United Kingdom 
109 
 
designed the ‘Harmonized Question Set’ that includes the following social capital 
aspects: social participation, social networks and social support, reciprocity and trust, 
civic participation and views of the local area (see e.g. Walsh et al., 2015; Webb, 
2015).  
 
There is also acknowledgement of the potential overlap of different social capital 
perspectives such as trust, networks, and social participation/civic engagement 
providing rationale for researchers to either combine available measures of these 
components into one social capital scale or regard one measure as a proxy for 
another (Moore and Carpiano, 2020). The definition of social capital adopted in this 
study can be viewed in this line of thinking and is closely related to the concept of 
group social capital introduced by Oh et al. (2004), which is the configuration of 
group members’ social relationships within a group and extending to the broader 
social structure to which the group belongs, through which essential resources for the 
group can be obtained.  
 
Furthermore, this definition views social capital as a community or neighbourhood-
wide construct implying that having social groups in which some household 
members participate is enough to generate networks, norms, and trust (see e.g. 
Alaimo et al., 2010). However, research on the topic is relatively sparse despite the 
fact that neighbourhood organizations are widely cited as mechanisms of social 
capital. In public health literature, inter alia, social capital has been operationalized 
as social participation referring to the number of groups and associations to which 
citizens belong (Guillen et al., 2011). Literature also points to social participation as 
meeting socially, helping behaviour, participation in a voluntary organization, 
conventional political participation and political protest behaviour (see Newton and 
Montero, 2007 cited in ibid). The definition of social capital adopted in this study is 
similar in approach to the European Social Survey which asked respondents to 
indicate for 12 organizations whether they “are members”, “participate actively” 
and/or “do voluntary work”. In the context of Zimbabwe, and with particular 
reference to informal social systems, social capital measured as whether a household 
has a member who belongs to a social group reflects the dynamism and complexity 






The fact that only the 2015 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
(ZIMVAC) survey asked whether the household has a member who belongs to a 
social group and that other later surveys did not ask this question became a weakness 
in this study. This means that the study relies on one cross-sectional survey despite 
the fact that the ZIMVAC is an annual survey. The analysis could arguably be richer 
had it been possible to pool together more annual cross-sectional datasets. Even if it 
is not possible to identify the same households across annual ZIMVAC surveys, 
pooling surveys across time would improve on external validity of the findings 
presented in this study.  
 
As already detailed above, the fluidity of the concept of social capital as social 
participation may demand a further interrogation of within-social group 
heterogeneity. It is logical to think that some social groups will have larger social 
capital endowment than others probably because of their members’ influence in the 
overall social make-up of their group which may in turn influence household food 
security. There may be need for further research in which the different social groups 
indicated by respondents (i.e. community associations, informal savings and loans 
associations, burial societies) can be interrogated to show how different they are 
against each other in influencing food security. Furthermore, if the within-group 
heterogeneity causes systematic differences and is unobserved, then this is a 
potential source of bias that may not be fully addressed by the empirical strategy 
adopted in this study.  The Propensity Score Matching relies on observed 
characteristics to assign households into treatment and control groups. There is need 
therefore for further studies based on empirical strategies that address unobserved 
heterogeneity.  For example, data permitting, studies and findings based on panel 
data models are recommended in this regard. 
 
For the potential challenge of endogeneity that may exist between food security and 
membership into various social groups, further research based on panel data models 
is also recommended. Empirical strategies in which the lag of social capital 
(measured as membership in social groups in prior years) can be used as an 
Instrumental Variable and this has the potential to address the problem of 
endogeneity. This can actually be motivated by the Arellano-Bond Estimator 
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approach. This could not be done in this study because the ZIMVAC data does not 





Based on Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee data, this research 
assesses the impact of social capital on food security. Social capital is measured at 
household level and defined as a binary response as to whether a household has a 
member or members belonging to a social group. The research analyses the impact 
of social capital on a number of specific food security pillars, household hunger, 
coping strategies, and agricultural extension and veterinary services.  
  
The study provides evidence supporting the importance of social capital in ensuring 
food security in Zimbabwe. Households with social capital are more food secure 
than those without in all the food security pillars outlined in the research, with all 
estimates being strongly significant. Relatedly, the findings show that households 
with members belonging to a social group are less likely to not have food to eat, to 
sleep at night without eating and going for a whole day and night hungry than those 
without social capital. Social capital reduces incidences of household hunger. 
Furthermore, the results show that households with social capital are less likely to 
skip meals,  limit portion size at meal, reduce number of meals, borrow food, rely on 
less expensive food, harvest immature crops, send members to beg, purchase food on 
credit, and reduce adult consumption; than those without social capital. Households 
with social capital are less likely to be forced to adopt demanding and 
psychologically stressful food insecurity coping strategies compared to households 
without social capital.  
 
Finally, the findings indicate that households with members belonging to a social 
group are more likely to participate in agricultural training than those without. 
Participating in agricultural training is important in ensuring food security. Social 
capital increases the household chances of receiving visits from agricultural 
extension officers. Interaction with agricultural extension officers is expected to 
increase food security through knowledge dissemination and diffusion.  This kind of 
interaction is therefore expected to lead to increased cropping and animal husbandry 
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advisory and technical support. The results show that households with social capital 
are more likely to seek cropping advice, veterinary services, and technical support 
than their counterparts. This should increase household food security so is preserving 
harvests. The results show that households with members belonging to social groups 
are more likely to treat their harvest than those without social capital and thereby 
ensure food security. The study concludes that social capital increases food security 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
These results have important policy implications in that although community-based 
food and nutrition interventions should cater for those suffering from food 
insecurity, their success depends on how the intended beneficiaries evaluate the 
collective functioning of society. Interventions to ensure food security in Zimbabwe 
can ride on social groups to leverage on the benefits that members draw from their 
social groups, such as information sharing, learning from each other, and pooling of 
























THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE SPECIAL COVID-19 





South Africa became the epicentre of COVID-19 in Africa (Carlitz and Makhura, 
2020; Garba et al., 2020; Stiegler and Bouchard, 2020) and continues to record 
highest cumulative COVID-19 cases; accounting for the 90 percent of confirmed 
deaths in Southern Africa (see e.g. Mbunge, 2020). As a result, this prompted the 
authorities to institute drastic measures which include national total lockdown, 
curfews and stay-at-home requirements. These measures, which were the most 
restrictive on the African continent, have imposed huge economic costs and have 
negative implications for the factor distribution of income (see e.g. Arndt et al., 
2020). 
 
The severe shocks to household income and limited means to purchase food have the 
potential to throw households into food insecurity. Households with high 
dependence on labour income are more likely to experience enormous real income 
shock. In South Africa, the lack of food and financial resources led to ‘hunger riots’, 
looting and confrontation with police (see e.g. Stiegler and Bouchard, 2020). The 
pandemic and the lockdown measures, in general, created fear, anxiety, distress, and 
discomfort as well as food insecurity; all which can have long-lasting effects on 
well-being.  Food-insecurity, for example, has long-term effects on the well-being of 
society and understanding its prevalence and determinants during the COVID-19 
pandemic is important and can influence the creation of earmarked and effective 
strategies (see e.g. Kent et al., 2020). 
 
The South African government introduced a number of temporary social and 
economic relief interventions, which include the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of 
Distress Grant of R350 per month that is equivalent to US $20, increases to existing 
social welfare grants, and economic support through the Special COVID-19 
Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit (see e.g. Haffejee and Levine, 2020). For 
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example, the basic Child Support Grant was increased by an extra R300 in May 2020 
and an additional R500 from June 2020, which is equivalent to an additional US $26 
per month per eligible child. Other grant beneficiaries (e.g. of Old Age Grant, Foster 
Care Grant) received an additional R250 per month. The Special COVID-19 Social 
Relief of Distress Grant can only be accessed by residents of South Africa who are 
above the age of 18 and not receiving any income, social grant or unemployment 
insurance benefit. The question, however, is whether these interventions have an 
impact on hunger given the severe shocks to incomes and the prolonged restrictive 
and stringent lockdown measures. This research, therefore, aims to assess the impact 
of social protection and the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on 
hunger and contribute to promoting knowledge on food security in a crisis period 
thereby preventing the expansion of hunger during and after the social and economic 
crisis brought about by COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
Based on Correlated Random Effects estimations employed on two waves of the 
National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (NIDS-
CRAM), which is the first nationally representative panel data survey investigating 
the socioeconomic impacts of the national lockdown associated with the State of 
Disaster declared in South Africa in March 2020, the study offers four major 
findings. First, receiving a government grant reduces the likelihood of going hungry 
and running out of money to buy food. Receiving a government grant leads to a 6 
and a 12 percentage point lower chance of going hungry and of running out of 
money to buy food, respectively. Second, households with individuals receiving the 
Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant have an 8 percent lower chance of 
facing child hunger than those that do not receive the grant. Third, the results show 
that the Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit does not have an 
impact on hunger and does not cushion individuals and households from running out 
of money to buy food. Finally, although COVID-19 has put pressure on food 
security for individuals and households, there is no evidence to suggest that those 
who were tested or screened for the virus are more likely to go hungry or run out of 
money to buy food than those who were not. There is no heterogeneity emanating 




The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents short 
description of the special COVID-19 social protection interventions in South Africa. 
Section 4.3 provides a brief literature review and outlines hypotheses tested in the 
study. Section 4.4 details the data and methodology adopted, and Section 4.5 
presents the results and discussion of the findings whereas Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Special COVID-19 social protection interventions  
 
Following imminent substantial welfare losses to individuals and households as a 
result of its lockdown policy, the South African government responded quickly to 
address the adverse economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 21 April, 
2020, the government allocated R502 billion (equivalent to USD 33.45 billion) 
towards a wide array of economic support measures for businesses and individuals of 
which R50 billion (equivalent to USD 3.30 billion) was ear-marked for the most 
economically vulnerable members of society in the form of direct financial transfers 
(see e.g. Bhorat et al., 2020; National Treasury, 2020), which included a temporary 
increase in all existing social grants (i.e. Foster Care Grant, Child Support Grant, Old 
Age Grant, Care Dependency Grant, War Veterans Grant, and the Disability Grant), 
and introduction of the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant.  
 
 
4.2.1 Temporary increase to existing social grants 
 
As part of the government’s social grant COVID-19 intervention, the Child Support 
Grant amount was increased by an additional R300 in May 2020 and thereafter the 
figure was pegged at R500 from June to October 2020; an additional R250 monthly 
from May to October 2020 to all other social grants that include the Foster Care 
Grant, Old Age Grant, Care Dependency Grant, War Veterans Grant, and the 
Disability Grant. This means additional direct financial transfers to 13 million Child 
Support Grant and 5 million ‘all other grants’ beneficiaries (see e.g. K?̈?hler and 
Bhorat, 2020).  
 
The Child Support Grant is a means-test social protection for children under the age 
of 18 given to a caregiver not earning more than R48000 a year (R4000 a month) if 
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single and/ or not earning a combined income of more than R96000 per year (R8000 
per month) if married. The child must be living with the primary caregiver and not 
be in the care of a state institution. The grant gives an eligible child R 440 per month 
and as a response to COVID-19 pandemic, the amount was increased by an 
additional R500 as noted above. On the other hand, the Old Age Grant is given to 
South African citizens, permanent residents or refugees who are 60 years or above. 
The recipients of the grant must meet means-test requirements and must not be 
maintained or cared for in an institution funded by the state (e.g. a prison, 
rehabilitation centre or a state old age home) and must not receive another social 
grant. The grant gives an eligible old person R1800 per month and due to special 
COVID-19 government intervention the recipient would receive an additional R250 
per month for the stipulated time. 
 
Related, recipients of the Care Dependency Grant also received an additional R250 
as a direct response to COVID-19 pandemic. The Care Dependence Grant is given to 
caregivers of disabled children under the age of 18 upon submission of a medical or 
assessment report confirming that the child is severely disabled and receives 
permanent care or support services. The grant is means-test and the care-dependent 
child must not be permanently cared for in an institution funded by the state. Unlike 
the Care Dependency Grant, the Disability Grant is meant for disabled people aged 
between 18 and 59 who are certified as such through a medical or assessment report. 
Recipients of these grants received an additional R250 per month for the stipulated 
period of special COVID-19 pandemic government intervention.   
 
 
4.2.2 Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant 
 
In response to the detrimental economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
government introduced a new social grant, in the form of a Special COVID-19 
Social Relief of Distress Grant, to cater for individuals above the age of 18 who are 
unemployed and who do not receive any income, any social grant or support from 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund.  Furthermore, applicants must not qualify to 
receive unemployment insurance benefit and not reside in a government funded or 
subsidized institution to qualify for the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress 
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Grant. Eligibility to access the grant extends to South African citizens, permanent 
residents, refugees, asylum-seekers, and special permit holders who meet the above-
stated criterion. The grant gives eligible individuals an amount of  R350 (USD23) 
per month and is expected to reach to more than 11 million beneficiaries (see e.g. 
Baskaran et al., 2020) that have never been catered for and the ‘new poor’ who have 
been forced to migrate from the middle of the income distribution as a result of 
structural changes brought about by COVID-19 pandemic. It is reported to have 
brought millions of previously vulnerable but unreached individuals into the social 
protection system (Bhorat and K?̈?hler., 2020). Initially, the grant was meant to be for 
6 months from May to October 2020 but it has since been extended by an additional 
3 months to January 2021 and for a further 3 months in February 2021.  
 
In terms of uptake, a total of 9.15 million unique applications were considered 
between May and September 2020 (Baskaran et al., 2020); with 73 percent of the 
applications made in May, reducing to 830,000 new applications in July and 195,000 
in September 2020. The total number of applications reviewed on a monthly basis 
increased by 40 percent from May to September 2020. As of mid October 2020, 
more than 18.5 million COVID-19 grants were distributed suggesting that a 
substantial number of recipients received the grant more than once (see e.g. ibid.). 
The extension of the grant from November 2020 to January 2021 is estimated to 
have resulted in 9.8 million additional COVID-19 grants being disbursed over the 
three-month extension period.  
 
 
4.2.3 Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Benefit 
 
The Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Benefit was introduced by 
government to provide between 38 and 60 percent of the salary of employees who 
found themselves laid off specifically as a result of COVID-19 pandemic. The grant 
provides relief to thousands of workers who lost their jobs as a result of the toughest 
lockdowns that South Africa was forced to implement in order to curb the spread of 
the virus. The benefit covers different situations faced by employer and employees 
during national lockdowns as a result of COVID-19; namely illness benefit given to 
employees who have to self-quarantine, death benefit given in provision of death to 
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oneself or a family member, reduced work time, and the Temporary Employer Relief 
Scheme. Under the Temporary Employer Relief Scheme, any employer that closes 
operations for 3 months or for a shorter period and suffers financial distress as a 
direct result of COVID-19 pandemic qualifies for the benefit. As of October 2020, a 
total of almost R50 billion (about USD 3.30 billion) had been disbursed in the form 
of benefits to 5 million workers who had been laid off.  
 
 
4.3 Literature review and hypotheses 
 
Households from developing countries with strong lockdown measures but weak 
social protection systems are likely to face a grim food security outlook (Arndt et al., 
2020). Distribution of food parcels for the poorest communities is usually not 
enough under such circumstances (see e.g. Stiegler and Bouchard, 2020). The 
pandemic severely affects those socioeconomically vulnerable (Ribeiro-Silva et al., 
2020). The health, economic, and social impacts of COVID-19 are complex, 
emergent and unpredictable (Lawrence, 2020). In Southern Africa, in general, the 
COVID-19 pandemic coincided with other existing shocks such as adverse climatic 
effects in Zimbabwe (Ejeromedoghene et al., 2020) and thus the coronavirus 
pandemic amplified the threats to food security. 
  
The economic devastation from COVID-19 increases the importance of a robust 
safety net (Saloner et al., 2020). Other usual food-insecurity coping strategies such 
as depending on social networks for support in the form of sharing meals with 
neighbours and family, for example, are difficult due to lockdowns and social 
distancing restrictions (see e.g. Kinsey et al., 2020). The severe shocks brought about 
by COVID-19 demonstrate the value of having in place social protection programs 
that support vulnerable members of society against these unprecedented types of 
shocks. The following hypotheses linking COVID-19 and government grants to 




Households with individuals that receive government grants are less likely to 





Households with individuals that receive the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of 
Distress Grant are less likely to experience hunger. 
 
In general, the wide-spread stay-at-home orders and business closures instituted to 
fight the spread of the virus resulted in large increases in unemployment, food 
insecurity and hunger (see e.g. Dunn et al., 2020; Kent et al., 2020; Owens et al., 
2020). The global COVID-19 has caused unprecedented job losses and financial 
strain (Ribeiro-Silva et al., 2020; Saloner et al., 2020)). In South Africa, a large 
number of workers have not been able to report for work and to earn an income 
during the lockdown and these also include lowly-paid workers usually engaged in 
the service sector, construction, manufacturing, and domestic work (Bhorat et al., 
2020a). The detrimental labour market effects of COVID-19 pandemic and its 
associated lockdown restrictions have been disproportionately felt by individuals in 
lower-income households (K?̈?hler and Bhorat, 2020). In situations like these, many 
individuals look up to social protection such as unemployment insurance programs 
as coping strategies. The impact on food security for some households will be 
affected in the absence of strategies to guarantee incomes. This leads to the 
development of the following hypotheses linking the Special COVID-19 
Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit to hunger: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1.2  
 
Households with individuals receiving the Special COVID-19 Unemployment 




Having been screened or tested for COVID-19 increases the chances of experiencing 












The research is based on the National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid 
Mobile Survey (NIDS-CRAM). It is the first nationally representative panel data 
survey that investigates the socioeconomic impacts of the national lockdown 
associated with the State of Disaster declared in South Africa in March 2020, and the 
social and economic repercussions of the global Coronavirus pandemic. The survey 
is aimed at informing policy based on dependable research on income, employment 
and welfare in South Africa, in the context of the global Coronavirus pandemic. It is 
implemented by the Southern Africa Labor and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU). The NIDS-CRAM therefore provides a measure of how firms and 
families are being affected by the lockdown, the pandemic, and takes stock of the 
reach and efficacy of government’s social and economic relief efforts.  
 
The NIDS-CRAM is derived from a special follow up of adults from households in 
the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) Wave 5 of 2017. NIDS-CRAM is a 
repeated Computer Assisted Telephone Interview with two waves whose focus is on 
the Coronavirus pandemic and the national lockdown. Data collection for Wave 1 of 
NIDS-CRAM started on 07 May 2020 and ended on 27 June 2020. It interviewed 
7,073 individuals. On the other hand, data collection for Wave 2 of the NIDS-
CRAM commenced on 13 July 2020 and finished on 13 August 2020 after 
interviewing 5,676 individuals. The superiority of NIDS-CRAM lies in the fact that 
it is a panel survey which tracks the same individual; providing a window to 
understand and to be able to identify who is receiving new and existing grants, and 
what influence such receipt may have on welfare for vulnerable members of society 
in South Africa during trying times brought about by COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
  
4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
 
The NIDS-CRAM is a panel data with two waves and as such it allows for the 
adoption of empirical strategies that can deal with inherent selection bias associated 
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with social protection programs. If individuals who choose to take up the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant, for example, have unique and 
unobserved characteristics that make them more likely to take up the grant than 
others then estimating the impact of the grant on food security using simple OLS 
estimations will result in biased results. Concerning the Special COVID-19 Social 
Relief of Distress Grant, Bhorat and K?̈?hler (2020) observed that conditional on 
applying, certain individuals are more likely than others to be successful in their 
application. However, with panel data, Fixed Effects models are suited to deal with 
this challenge. If the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time, with Fixed 
Effects, it will be differenced away and the estimate will be a true reflection of the 
impact of the grant on food security. 
 
However, the variables of interest in this study are relatively constant over time 
given the short time difference between the waves hence using Fixed Effects 
estimations difference them away. It is therefore proposed to use the Mundlak’s 
Correlated Random Effects formulation. The Correlated Random Effects allows 
unification of Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimation approaches. This way, it 
allows the inclusion of time-constant variables while guaranteeing the Fixed Effects 
estimates on the time-varying covariates (see e.g. Schunck, 2017). Under the 
Mundlak’s approach, the Fixed Effects estimator can be computed either as a pooled 
OLS or Random Effects using the original data but adding the time averages of the 
covariates as additional explanatory variables (see e.g. Mundlak, 1978; Wooldridge, 
2010). The Correlated Random Effects model adopted in this study is motivated as 
follows: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷 +  ?̅?𝑖𝝋 +  𝒛𝑖𝜸 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                            (1)   
 
where ℎ𝑖𝑡 is a measure of food security for household i at time t, 𝒙𝑖𝑡 captures a host 
of variables that influence household hunger at time t, ?̅?𝑖 is the average of covariates 
over the time periods in which a full dataset on covariates and response variables can 
be observed. The inclusion of ?̅?𝑖, mops up any correlation between this variable and 
the unobserved random effect.  𝒛𝑖 captures other time constant variables, 𝛼𝑖 is meant 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 models idiosyncratic errors. Interest 
is on the estimate of 𝜷 which captures the effect of the grants on household hunger. 
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Captured in ℎ𝑖𝑡 are binary outcome variables based on questions asking whether 
there was anyone in the household who had gone hungry in the past 7 days because 
there was not enough food; whether there was any child in the household who has 
gone hungry in the last 7 days because there was not enough food; and whether the 
household ran out of money to buy food in the last 30 days. Relatedly,  𝑥𝑖𝑡 captures 
binary variables of interest based on whether the respondent or anyone in the 
household had been screened or tested for Coronavirus; whether the respondent 
received any kind of government grant; whether the respondent received the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant; and whether or not the respondent 
received the Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit.  
 
 
4.5 Results and discussion 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show household characteristics. On average, each household 
is comprised of six members, two of which are under the age of 18. Five percent of 
the people surveyed are white, 9 percent coloured and 1 percent is of Asian origin. 
Of interest to note, however, is that in Wave 1 only 18 percent were living in the 
rural areas but in Wave 2 the figure has jumped to 28 percent. This can loosely be 
associated with the general trend in most countries where people temporarily 
migrated to rural areas in an attempt to break away from usually congested urban 
areas. Average household income in Wave 2 is slightly smaller compared to that 
observed in Wave 1 generally pointing to sustained loss of income during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. This is also confirmed in Table 4.3 where those who reported 
to be employed fell from 38 percent in Wave 1 to 10 percent in Wave 2. 
 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 detail descriptive statistics for variables of interest and 
outcome variables respectively. In general, those that have been receiving 
government grants increased from 22 percent in Wave 1 to 40 percent in Wave 2 
which is a reflection of a coping strategy likely to be adopted in such unprecedented 
situations of acute shocks where individuals are losing incomes in the face of 




Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics – Household Characteristics 
 
 WAVE 1 WAVE 2 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   
Race  : Black 0.85 0.86 
 (0.35) (0.35) 
            Coloured 0.09 0.09 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
            White 0.05 0.05 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
            Asian 0.01 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Geo area  : Rural 0.18 0.28 
 (0.39) (0.45) 
             Urban 0.77 0.69 
 (0.42) (0.46) 
             Farm 0.04 0.03 
 (0.20) (0.17) 
Household income 5,324.24 5,058.24 
 (12,156.79) (10,011.80) 
   
Observations 7,073 5,676 
NOTES: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Black refers to people of specifically African origin. 
Asian refers to people of Asian origin including black people from Asia. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics – Household Size 
 
 WAVE 1 WAVE 2 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   
Household size 5.56 5.41 
 (3.31) (3.32) 
Under 18 years of age 2.22 2.26 
 (1.20) (1.94) 
Under 7 years of age 1.15 1.11 
 (1.13) (1.12) 
   
Observations 7,073 5,676 
  NOTES: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
 
the only fall-back. However, none received the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of 
Distress Grant in Wave 1 but 7 percent received it in Wave 2. Of interest, however, 
is the fall in those that received the Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance 
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Fund benefit from 14 percent in Wave 1 to 6 percent in Wave 2. Given the fall in 
those that are employed from 38 percent to 10 percent, one would expect to see an 
increase in unemployment benefit claim. In both the two waves, 37 percent had 
undergone COVID-19 testing. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics – Individual Characteristics 
 
 WAVE 1 WAVE 2 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   
Age 40.58 40.86 
 (15.62) (15.69) 
Gender      :  female 0.61 0.61 
 (0.49) (0.49) 
Has tertiary education 0.34 0.33 
 (0.47) (0.47) 
Employed 0.38 0.10 
 (0.48) (0.29) 
   
Observations 7,073 5,676 




Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics – Variables of Interest 
 
 WAVE 1 WAVE 2 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   
Special COVID-19 UIF Benefit 0.14 0.06 
 (0.34) (0.23) 
Government grant 0.22 0.40 
 (0.41) (0.49) 
Special COVID-19 SRD Grant 0.00 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.26) 
COVID-19 test 0.37 0.37 
 (0.48) (0.48) 
   
Observations 7,073 5,676 
NOTES: Special COVID-19 UIF Benefit is Unemployment Insurance Fund, which is a social 
protection fund that gives short-term relief to workers when they become unemployed or are unable to 
work during COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa. Government grant is binary based on whether the 
respondent received any kind of government grant. Special COVID-19 SRD Grant is the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant COVID-19 that can only be accessed by residents of South 
Africa who are above the age of 18 and not receiving any income, social grant or unemployment 
insurance benefit. COVID-19 Test is binary and based on a question which asked whether the 





On average, households and individuals were relatively more food insecure in Wave 
1 than they were in Wave 2. This may be explained by and associated with the 
increase in the proportion of those that reported receiving government grants and the 
Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant. From Table 4.5, 52 percent 
reported ever running out of money for food in Wave 1 compared to 40 percent in 
Wave 2. On the other hand, 26 percent reported ever going hungry in Wave 1 
compared to 19 percent in Wave 2 and finally, 19 percent reported that a child has 
ever gone hungry in Wave 1 compared to 14 percent in Wave 2. 
 
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics – Outcome Variables of Interest 
 
 WAVE 1 WAVE 2 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   
Ever ran out of money for food 0.52 0.40 
 (0.50) (0.49) 
Gone hungry 0.26 0.19 
 (0.44) (0.39) 
Child hunger 0.19 0.14 
 (0.39) (0.35) 
   
Observations 7,073 5,676 
NOTES: Ever ran out of money for food is based on a question that asked whether the household 
ran out of money to buy food in the last month. Gone hungry is based on a question which asked 
whether there was anyone in the household who had gone hungry in the past 7 days because there 
was not enough food. Child hunger is based on whether there was any child in the household who 





Table 4.6 presents Correlated Random Effects results on the effect of government 
grants on household hunger. Government grant is binary based on whether the 
respondent received any kind of government grant. The dependent variable in 
Column (1) of the table is based on a question which asked whether there was 
anyone in the household who had gone hungry in the past 7 days because there was 
not enough food. Column (2) presents results on the impact of government grant on 
child hunger. Child hunger is binary and based on whether there was any child in the 
household who has gone hungry in the last 7 days because there was not enough 
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food. Results in Column (3) of the same table are based on whether the household 
ran out of money to buy food in the last month. 
 
Table 4.6: Correlated Random Effects Results on the Effect of Government 






Ran out of money to 
buy food 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Government grant -0.06*** -0.02 -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
COVID-19 Test 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.01 0.00 -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household size  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of household income -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender – female  0.01 0.02 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Tertiary education   -0.05*** -0.03** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Employed  0.07** 0.07** 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Geo area:  traditional -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
            Urban -0.06 0.04 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Race:      Black   0.10*** 0.06** 0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
            Coloured   0.08*** 0.03 0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
            Asian 0.05 -0.01 0.19*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Mean:      age 0.01 -0.00 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
            Employed   -0.11*** -0.09** -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
            Traditional 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
            Urban -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
           Government grant 0.03 -0.01 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
           COVID-19 Test -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Constant    0.59*** 0.35*** 1.14*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
    
Observations 4,239 3,518 4,247 
Number of pid 3,368 2,810 3,376 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are all binary. The dependent 
variable for results in Column (1) is based on a question which asked whether there was anyone in the 
household who had gone hungry in the past 7 days because there was not enough food. Column (2) is 
based on whether there was any child in the household who has gone hungry in the last 7 days 
because there wasn’t enough food. Column (3) is based on a question that asked whether the 
household ran out of money to buy food in the last month. Government grant is binary based on 
whether the respondent received any kind of government grant. COVID-19 Test is binary and based 
on a question which asked whether the respondent or anyone in the household had been screened or 
tested for Coronavirus.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Results in Column (1) of Table 4.6 indicate that, compared to those who do not 
receive any government grant, receiving a government grant reduces the likelihood 
of going hungry by 6 percentage points, which is significant at 1 percent. This result 
confirms hypothesis 4.1 hypothesizing that households with individuals that receive 
government grants are less likely to experience hunger during COVID-19 pandemic. 
As is generally expected, increasing household size by an additional member 
increases the chances of household hunger during crisis periods like COVID-19 
pandemic era; and having a tertiary education reduces the chances of going hungry 
by 5 percentage points, an estimate which is significant at 1 percent. Increasing 
household income by 1 percent reduces the chances of going hungry by 5 percent, 
which is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of significance. 
   
Authorities instituted drastic measures which include national total lockdown, 
curfews and stay-at-home requirements. The severe shocks to household income 
threw households into food insecurity. This is reflected in the results as those who 
are employed have a 7 percentage point higher chance of going hungry than those 
who are not employed; an estimate which is significant at 5 percent, implying that 
those that depend on labour income were severely affected by lockdowns. Under 
normal circumstances, one would expect employment status to be inversely related 
to household hunger. This result confirms that during lockdowns and due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, people in South Africa faced hunger irrespective of 
employment status, with those employed bearing the greatest brunt due to income 
shock. On another hand, under such circumstances, vulnerable members of society 
are the most hard-hit. For example, blacks have a 10 percentage point higher chance 
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of going hungry than whites in this pandemic, which is significant at 1 percent. 
Likewise, coloureds have an 8 percentage point higher chance of going hungry than 
whites, which is also significant at 1 percent. 
 
Column (2) of Table 4.6 presents results of the impact of government grants on child 
hunger. The results show that there is no significant impact of receiving a 
government grant on child hunger. Household size is also predicted to have a 
significant effect on child hunger. An increase in household income by 1 percent is 
predicted to lead to a 4 percent lower chance of child hunger, which is significant at 
1 percent. Children living with household members with tertiary education are 3 
percentage points less likely to go hungry compared to those living with those 
without tertiary education; an estimate which is significant at 5 percent. When 
compared to whites, blacks have a 6 percentage point higher chance of witnessing 
child hunger, which is significant at the 5 percent level. COVID-19 pandemic and its 
associated lockdown and social distancing restrictions has had a relatively higher 
effect on hunger for the employed. Unfortunately, this is also affecting children as 
those who reported having been employed have a 7 percentage point higher chance 
of experiencing child hunger than those not employed, an estimate which is also 
significant at 5 percent. 
 
On the other hand, Column (3) of the table shows estimation results of the impact of 
government grant on money to buy food. Households with individuals that receive a 
government grant have a 12 percentage point lower chance of running out of money 
to buy food compared to those without; an estimate which is significantly different 
from zero at the 1 percent level. This result also confirms Hypothesis 4.1 that 
households with individuals who receive government grants are less likely to 
experience hunger during COVID-19 pandemic. Estimates of the effect of household 
size, household income and tertiary education are all significant at 1 percent. Of 
interest however, is the estimated effect of gender on whether the household ran out 
of money to buy food. Females have a 4 percentage point higher chance of running 
out of money to buy food, an estimate which is significant at 5 percent. This is an 
important finding; reflecting gender heterogeneity in food security during the 
pandemic. This is an important finding considering that conditional on applying, 
Bhorat and K?̈?hler (2020) found that women were less likely than men to experience 
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a successful Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant application. Related, 
blacks, coloreds and those of Asian origin have 9 percentage, 20 percentage and 19 
percentage point higher chances of running out of money to buy food than whites, 
respectively. All the estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent, 1 
percent and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively.  
 
Table 4.7 presents Correlated Random Effects estimation results of the effect of the 
special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on household hunger. Results in 
Column (1) of the table indicate that the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress 
Grant does not have an effect on hunger. Although it reduces the chances of running 
out of money for food as shown in Column (3) of the table, the estimate is not 
statistically different from zero. These results detailed in Column (1) and Column (3) 
of the table do not confirm hypothesis 4.1.1 that households with individuals 
receiving the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant are less likely to 
experience hunger. However, households with individuals receiving the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant have an 8 percentage point lower chance 
of facing child hunger compared to their counterpart, an estimate which is 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. This is an important result 
since this may reflect hunger coping strategies adopted by households and 
individuals when faced with unprecedented shocks of the magnitude such as 
COVID-19 has caused. Households may be forced to dedicate specific social 
protection benefits to fight child hunger. This may reflect altruism on the part of 
adults during trying times. On the other hand, the results show that the Special 
COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit does not have an impact on 
hunger. This therefore does not support hypothesis 4.1.2 which postulates that 
households with members receiving the Special COVID-19 Unemployment 
Insurance Fund benefit are less likely to experience hunger during COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
As for whether those that were screened or tested for COVID-19 have higher 
chances of going hungry, face child hunger, or run out of money to buy food, results 
in Table 4.6 indicate that there is no statistical difference of being screened or tested 
for COVID-19 on hunger. This result therefore does not support Hypothesis 4.2 
above. However, to check for robustness, Table 4.8 presents results of Correlated 
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Random Effects with interactions, the estimate of the mean of those that were 
screened or tested on household hunger and on child hunger are positive and pick 
significance.  
 
Table 4.7: Correlated Random Effects Results on the Effect of Covid-19 Grant 






Ran out of money 
for food 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Special COVID-19 SRD Grant 0.01 -0.08** -0.09 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Special COVID-19 UIF benefit 0.07 0.07 -0.13 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
COVID-19 Test 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Household size 0.00 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of household income -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender: female 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tertiary education -0.05*** -0.03* -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employed 0.15*** 0.09* 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Geo area: traditional -0.15* -0.07 -0.14 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
           Urban -0.11 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
Race:     Black 0.08*** 0.06** 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
           Coloured 0.04 0.02 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
           Asian 0.07 0.00 0.14 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Mean:     age -0.00 -0.00 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
           Employed -0.16*** -0.11** -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
           Traditional -0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
           Urban -0.03 -0.16 0.11 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
           COVID-19 Test -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
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 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
           UIF benefit -0.04 -0.03 0.18 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) 
Constant 0.65*** 0.33*** 1.18*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) 
    
Observations 2,034 1,690 2,037 
Number of pid 1,962 1,633 1,966 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are all binary. The dependent 
variable for results in Column (1) is based on a question which asked whether there was anyone in the 
household who had gone hungry in the past 7 days because there was not enough food. Column (2) is 
based on whether there was any child in the household who has gone hungry in the last 7 days 
because there was not enough food. Column (3) is based on a question that asked whether the 
household ran out of money to buy food in the last month. The Special COVID-19 SRD Grant is the 
Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant, which can only be accessed by residents of South 
Africa who are above the age of 18 and not receiving any income, social grant or unemployment 
insurance benefit. The Special COVID-19 UIF Benefit is binary based on whether the respondent 
received any money from the Unemployment Insurance Benefit’s Temporary Employer/Employee 
Relief Scheme. COVID-19 Test is binary and based on a question which asked whether the 
respondent or anyone in the household had been screened or tested for Coronavirus.   *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
However, if anything, they should be interpreted to mean that, in general, COVID-19 
pandemic has put pressure on food security in South Africa. Furthermore, the results 
in Table 4.8 confirm results in Table 4.6 that receiving government grant reduces the 
chances of going hungry and of running out of money to buy food. A household with 
individuals receiving government grants have a 5 percentage point and a 15 
percentage point lower chance of going hungry and running out of money to buy 
food, respectively. 
 
Table 4.8: Correlated Random Effects (with interactions) Results on the Effect 






Ran out of money to 
buy food 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
(Government grant) x 
(mCOVID-19 Test) 
-0.04 -0.02 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
(Female) x (Mean 
COVID-19 Test) 
-0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Government grant -0.05* -0.00 -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Mean COVID-19 Test 0.05* 0.06** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Female 0.02 0.04* 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.01 0.00 -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household size 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of household income -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tertiary education -0.05*** -0.03** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Employed 0.07** 0.07** 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Geo area: traditional -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
           Urban -0.06 0.04 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Race:     Black 0.10*** 0.06** 0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
           Coloured 0.08*** 0.03 0.21*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
           Asian 0.05 -0.01 0.19*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Mean:     age 0.01 -0.00 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
           Employed -0.11*** -0.09** -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
           Traditional 0.02 -0.04 -0.00 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
           Urban -0.00 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
           government grant 0.03 -0.01 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.58*** 0.34*** 1.13*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
    
Observations 4,255 3,531 4,264 
Number of pid 3,375 2,817 3,384 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are all binary. The dependent 
variable for results in Column (1) is based on a question which asked whether there was anyone in the 
household who had gone hungry in the past 7 days because there was not enough food. Column (2) is 
based on whether there was any child in the household who has gone hungry in the last 7 days 
because there was not enough food. Column (3) is based on a question that asked whether the 
household ran out of money to buy food in the last month. Government grant is binary based on 
whether the respondent received any kind of government grant. COVID-19 Test is binary and based 
on a question which asked whether the respondent or anyone in the household had been screened or 









The finding that households with individuals who receive government grants are less 
likely to go hungry and are less likely to run out of money to buy food than those 
without supports Arndt et al. (2020) observation that low income households in 
South Africa are significantly insulated by government transfer payments. This 
emphasizes the importance of social protection programs during severe shocks 
caused by COVID-19 which have a potential to throw many households into food 
insecurity. The finding is important because due to COVID-19 pandemic, other 
common food insecurity coping strategies may not be feasible. For example, social 
capital through sharing food with neighbours and family during lockdowns and strict 
social distancing restrictions is difficult (see e.g. Kinsey et al., 2020); making social 
protection programs one of the very few strategies available for the vulnerable. 
 
 As in many countries, food parcels were distributed to the poorest communities in 
South Africa, however, this was not enough (see e.g. Stiegler, 2020) further 
confirming the importance of government grants in helping to ensure food security 
during the pandemic. Government grants in general have reduced the poverty and 
hunger effects of the pandemic. With no extra support from the government, an 
estimated 9.8 million people would face hunger. Although it may be known that 
providing income support will reduce food insecurity, the Special COVID-19 
pandemic government interventions have provided support to millions who faced 
destitution, especially given stringent lockdown measures, and highly strained labour 
markets and other income-generation activities. 
 
However, although there is a significant impact of the Special COVID-19 Social 
Relief of Distress Grant on child hunger, there is no such impact on household 
hunger and on running out of money to buy food. This may be due to the challenges 
experienced in the distribution of the grant. It is reported that four months into the 
lockdown, 74 percent of eligible individuals had not accessed the grant (see e.g. 
Broadbent et al., 2020; Thebus, 2020 cited in Haffejee and Levine, 2020). Related, in 
August of 2020, 10.3 percent of approved applications were reported to be at the 
banking process bottleneck and had not been paid (Baskaran, 2020). This result 
somewhat corroborate the findings of Haffejee and Levine (2020) in which they 
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concluded that the pandemic and resultant national lockdown in South Africa 
brought to fore shortcomings in the protection and care of children. However, their 
focus was on children in alternative care.  
 
On another hand, two-thirds of the estimated individuals who received the grant in 
June 2020 were male despite the fact that two-thirds of individuals who experienced 
job losses between February and April 2020 were female (Bhorat and K?̈?hler, 2020). 
The fact that 85 percent of women were found not to be eligible for the grant may 
explain why the intervention is not having a significant impact on hunger since 
elsewhere in the literature it has been observed that poor women spend most of their 
resources towards the family more often than their male counterparts. This may also 
explain why, in Table 4.6 and Table 4.8, women are more likely to run out of money 
to buy food and face child hunger than men. 
 
Furthermore, there has been considerable under-coverage. According to Bhorat et al 
(2020b), a total of almost 6.5 million individuals in June 2020 were eligible for the 
Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant but did not report receipt. These 
individuals will be erroneously regarded as non-recipients and therefore mask the 
effect of the grant on hunger. They also reported on significant differences across 
provinces which may explain comparative efficiencies of grant distribution systems 
thereby overall affecting the impact of the intervention on welfare outcomes. 
Another important dimension is that of ineligible recipients receiving the benefit 
while a lot of the eligible remain ‘locked out’, which may have an effect on the 
overall performance of the grant. According to the Department of Social 
Development, the Auditor General (AG) identified about 30,000 undeserving 
applicants who, despite not satisfying the qualifying criteria due to them receiving 
financial support from the government through other initiatives, were receiving the 
grant.    
 
The Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant amount of R350 per month is 
too low an amount and is insufficient to cover basic food costs, and is even less 
when shared amongst household members and this may have contributed to the 
result of no impact on household hunger. The grant amount is far short of the upper-
bound poverty line of R 1,227 per person per month and the lower-bound poverty 
line of R810 per person per month. The upper-bound poverty line is the poverty line 
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plus the average amount derived from non-food items of households whose food 
expenditure is equal to the food poverty line whereas the lower-bound poverty refers 
to the food poverty line plus the average amount derived from non-food items of 
households whose total expenditure is equal to the food poverty line. The Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant amount is less than the food poverty line 
in South Africa, which is put at R561 per person per month. The food poverty line is 
the ‘extreme’ poverty line which is the amount of money an individual requires to 
get the minimum daily energy intake. The grant is only about 10 percent of the 
median wage in South Africa which is at R 3,300.  
   
The finding that the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant has a 
significant impact on child hunger is an important finding. It is documented that 
before the pandemic, 25 percent of children in South Africa were stunted and 59 
percent lived below the upper-bound poverty line (Hall and Sambu, 2016 cited ibid). 
Children in South Africa are vulnerable and food insecurity has long-term effects on 
their physical, mental and cognitive development. This means that this result has 
important policy implications.  
   
The Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit, which is a COVID-
19 temporary employer/employee relief scheme to provide between 38 and 60 
percent of the salary of employees laid-off directly as a result of the pandemic, does 
not have an impact on hunger. The fact that there is no significant impact of the 
Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) benefit on hunger may 
point to questions of sustainability of such safety nets in the presence of 
unprecedented and extraordinary pressure of the form and magnitude as presented by 
COVID-19. This may also point to the need to further understand how individuals 
are enrolling and accessing the program during the pandemic.  
 
Common problems cited in connection with accessing the Special COVID-19 
Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit are that companies are having problems 
accessing payouts available for their employees, only some employees get payments, 
and foreign workers are not being paid. There have also been reports of possible 
fraud to the fund which resulted in investigation. For example, in September 2020, 
payments for the Temporary Employer Relief Scheme were ceased after 
investigations revealed serious irregularities that included invalid rejections and 
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payments to ghost beneficiaries. This may explain the findings in Table 4.4. From 
Table 4.4, 14 percent reported receiving the Special COVID-19 Unemployment 
Insurance Fund benefit in Wave 1 and the figure fell to 6 percent in Wave 2. There is 
need for further research to understand why this is so which may in turn explain why 
there is no significant impact of such an important program. In the United States, 
Saloner et al. (2020) argued that given the closure of a number of places of business 
coupled with individuals’ reluctance to seek in-person services due to coronavirus 
risk, individuals may find it difficult to visit social services offices to enrol or for 
customer service. 
 
This study has a number of strengths in achieving a better understanding of the 
dynamics of food security during COVID-19 in South Africa. First, the survey used 
in this study is panel with two waves collected during the COVID-19 pandemic and 
as such provided an opportunity to explore the effect of social protection programs 
and the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on food security during 
the pandemic in South Africa. Second, the surveys are nationally representative, 
which is very important given that the pandemic is not selective. This also means 
that the external validity of the results is somewhat guaranteed as it can be argued 
that the results can be generalized in the context of South African COVID-19 
pandemic experiences. Related, the sample size of the two waves (N=12,749), is 
reasonably large and allowed the interrogation of important heterogeneity across 
subgroups. The size of the sample came handy when dealing with household income. 
The best functional form to use when dealing with household income is to consider 
elasticity. However, given that the data was collected during a period of 
unprecedented shocks as a result of COVID-19 pandemic where many households 
reported zero income, taking the log of income resulted in a substantial drop in the 
number of observations but because the sample size of the two waves was relatively 
large it was possible to use elasticity by taking the log of income and remain with a 
meaningful number of observations. 
 
On the other hand, the study has some limitations. The National Income Dynamics 
Study-Coronavirus Rapid Mobile (NIDS-CRAM) surveys used in this study are 
computer assisted telephone interviewing surveys sampled from the National Income 
Dynamics Study (NIDS) Wave 5 of 2017 which means that they are likely to suffer 
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from sample selection bias in that only those that provided mobile numbers will be 
covered. Sample selection bias may arise if those that were successfully interviewed 
were systematically different from those that were not. Related, individuals from 
bigger households were more likely to be sampled than those from smaller 
households. However, if these characteristics are fixed over time, which is strongly 
plausible, then it has been differenced away by the use of Fixed Effects estimations 
and as such the results should be a true reflection of the impact of social protection 
and the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on hunger in South 
Africa. 
 
Another limitation is that unlike the NIDS Wave 5 which asked the oldest women or 
most knowledgeable person in the household about the household and its members, 
the NIDS-CRAM asks the selected respondent questions about their households. 






The South African government introduced a number of temporary social and 
economic relief interventions. The question, however, is whether these interventions 
have an impact on hunger given the severe shocks to incomes and the prolonged 
restrictive and stringent lockdown measures. Based on the National Income 
Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (NIDS-CRAM), which is a 
nationally representative panel data survey that investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of the national lockdown associated with the State of Disaster declared in 
South Africa in March 2020, this research assessed the impact of social protection 
and the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on hunger in South 
Africa.  
 
The findings in this study indicate that COVID-19 has put pressure on food security 
for individuals and households. However, receiving a government grant reduces the 
likelihood of going hungry and running out of money to buy food. This is an 
important finding considering that other behavioural hunger-coping strategies 
usually adopted by the food insecure such as eating with neighbours and friends are 
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not feasible during the COVID-19 pandemic due to the restrictive social distancing 
requirements and strict lockdowns. Furthermore, the findings indicate that 
households with individuals receiving the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of 
Distress Grant have a lower chance of facing child hunger. On the other, the Special 
COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund benefit does not have an impact on 
hunger and does not cushion individuals and households from running out of money 
to buy food. Finally, the findings indicate that although COVID-19 pandemic has put 
pressure on food security in South Africa, there is no heterogeneity on hunger 
between those that were screened or tested for COVID-19 and those not. 
 
These findings have important policy implications. In their entirety, government 
grants are a cushion to hunger during the COVID-19 pandemic. Social safety nets of 
this nature may be the only coping strategy available to the vulnerable during the 
pandemic and its associated restrictive lockdown and social distancing measures. 
However, it is important to pay special attention to each type of social protection and 
its accessibility to ensure that its effect can be maximized during times of fear, 
anxiety, distress and food insecurity such as posed by COVID-19 pandemic. To 
further understand the dynamics between social protection programs and food 
security during crisis periods such as posed by COVID-19 and its effects in the 
medium- and long-term, more studies need to be carried out to test the external 
validity of the findings presented herein. Furthermore, there are other food security 
and health aspects and measures such as nutrition and obesity that may need to be 
interrogated using panel data given the restrictive nature and lockdowns associated 

















There is renewed interest in better understanding the  impact of social protection  on 
welfare in developing countries, particularly in Southern Africa due to increasing 
levels of poverty, devastating climate change induced suffering and collapse of 
family structures. It has also gained renewed prominence in the presence of 
unprecedented shocks such as that posed by COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic 
and the associated restrictive measures such as total national lockdowns imposed 
severe shocks to household income throwing many into food insecurity. These 
desperate situations create fear, anxiety, distress, and discomfort as well as 
deterioration of welfare to vulnerable members of society. For many, social 
protection is the only available coping strategy to ensure survival. 
   
Social protection in Southern Africa is diverse with complex and interesting 
dynamics characterized by, for example, formal social protection systems in South 
Africa, and informal initiatives in Zimbabwe that rely on traditional networks of 
family, neighbours and community. Both the formal and informal mechanisms aim 
to address deep-seated vulnerabilities through either cash transfers or social capital. 
This study empirically investigates the impact of social protection on welfare in 
Southern Africa with emphasis on South Africa and Zimbabwe. South Africa was 
chosen mainly because it is the only country in Southern Africa with a 
comprehensive formal protection system for children, the aged, disabled, war 
veterans and for those in need of social relief of distress; covering millions of 
beneficiaries. It was also chosen because it has proved to have been influential in the 
diffusion of social protection systems to neighbouring countries such as Lesotho and 
Eswatini, and it is a possible model for other relatively wealthier countries such as 
Botswana and Namibia. 
  
On the other hand, Zimbabwe was selected ahead of other Southern African 
countries because of the relative uniqueness of its circumstances characterized by 
weak and in some instances absent formal systems, a majority of people eking a 
living outside the formal sector with irregular, uncertain incomes and little to no 
chance of making any contributions towards social security as well as the prevalence 
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of informal social protection systems premised on behavioural principles of 
reciprocity, affective relationships, and community bonding. 
 
The study is comprised of three papers. First, and based on five waves of the 
nationally representative National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), the study 
assesses the impact of the Foster Care Grant on child health in South Africa. The 
Foster Care Grant is an unconditional cash transfer meant for vulnerable children 
whose families cannot provide them with a safe and nurturing environment. It is 
meant to provide temporary, substitute, away-from-home care to vulnerable children. 
Despite being comparatively generous, surprisingly the grant has not been subjected 
to rigorous evaluations and has not received much attention. It has been around for 
over 20 years, which when compared to many unconditional cash transfers in Africa, 
presents an interesting opportunity to better understand the long-term impact of 
unconditional cash transfers on child health. 
 
Second, based on 2015 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) 
survey data, the study investigates the impact of social capital on food security in 
Zimbabwe. Food insecurity is a perennial challenge for many households in 
Zimbabwe due to a number of potential reasons ranging from incessant droughts, 
other  climate-change related disasters such as tropical cyclones to land tenure as 
well as lack of sophistication in agricultural production and little research and 
development. Unlike South Africa with its comprehensive formal social protection 
system, Zimbabwean households are forced to fall back on their informal social 
protection systems characterized by self organization, reciprocity, family and 
community ties. Households and individuals self-organize themselves in social 
groups ranging from community associations, informal savings and loans 
associations, agricultural extension groups, credit unions for inputs, and burial 
societies. Benefits derived from being a member in these social groups include 
information sharing, learning from each other, pooling resources for production; 
among others. The relative uniqueness of circumstances in Zimbabwe makes it an 
interesting case to better understand the impact of social capital on food security. 
 
Finally, based on two waves of the National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus 
Rapid Mobile Survey (NIDS-CRAM), which is the first nationally representative 
panel data survey investigating the socioeconomic impacts of the national lockdown 
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in South Africa, the study assesses the impact of social protection and the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on hunger in South Africa. South Africa 
became the epicentre of COVID-19 in Africa and is continuing to record highest 
cumulative COVID-19 cases and deaths, which forced the authorities to adopt one of 
the most restrictive measures in a bid to contain the spread of the virus. The 
pandemic and the lockdown measures, in general, created fear, anxiety, distress, and 
discomfort as well as food insecurity.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.1 summarizes the empirical findings 
from the investigation of the impact of the Foster Care Grant in South Africa on 
child health, assessment of the impact of social capital on food security in 
Zimbabwe, and the impact of social protection and the Special COVID-19 Social 
Relief of Distress Grant on Hunger in South Africa. Informed by these findings, 
Section 5.2 concludes with policy implications. 
 
 
5.1 Summary of findings 
 
Chapter 2 provided an impact evaluation of the Foster Care Grant on child health in 
South Africa. The findings from Propensity Score Matching, Correlated Random 
Effects, and Hybrid models employed indicate that there is a positive and significant 
program intensity impact on height-for-age for children in South Africa (children 
aged 0-14 years), for children aged 1-4 years, and for children aged 5-9 years. 
However, this program intensity effect on height-for-age does not cascade to 
children aged 10-14 years and neither is there a significant program intensity impact 
on weight-for-age and body mass index for all ages.  
 
Disaggregating by gender, the results show that there is a positive and significant 
program intensity impact for boys in all age categories including even children aged 
10-14 years, and a positive and significant program intensity impact on weight-for-
age for boys aged 1-4 years. However, there is no program intensity impact on 
height-for-age, weight-for-age, and body mass index for girls. On the other hand, the 
findings indicate that the grant has a significant program impact on height-for-age 
for children in South Africa; and even after paying particular attention to gender 
heterogeneity, there is a positive and significant program impact on height-for-age 
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for both boys and girls. However, the program effect is not experienced by children 
aged 10-14 years. Overall, the Foster Care Grant has an impact on height-for-age for 
children in South Africa.  
 
Chapter 3 provided an assessment of the impact of social capital on food security in 
Zimbabwe. The findings show that households with social capital are more food 
secure. Specifically, households with members belonging to a social group are less 
likely to engage in demanding, psychologically stressful behavioural hunger-coping 
strategies such as skipping meals, limiting portion size of meals, and reducing 
number of meals eaten. Households with members belonging to a social group have 
a 7 percentage point lower chance of experiencing a day with no food to eat, a 4 
percentage point lower chance of going to sleep at night hungry, a 5 percentage point 
lower chance of limiting portion size of meals and a 5 percentage point lower chance 
of reducing number of meals eaten; compared with households without social 
capital. Furthermore, households with members belonging to a social group are more 
likely to seek and receive agricultural extension services than those without members 
belonging to a social group. For example, social capital increases the chances of 
receiving agricultural training, seeking crop advice, and treating harvests against 
post-harvest losses by 23, 17, and 14 percentage points, respectively. These results 
have important policy implications. For a country with weak formal social protection 
systems as well as recurrently experiencing climatic shocks ranging from droughts to 
devastating tropical cyclones, self organization, reciprocity and informal, traditional 
social protection systems in the form of social capital ensure food security. 
  
Finally, Chapter 4 provided an impact evaluation of social protection and the Special 
COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant on hunger in South Africa. In an attempt 
to curb the spread of the coronavirus, South Africa was forced to institute drastic and 
extremely restrictive measures, resulting in severe shocks to income and food 
security. The government then had to introduce a number of temporary social and 
economic relief interventions.  Chapter 4 therefore answers whether these 
interventions introduced by government have an impact on hunger in South Africa 
given the severe shocks to incomes and the prolonged restrictive and stringent 
lockdown measures. The findings indicate that receiving a government grant reduces 
the likelihood of going hungry and running out of money to buy food by 6 and 12 
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percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, households with individuals receiving 
the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant have a lower chance of facing 
child hunger. However, the Special COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance Fund 
benefit does not have an impact on hunger and does not cushion individuals and 
households from running out of money to buy food. Finally, the findings indicate 
that although COVID-19 pandemic has put pressure on food security in South 
Africa, there is no heterogeneity on hunger between those that were screened or 
tested for COVID-19 and those who were not.  
 
 
5.2 Policy Implications 
 
The Foster Care Grant has a significant impact on stunting for children in South 
Africa. This is a very important conclusion for South Africa, a country with 3.7 
million children who are orphaned and in need of care and where 27 percent of 
children are stunted. The findings show that the program contributes to the health of 
children but does not add to the problem of obesity that is prevalent in South Africa. 
This is an important finding too, considering that 13.5 percent of children aged 
between 6 and 14 years in South Africa are overweight and obese; a figure that is 
way above the 10 percent global prevalence in school children. Furthermore, the fact 
that there is no program intensity and program impact on weight-for-age but on 
height-for-age means that the program appeals to the long term human capital 
development as opposed to the short-term changes in nutritional status. 
  
On the other hand, the finding that the program has no effect on children aged 10-14 
years has important policy implications. Since the Foster Care Grant is awarded 
initially for two years with a possibility of extension for another two years, for health 
outcomes considerations, then preference for extension should be given to children 
younger than 10 years. Related, where circumstances allow, and when it does not 
lead to gender inequality to program access, preference for extension should be 
given to boys since there is no program intensity impact for girls (there is no further 
marginal impact for girls who receive the grant twice compared to those that receive 
it only once). Boys experience both significant program and program intensity 
impacts. There may also be need for further research to better understand why there 
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is no further marginal impact of the program for girls and to ascertain whether this 
does not imply gender heterogeneity to care of foster children by foster parents. 
 
On the other hand, the conclusion that social capital in the form of membership to 
social groups increases food security in Zimbabwe has important policy implications 
too. Interventions to ensure food security in Zimbabwe can ride on social groups to 
leverage on the benefits such as information sharing, learning from each other, and 
pooling of resources for production that members draw from their social groups. As 
much as community based food and nutrition interventions should cater for those 
suffering from food insecurity, the success of such interventions may depend on how 
the intended beneficiaries evaluate the collective functioning of their society. For a 
country with weak formal social protection systems in place, any deliberate efforts to 
prop-up social capital can help in improving the welfare of its people. 
     
Finally, government grants are a cushion to hunger during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Given the nature of restrictions adopted in a bid to curb the spread of the virus, they 
may be the only coping strategy available to the vulnerable and as such governments 
should ensure their continued existence. For example, the Special COVID-19 Social 
Relief of Distress Grant was initially for six months from May to October 2020 and 
was extended for another three months to January 2021. The South African 
government should seriously consider extending the life of the grant especially 
considering that it has a significant impact on child hunger. There is need, however, 
to pay particular attention to each type of social protection and its accessibility to 
minimize irregularities and ensure that its effect on welfare is maximized. To gain 
further understanding of the dynamics between social protection programs and 
welfare during crisis periods such as posed by COVID-19 and its effects in the 
medium- and long-term, there is need for further studies. There is scope for further 
studies interrogating what happens to other food security and health aspects and 
measures such as nutrition and obesity that may be importantly affected by COVID-
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